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ABSTRACT 
 
B. Josh Doty: The Anatomy of Conscience: Science, Ethics, and Religion in Nineteenth-Century 
American Literature 
(Under the direction of Jane F. Thrailkill) 
 
 
 “The Anatomy of Conscience” examines how nineteenth-century American fiction 
figures a trajectory between Revolutionary physician Benjamin Rush’s speculations about a 
citizenry physiologically optimized for virtuous self-governance to physician and novelist Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, Sr.’s postbellum vision of a reformed ethics and theology informed by the 
biological theory of heredity. It argues that a rarely-linked group of novelists—Hannah Foster, 
Charles Brockden Brown, Robert Montgomery Bird, Herman Melville, and Holmes—use fiction 
to imagine into being new ethical and theological worlds inspired by emerging biological ideas.   
During the roughly hundred years separating Rush and Holmes, writers represented how 
new biological ideas transformed humans from blank slates capable of stunning moral change to 
beings burdened by the moral weight of not only their own bodies but those of their ancestors, 
preserved through the biological mechanism of heredity. Tracing writers’ fictionalization of the 
biological developments that took place between Rush and Holmes reveals the ways that 
literature intervened in myriad debates about emerging modes of understanding vice, virtue, and 
sin. Fiction, by transforming, testing, and disseminating these debates, shaped them even as they 
dramatized them. In doing so, I argue, it gave form to the materialist turn of the twentieth century 
by locating vice and virtue in terms that are as much physiological as they are moral, legal, or 
theological.  
   
 
iv 
 
 
 
 
To Katie 
   
 
v 
 
 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
No man is an island, least of all the dissertator. I am grateful to have many people to 
thank for their contributions to this project. My foremost intellectual debt is to my director, Jane 
Thrailkill, whose rigor, clarity of thought, and generosity has been a model of scholarly 
excellence since my first semester at UNC. As a student in her seminars, I learned how to 
analyze the reciprocities among literature, philosophy, and science; as a teaching assistant in her 
medical humanities course, I learned the pedagogical value of wit, patience, and vision. My 
committee members have been dedicated interlocutors. Eliza Richards has from the beginning 
pushed me to develop the clarity, concision, and scope of my writing; Chapters 2 and 4 began as 
seminar papers written for her classes. It is under her tutelage that I honed my historicist 
methodology. Matt Taylor has been a dependable source of encouragement and productive 
critique since the beginning stages of the project; in his literary theory seminar I encountered 
thinkers who are foundational to my theoretical orientation. Timothy Marr is dynamo of 
intellectual energy whose deep knowledge of all things Melville significantly improved Chapter 
3. John McGowan has provided generous and wise counsel throughout.  
Outside of my committee, I owe Philip Gura an immense debt for introducing me to early 
American religious and intellectual history. James Thompson’s theory of the novel seminar 
allowed me to test ideas about the intersection of food and philosophy that culminated in Chapter 
3; his feedback continued to shape my argument long after the course ended. And Heidi Kim, in 
her role as my job placement advisor, has been a savvy, forthright, and kind advocate. At 
Mississippi State University, Richard Raymond provided a model of graciousness, generosity, 
   
 
vi 
thoughtfulness, and kindness in the classroom that continues to inform my pedagogy. The late 
Noel Polk, inimitable Faulkner scholar and editor, taught me to take my ideas and writing 
seriously. At Auburn University, Erich Nunn gave needed lessons on the norms and mores of the 
academy. Don Wehrs has for years been a mentor and advocate; I first began thinking seriously 
about the links among literature, ethics, religion, and science in conversations with him. 
Significantly different versions of the arguments made in Chapters 2 and 3 appeared or are 
appearing in Early American Literature and Leviathan: A Journal of Melville Studies, 
respectively; I thank Sandra Gustafson, Samuel Otter, Brian Yothers, and my anonymous readers 
for their generous feedback and suggestions. I also wish to thank the UNC Graduate School for a 
yearlong dissertation completion fellowship that provided time to complete the project.  
 My friends—fonts of humor and camaraderie all—have enriched my time at UNC. The 
Nineteenth-Century Americanist writing group workshopped several drafts of Chapters 2 and 3. I 
am grateful to Emma Calabrese, Vera Foley, Leslie McAbee, and Kym Weed for their many 
critiques and contributions. Friends not at UNC have been pillars of support and welcome 
respites from the academy: I especially thank Corey Bishop, Steele Campbell, and Erin Clyburn.  
 I wish to thank my parents, Danny Doty and Diane Doty, for years of encouragement. I 
also wish to thank my in-laws, John Meersman, Jean Meersman, and Colleen Meersman, for 
welcoming me into their family. My dog, Darwin, has been a boundless source of fun, laughter, 
and companionship and enlivened my hours spent writing. 
 My wife, Katie Meersman, deserves my deepest gratitude. Through the years she has 
provided endless love, encouragement, and support, and she has been a peerless editor. Every 
idea that follows was nourished and revised in conversations with her, and for that and more she 
has my eternal love. 
   
 
vii 
 
 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................... 1 
CHAPTER ONE: “‘THE EMPIRE OF MECHANICAL AND HABITUAL  
IMPULSES’: HANNAH FOSTER, CHARLES BROCKDEN BROWN, AND HABIT ........... 13 
A Settled Habit.......................................................................................................................... 17 
Bad Habits................................................................................................................................. 27 
A Reformed Rake ..................................................................................................................... 31 
The Empire of Mechanical and Habitual Impulses................................................................... 40 
Moralizing on the Tale.............................................................................................................. 47 
CHAPTER TWO: BETWEEN VICE AND DISEASE: MORAL INSANITY,  
SHEPPARD LEE, AND THE ETHICS OF EMBODIMENT...................................................... 49 
A Perfectly Sound Judgment .................................................................................................... 55 
The Limitations of Human Responsibility................................................................................ 67 
Causes and Influences Purely Physical..................................................................................... 72 
The Popular Actor..................................................................................................................... 81 
Coda: Comedy and Interpretation............................................................................................. 92 
CHAPTER THREE: DIGESTING MOBY-DICK: STOMACH, BRAIN, AND TEXT .............. 94 
The Most Varied of All Diseases.............................................................................................. 99 
Manufacturing Mind and Soul ................................................................................................ 107 
The Sins of Indigestion ........................................................................................................... 116 
Stomachs and Sharks .............................................................................................................. 129 
   
 
viii 
Vengeance on a Dumb Brute .................................................................................................. 135 
A Very Long Night’s Digestion.............................................................................................. 140 
CHAPTER FOUR: TRICKS OF THE BLOOD: HEREDITY, CALVINISM,  
AND THE LIMITS OF RESPONSIBILITY IN OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES................... 142 
Like Begets Like ..................................................................................................................... 149 
Hereditary Corruption............................................................................................................. 159 
A Palpable Outside Agency .................................................................................................... 167 
Inherited Impulses................................................................................................................... 177 
CODA: MORAL INTERVENTIONS........................................................................................ 192 
WORKS CITED ......................................................................................................................... 194 
 
 
 
  
1 
 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 “The Anatomy of Conscience” examines how nineteenth-century American fiction 
figures a trajectory between Revolutionary physician Benjamin Rush’s speculations about a 
citizenry physiologically optimized for virtuous self-governance to physician and novelist Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, Sr.’s postbellum vision of a reformed ethics and theology informed by the 
biological theory of heredity. It argues that a rarely-linked group of novelists—Hannah Foster, 
Charles Brockden Brown, Robert Montgomery Bird, Herman Melville, and Holmes—use fiction 
to imagine into being new ethical and theological worlds inspired by emerging biological ideas. 
Rush’s numerous postrevolutionary essays posit citizens’ ethical capacities as almost infinitely 
moldable and therefore available to governance: he views the new republic as an opportunity for 
enlightened social policy to create a morally perfect nation. Holmes, conversant with mid-
nineteenth-century theories of heredity, understands humans’ ethical capacities as inflected and 
limited by their ancestry. Rather than follow Rush and alter the individual to fit society, a task he 
believes to be a lost cause, he wishes to fit society to the range of moral capabilities heredity 
affords. During the roughly hundred years separating these two iconic American physicians, 
writers represented how new biological ideas transformed humans from blank slates capable of 
stunning moral change to beings burdened by the moral weight of not only their own bodies but 
those of their ancestors, preserved through the biological mechanism of heredity. Tracing 
writers’ fictionalization of the biological developments that took place between Rush and 
Holmes reveals the ways that literature intervened in myriad debates about emerging modes of 
understanding vice, virtue, and sin. Fiction, by transforming, testing, and disseminating these 
  
2 
debates, shaped them even as they dramatized them. In doing so, I argue, it gave form to the 
materialist turn of the twentieth century by locating vice and virtue in terms that are as much 
physiological as they are moral, legal, or theological.  
 This dissertation contends that the emergence of physiology as a way of understanding 
cognition and behavior in the late eighteenth century, which sparked ethical and religious 
controversies that played out on a broad literary-cultural stage through the Civil War, provoked 
problems that were depicted and addressed in fiction. Writers figured how nineteenth-century 
physiological thinking—incarnated in both “professional” disciplines such as lab physiology and 
“popular” disciplines such as phrenology—imagined humans as subject to (and comprised of) a 
variety of historically and culturally specific somatic phenomena, including nervous tension, 
inherited moral character, over- or under-developed phrenological bumps, and vibrations of the 
nervous fluid. As “nervousness,” the belief that the nerves bind mind and body into an 
ontological whole, came to “characterize[] the basic psychological assumption of the century,” 
then, fiction depicted consequent ethical, theological, and legal controversies about sleepwalking 
killers, the insanity defense, and a purportedly hereditary criminal class developed (Murison 2). 
In doing so, it made physiology’s repercussions for ethics and religion a matter of popular 
concern.  
Through chapters centered on novels by Charles Brockden Brown, Hannah Foster, 
Robert Montgomery Bird, Herman Melville, and Oliver Wendell Holmes Sr., I argue that 
literature, particularly novels, was crucial in articulating these medico-philosophical ideas and 
debates for a wide audience. When Benjamin Rush sought to shape Americans of the early 
republic into “republican machines” physiologically optimized for virtuous self-governance, 
Brockden Brown’s Wieland and Foster’s The Coquette expressed doubt about such a project by 
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depicting the ethical morass to which it might lead. Likewise, Bird’s Sheppard Lee (1836) 
dramatizes conservative fears that the emergence of physiological theories of mental disease in 
the 1830s would erase personal responsibility by depicting a protagonist who draws on the 
language of medicine to exculpate himself of responsibility for his actions. Yet in the following 
decades, dietary reformers tied moral character to digestive health: Melville draws on their ideas 
in his characterization of the Pequod’s crew (and their stomachs), in doing so supporting 
reformers’ insistence on the primacy of the body in moral life. Holmes by the 1880s wrote two 
novels that depict their subjects in terms of the science of heredity; the plots of these novels 
articulate a naturalistic doctrine of original sin, setting in motion an ideology of moral disability 
that would underwrite both the (progressive) insanity defense and the (regressive) pseudo-
science of eugenics. Nineteenth-century novelists, I argue, built narrative laboratories in which 
biology’s metaphysical repercussions were not only tested but transformed, creating ways to 
explore new and controversial moral worlds. 
By arguing that fiction written by Foster, Holmes, and others use narrative elements such 
as plot, figuration, and characterization to intervene in contemporary ethical controversies, this 
project argues for considering the relationship between narrative and ethics in historicist terms. 
Most scholarship on narrative and ethics, since the 1990s heavily indebted to the 
phenomenological ethics of Martin Buber and Emmanuel Levinas, argues that narrative itself is a 
form of ethics, an argument that typically entails defining the novel as a genre unique in its 
ethical capabilities. By emphasizing character psychology and social relations, and by focusing 
on the particularities of human subjectivity, a representative claim might go, novels can assuage 
and even prevent the ethical harm caused by the categorizations we inflict on each other: racism, 
sexism, classism, etc. Narrative, writes Adam Zachary Newton, is ethically powerful because it 
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“creates an immediacy and force, framing relations of provocation, call, and response that bind 
narrator and listener, author and character, or reader and text” (13). Martha Nussbaum claims 
that narrative "searches for patterns of possibility—of choice and circumstance, and the 
interaction between choice and circumstance—that turn up in human lives with such a 
persistence that they must be regarded as our possibilities" (171). One of the tasks of the critic, 
then, would be to explicate the narrative “relations” (Newton) and “patterns” (Nussbaum) that 
frame the sorts of ethical values that are so persistent throughout time that they remain relevant 
for current-day readers. The works found in most “Great Books” curricula are thought to have 
lasting moral value because they provide insight into immutable, persistent aspects of the human 
condition. Yet addressing only those ethical relations, patterns, and values that remain legible to 
twenty-first-century sensibilities tends either to neglect historically particular modes of ethical 
expression or to distort them into more comfortable or familiar current-day forms. Attending to 
the ways that nineteenth-century American fiction addresses contemporary ethical problems and 
controversies with narrative provides a new way of thinking about the relationship between 
narrative and ethics that is, compared to the narrative ethics practiced by Newton and Nussbaum, 
more historically grounded—and, in this dissertation, more attentive to the body. 
Instead of arguing for nineteenth-century American literature’s enduring moral value, this 
dissertation traces how writers such as Bird and Melville use fiction as a way to participate in 
and shape the ethical and theological debates attendant to the emergence of physiology. Taking 
what Lorraine Daston calls “historical epistemology” as the foundation of my historicist 
methodology, I investigate how these debates arise from multiple, competing ways of 
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conceptualizing such ideas as virtue, culpability, and sin (282).1 I analyze fiction’s engagements 
with emerging ethical and theological concepts not as part a Whiggish history of progression 
towards a more enlightened, more sophisticated, more scientific, or otherwise “better” set of 
stories or values but as vibrant, historically particular conceptual assemblages with no intrinsic 
telos. Likewise, I read physiology and the numerous popular sciences kin to it not as agents of a 
historically transcendent heteropatriarchal, imperial, hegemonic oppression, which extracts 
science from the social and epistemological conditions of its time, or as reductivist and thus 
antithetical to humanist inquiry, but as an important parts of culture, including the novels that are 
the subject of this dissertation.2  
Each chapter treats a set of texts that contributed or responded to a historically specific 
problem regarding new physiological ideas’ repercussions for ethics and religion. The first 
chapter focuses on how novels written by Hannah Foster and Charles Brockden Brown figure 
eighteenth-century theories of habit expressed by John Locke, Benjamin Rush, Benjamin 
Franklin, and early criminologists that rendered porous the previously impermeable conceptual 
division between voluntary and involuntary action. The second chapter addresses the ways that 
                                                
1 Daston writes that she understands historical epistemology as “the history of the categories that 
structure our thought, pattern our arguments and proofs, and certify our standards for 
explanation” (282). 
 
 
2 A number of critics take science as a point of origin for Foucauldian analyses of power. Joan 
Burbick, in her study of health discourses in nineteenth-century America, writes that “ruthless 
attempts are made to differentiate bodies into hierarchies of sexual, racial, and class differences” 
when the body emerges “as that which society must confront and explain” (3). “To read the 
narratives of the healthy body,” she continues, “is to begin to understand the relationships of 
power and subordination that societies attempt to render invisible” (3). In contrast, theorist Vicki 
Kirby urges humanists not to think of science as “a bad boy whose penetrative and instrumental 
logic must be distinguished from more poetic, creative, and generous curiosities” or as 
“inherently conservative” but as a way to limber up their anthropocentric views of the world (15, 
71). 
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Robert Montgomery Bird’s Sheppard Lee takes part in controversies arising from broadening 
definitions of mental disease and the insanity defense that were fostered by physicians such as 
Rush and James Cowles Prichard in the 1830s. In the third chapter, I examine how Herman 
Melville in Moby-Dick draws on contemporary physiological theories of the brain’s relationship 
to the stomach, popularized by dietary reformers such as Sylvester Graham, to characterize 
Ishmael, Queequeg, and even Moby Dick. The fourth chapter centers on how Holmes’s first two 
novels, Elsie Venner: A Romance of Destiny and The Guardian Angel, emplot the ethics of 
inherited moral debility, a latecentury concept that underwrites both a broadening of the idea of 
diminished moral capacity and the logic of eugenicism.  
By organizing the chapters this way, I situate literature among medical treatises, political 
speeches, and legal decisions as constitutive of the problems I examine. I read literary texts as 
doing what literary critic Jane Tompkins calls “cultural work,” or as “articulating and proposing 
solutions for the problems that shape a particular historical moment” and as “providing men and 
women with a means of ordering the world they inhabited” (xi, xiii). Literature, I argue, does not 
merely reflect the world but acts upon it by offering readers ways to think through and be 
affected by new modes of understanding ethics and religion. In turn, I read other textual genres 
through literary modes of analysis such as close reading and interpretation, particularly when 
seemingly stable concepts change as they pass through different disciplinary regimes or as they 
overlap with other concepts.  
“The Anatomy of Conscience” begins in the late eighteenth century, when the public was 
riveted by newspaper accounts of murders committed by sleepwalkers acting by force of habit. 
Habit, theorized by physicians as the bodily principle enabling automatic action, posed vexing 
questions about the body’s role in volition and responsibility that would reappear throughout the 
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nineteenth century. The dissertation’s first chapter, “‘The Empire of Mechanical and Habitual 
Impulses’: Habit and Responsibility in the Early American Republic,” examines how novels by 
Hannah Foster and Charles Brockden Brown emplot three recurring issues attendant to late 
eighteenth-century theories of habit: the body’s influence on behavior, the biological limits of 
responsibility, and the contested boundary between rationality and irrationality. This chapter 
traces how the plots of Foster’s and Brown’s novels depict the ethical uncertainties caused by the 
emergence of habit as a means of addressing morality and spirituality in the early republican 
context. To lay the historical groundwork for my literary analysis, I situate habit within the 
intersecting scientific, philosophical, and cultural fields it occupied, including John Locke’s 
associationism, David Hartley’s physiology, Rush’s pedagogy, Franklin’s self-improvement 
regimes, and early criminology. These fields are not as disparate as they may seem, for they are 
linked by habit as what Rush calls a “general law” of human nature. From Locke’s and Hartley’s 
speculations on habit’s role in physiology and psychology, I argue, habit became thinkable as a 
way of understanding how the machinery of human nature operates without conscious direction; 
it also became a way to imagine the body as open to conditioning such that vice and virtue might 
be automated.  
In The Coquette (1797), Lucy Freeman, who attempts to educate her friend Eliza 
Wharton on the dangers seducer Peter Sanford poses, articulates a consequentialist approach to 
habitual vice yet finds that her moral lectures are of no avail. But Foster creates a narrative that 
allows readers to experience and be affected by, albeit at a remove, the consequences of Eliza’s 
seduction. In Wieland (1798), Brown dramatizes how habit’s dissociation of action and intent 
makes it difficult to make sure assessments of moral accountability. For both writers, literary 
form reveals the ethical worlds habit makes available. Habit emerged as a way for Americans of 
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the early republic to understand their bodies’ automatic actions, and it made persons thinkable as 
simultaneously (and paradoxically, from a current-day perspective) as both moldable and fixed. 
An individual was malleable, free, and agential in that her very physical makeup was plastic and 
open to impression by experience; experience affected her physiology, altering, in Hartley’s 
neurophysiology, the vibrations of the infinitesimal particles suspended in her nervous fluid and 
enabling Rush’s hope that the new nation’s citizenry might be comprised of “republican 
machines.” Yet she was fixed, determined, and instinctual in that she was understood as 
habituated to and by her experiences and bound, in time, to her habits. In the context of this 
theory of human nature, to moralize—to interpret something as containing a moral lesson, as 
both Foster and Brown ask their readers to do—is to take into account how habit merges not only 
malleability and fixedness but also similar “oppositional concepts like freedom/determination, 
natural/artificial, active/passive, cause/effect, spontaneity/instinct, and agent/patient” (Sparrow 
and Hutchinson 4-5).  
The second chapter, “Between Vice and Disease: Moral Insanity, Sheppard Lee, and the 
Ethics of Embodiment,” argues that Sheppard Lee, by physician Robert Montgomery Bird, 
addresses a set of ethical quandaries that arose when neurophysiology took habit’s place as a 
way of explaining automatic behavior in the early nineteenth century. The novel’s protagonist 
can invest his consciousness into any corpse he touches; he finds that each body carries within it 
an innate physiological character that changes his natural affections and instincts. In the novel he 
jumps from body to body, all the while, echoing the somnambulant murderers, blaming his 
actions on his (borrowed) flesh. I tie Lee’s actions to controversies surrounding moral insanity, a 
mental disease that, like Lee’s serial embodiment, disorders one’s temperament but not one’s 
intellect. Physicians such as Benjamin Rush and James Cowles Prichard used moral insanity to 
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argue that that one can be rational but still insane, contrary to prevailing medical and legal 
viewpoints. These physicians and the legal theorists who sought to integrate their arguments into 
criminal law raised questions about how to distinguish between insane persons and those who act 
in unusual or undesirable ways but are still sane. Yet many Americans found new theories of 
insanity productive of ethical and legal grey areas susceptible to abuse by criminals who would 
attribute their actions to insanity. I argue that Sheppard Lee reprises popular fears that moral 
insanity would eliminate responsibility.  
In the third chapter, “Digesting Moby-Dick: Stomach, Brain, and Text,” I argue that 
Herman Melville’s Moby-Dick figures the ethical aspects of midcentury dietary reform by 
characterizing the Pequod’s crew in terms of their ingestion and digestion. I claim that in doing 
so, Moby-Dick’s characters enact the philosophical, religious, and racial repercussions of dietary 
reform. Attending to digestion in Moby-Dick, I claim, illuminates how the novel counters 
Emersonian hopes of transcending the body by affirming its centrality to moral life. The chapter 
draws on a rich archive of texts on diet and digestion. By the 1840s and 50s, many Americans, 
moved by the midcentury spirit of reform embodied by women’s clothing reformers, 
prohibitionists, and utopian communes such as Brook Farm, looked favorably upon biological 
ideas as a way to better the nation and its citizens. It is within this milieu that dietary reform 
emerged as a means of physiological self-management. Antebellum physiology envisioned 
neural and alimentary structures as anatomically and functionally linked, joined by the 
“sympathetic nerve” (now termed the vagus nerve) stretching from brain to stomach. Eating the 
right food, physicians and reformers alike reasoned, makes for a healthy brain; conversely, a 
stomach irritated by improper digestion might disorder the brain and corrode the mind. This view 
was held by a diverse group including dietary reformers, cookbook authors, and physicians: 
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while domestic guides such as Catharine Beecher’s popular Treatise on Domestic Economy 
(1841) urged the centrality of food to mental function, medical works such as Wilson Philip’s 
Treatise on Indigestion and its Consequences, Called Nervous and Bilious Complaints (1824) 
and James Johnson’s Essays on the Morbid Sensibility of the Stomach and Bowels (1827) and 
popular dietary reform movements such as Grahamism emphasized that common digestive 
troubles could lead to insanity. These and other writings argue that attending to one’s digestion 
by carefully monitoring the circumstances of one’s ingestion—specifically, what is ingested and 
in what manner—is the best way to maintain healthy mental function. Moby-Dick, I argue, 
makes salient questions about the philosophical, religious, and racial aspects of connecting diet 
and the mind in this way. 
Whereas earlier chapters argue that novels by writers such as Brown and Bird express 
anxiety about the physiological limits of responsibility, “Tricks of the Blood: Heredity, 
Calvinism, and the Limits of Responsibility in Oliver Wendell Holmes, Sr.,” the final chapter, 
argues that Oliver Wendell Holmes, Sr.’s first two novels, Elsie Venner (1861) and The 
Guardian Angel (1867) find in those limits a basis for a truer understanding of God’s justice and 
mercy. I argue that his novels take heredity (understood in biological terms) as foundational to 
the personalities and behavior of the characters that are their subjects, Elsie Venner and Myrtle 
Hazard. Both characters act in socially undesirable ways due to the constraints their heredity 
places upon them, but in both novels wise, medically trained characters and kindhearted 
ministers alike counsel that they be treated with sympathy and not be held fully responsible for 
their actions. I argue that this figuration of heredity critiques the doctrine of original sin, 
illuminating the conditions under which heredity became thinkable as a way to address ethical 
and theological issues in the late nineteenth century. I claim that Holmes’s novels, written on the 
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cusp of the Darwinian revolution, address how biological heredity might mitigate moral 
responsibility; further, I argue that doing so makes possible a set of ways of thinking about 
descent, destiny, and morality later used by eugenicists, although Holmes had no commitment to 
the cultural or political aims of the eugenicists themselves. In his novels’ exculpation of 
individuals driven by their heredity to vice of responsibility, they implicitly suggest that others 
should assume responsibility for them, opening the door to imagining inheritors of less desirable 
traits as best managed by a supposed hereditary elite. But the novels differs from eugenicist 
thought, I argue, in two respects: first, they address unwanted or dangerous inherited tendencies 
as treatable rather than as immutable parts of a person’s being; second, they depict such 
tendencies as the province of the community and individual rather than the state. Holmes’s 
novels thus depict heredity as powerful enough an influence that it limits human responsibility 
but not so powerful that it totally determines individuals’ moral capacities. By displacing the 
heredity of original sin with the heredity of biological science, they articulate a view of 
inheritance that allows for the amelioration of transmitted traits, giving form to a pliable heredity 
historically and conceptually situated between the twin hereditary determinisms of Calvinism 
and eugenics. I argue that Holmes’s shift from the allegorical mode in Elsie Venner to the realist 
mode in The Guardian Angel enables him to frame the latter novel as a narrative experiment 
whose results are applicable not only to the narrative’s characters but to the reader. When 
Holmes turns to the realist mode in The Guardian Angel, he adopts the authority of biology. He 
also, by putting the ethical and theological repercussions of that biology into narrative form, 
transforms it into new conceptual structures and disseminates them to the public. Drawing on 
Holmes’s early religious training and familiarity with Calvinist doctrine, I conclude that his 
novels do not diminish Christianity but rather articulate a version of it more in keeping with the 
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rule of their depiction of a just God. In this vision, the distinctions between science, ethics, and 
religion that obtained earlier in the century disperse.  
The dissertation ends with a brief coda that connects nineteenth-century Americans’ 
attempts to navigate embodiment’s repercussions for ethics and religion with the current-day 
cultural changes arising from neuroscientific research. I identify fiction as a way to think through 
the new modes of ethical and religious being that neuroscience makes available. 
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CHAPTER ONE: “‘THE EMPIRE OF MECHANICAL AND HABITUAL IMPULSES’: 
HANNAH FOSTER, CHARLES BROCKDEN BROWN, AND HABIT 
 
“We are subject, by a general law in our natures, to what is called habit. Now, if the study of the 
Scriptures be necessary to our happiness at any time of our life, the sooner we begin to read 
them, the more we shall probably be attached to them; for it is peculiar to all the acts of habit, to 
become easy, strong, and agreeable by repetition.” 
Benjamin Rush, “A Defense of the Use of the Bible as a School Book” (1791) 
 
 When Benjamin Rush wrote to Jeremy Belknap, a Boston minister and historian, 
advocating integrating the Bible into school curricula, he founded his case on the power of habit, 
by which repetition makes an action “easy, strong, and agreeable” (93). To a twenty-first century 
sensibility, such a conception of habit might seem familiar, for in our own time we too 
understand a habit as a behavior made easy and ingrained by repetition. But for Rush, signer of 
the Declaration of Independence and the most prominent physician of the early American 
republic, habit is not only a way of training behavior but also a fact of the body, “a general law in 
our natures” to which humans “are subject” (93). Habit, in Rush’s understanding, does not 
describe a fixed, repeated action but rather the body’s tendency to transform freely chosen, 
voluntary actions into actions that become pleasantly automatic (“easy, strong, and agreeable”) 
over time (93). Further, habit is for Rush a solution to what he views as one of the greatest 
questions facing the new nation: how improve the morals of the citizenry, making them fit to 
participate in self-governance. He hopes, ultimately, to harness citizens’ physiology to form 
them into “republican machines” who, being automatically virtuous, would “perform their parts 
  
14 
properly, in the great machine of the government of the state” (“Education” 14-15).3 
 In this chapter I argue that Hannah Foster’s The Coquette (1797) and Charles Brockden 
Brown’s Wieland (1798) make salient a set of debates consequent to Rush’s theory of automated 
virtue and other contemporary efforts to link ethics with emerging conceptions of habit, 
including those of Benjamin Franklin and early criminologists. Although Rush and Franklin both 
view habit as a way to automate virtue, Colleen Terrell argues, they differ as to habitual actions’ 
ethical content (123). For Rush, who writes that “the mechanical effects of HABIT upon virtue, 
have not been sufficiently explored,” at times “virtues have been assumed by accident, or 
necessity, which have become real from habit, and afterwards derive their nourishment from the 
heart” (“Physical” 30). Here Rush implicitly distinguishes between virtues that begin as habits 
and then become “real,” thereafter drawing “their nourishment from the heart,” and those that 
remain “mechanical” (30). For Rush, the ethical content of a virtuous habit thus lies partly in 
whether it is nourished by the heart, or its emotional aspects. But Franklin makes no distinction 
between real or unreal, authentic or inauthentic, actions: what matters for him are an action’s 
consequences, not its motivations. Another set of ethical issues arose concerning those who, like 
“republican machines” running in reverse, habitually practice vice. Such “habitual criminals,” I 
argue, provoked epistemological and ethical quandaries about the influence of bodily processes 
on behavior, the biological limits of responsibility, and the malleability of human nature. If habit 
                                                
3 For Rush, goodness begins with citizens’ bodies. He states in a speech on “physical causes 
upon the moral faculty,” dedicated to Benjamin Franklin and given to the American 
Philosophical Society in 1786, that he is “fully persuaded” that with the judicious use of habit, 
diet, and other modes of affecting the human body “which operate at once upon the reason, the 
moral faculty, the passions, the senses, the brain, the nerves, the blood and the heart, it is 
possible to produce such a change in [a man’s] moral character, as shall raise him to a 
resemblance of angels—nay more, to the likeness of GOD himself (37). For Rush, habit is one of 
the tools by which an individual’s very physical substance (“the brain, the nerves, the blood and 
the heart”) might be altered in ways that render him Godlike—and, in his theory of government, 
a better republican.  
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describes a law of human nature by which voluntary actions become involuntary through 
repetition, then habitual vice presents the issue of whether it is fair to punish individuals for 
actions out of their control; the fault, if any, would lie in having acquired the habit at all. 
Through readings of Hannah Foster’s The Coquette and Charles Brockden Brown’s Wieland, Or, 
The Transformation, I claim that fiction of the early republic offers imaginative spaces in which 
readers can inhabit these issues. Both works are seduction novels, generically inclined towards 
the instructive dissection of vice. And both narratives, I argue, identify habit as the principle 
animating the actions of the antagonists (Foster’s glib, lecherous Peter Sanford and Brown’s 
enigmatic Carwin). Foster and Brown dramatize questions about the ethical content of habit in 
ways that echo Franklin and Rush, respectively: Foster’s narrative, like Franklin’s 
Autobiography, locates virtue and vice in the result of actions, no matter their motivation, 
whereas Brown’s narrative dramatizes the Rushian epistemological quandaries of distinguishing 
between actions actuated by pure mechanical habit and those “real” actions motivated by the 
heart.  
 My argument proceeds in four sections. The first situates late eighteenth-century ideas 
about habit’s ethical facets within earlier speculations about its role in bodily and mental 
processes.4 From Locke, whose associationism locates habit as the bridge between sensation and 
perception, I turn to David Hartley, whose neurology identifies it as a force altering the 
                                                
4 I view late eighteenth-century theories of habit as part of the larger contemporary turn from 
theological to naturalistic discourses in eighteenth-century America described by Eric Goldman 
(45). The turn, he argues, “reversed the theological tendency to translate physical and mental 
facts into abstract moral and spiritual terms,” yet I view habit in the 1790s as constituted in both 
naturalistic and moral terms. 
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miniscule “particles” suspended in the nervous fluid (I: 39).5 I then focus on the transference of 
these English ideas to the American context, resulting in the hope of harnessing habit for the 
social good of the fledgling republic.6 The transference (and transformation) of ideas from 
Europe to America is a major theme in the story this dissertation tells; American thinkers 
throughout the nineteenth century were keen to turn the transatlantic exchange of scientific ideas 
to their own social ends. The second section details the role habit plays in eighteenth-century 
theories of crime and vice, which, I argue, owe as much to Hartley’s conception of habit as 
Locke’s. I show that these theories conceptualized habitual crime as contagious; preventing 
crime, then, meant controlling the spread of “bad” habits such as drinking and patronizing 
prostitutes. The third section argues that novels allowed Americans of the early republic to 
encounter and work through contemporary ethical debates about habit. Through a reading of The 
Coquette, I demonstrate that fiction provides readers with the experience of habitual vice, 
                                                
5 Hartley works from a Cartesian conception of nerve anatomy that views nerves as hollow 
tubules filled with fluid. For studies of Hartley’s anatomical and physiological theories, see 
especially Richard C. Allen, David Hartley on Human Nature (Albany: State University of New 
York Press), 1999 and Barbera Bowen Oberg, “David Hartley and the Association of Ideas,” 
Journal of the History of Ideas 37: 441-54. For studies of Locke’s theories of psychology, see 
especially Galen Strawson, Locke on Personal Identity: Consciousness and Concernment 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press), 2011; Peter Anstey, John Locke and Natural Philosophy 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press), 2011; and Antonia LoLordo, Locke’s Moral Man (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press), 2012. 
 
 
6 For comprehensive studies of how late eighteenth-century theories of the nerves worked in 
European and American culture, see especially Stephen Gaukroger, The Collapse of Mechanism 
and the Rise of Sensibility: Science and the Shaping of Modernity, 1680-1760 (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press), 2010; G. S. Rousseau, Nervous Acts: Essays on Literature, Culture and 
Sensibility (New York: Palgrave Macmillan), 2004; Brain, Mind, and Medicine: Essays in 
Eighteenth-Century Neuroscience, eds. Harry Whitaker, C. U. M. Smith, and Stanley Finger 
(New York: Springer), 2007; and Thomas Steele Hall, Ideas of Life and Matter: From the 
Enlightenment to the End of the Nineteenth Century (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), 
1969. 
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providing an inoculation of sorts against it.7 I argue that Foster’s narrative, providing a broadly 
consequentialist view of habit, dramatizes the infectiousness of habit without excusing actions 
actuated by it. The fourth section examines the epistemological challenges posed by habitual 
virtue and vice. I argue that Wieland’s narrative maze—its own habit of sundering the 
“connections between motive and act, intent and consequences”—recreates for readers the 
treacherous epistemological adventure of ascribing blame to habitual offenders. Narrative, I 
conclude, renders the abstractions of Locke, Rush, and others concrete and available to the 
reading public. 
A Settled Habit 
“Moral virtue,” writes Aristotle in the Nichomachean Ethics, is “the result of habit” (26). 
He believed that the nourishment of virtues through habit would allow individuals to flourish 
ethically and live fulfilled, admirable lives. This is to say that enlisting habit as an ally to moral 
improvement was by no means a concept exclusive to the late eighteenth century. But what 
Aristotle understood as habit and what thinkers of the eighteenth century understood as habit are 
different concepts: to understand eighteenth-century conceptions of habit solely as offshoots or 
reflections of classical conceptions is to extricate them from the historical and cultural concerns 
from which they arose. In what follows I argue that Franklin and Rush’s notion of habit emerged 
                                                
7 Novel-reading was by no means universally regarded as a tool for moral improvement in the 
early republic. Thomas Jefferson was famously anxious about novels: “A great obstacle to good 
education,” he writes Nathaniel Burwell Monticello in March 1818, “is the inordinate passion 
prevalent for novels, and the time lost in that reading which should be instructively employed. 
When this poison infects the mind, it destroys its tone and revolts it against wholesome reading. 
Reason and fact, plain and unadorned, are rejected. Nothing can engage attention unless dressed 
in all the figments of fancy, and nothing so bedecked comes amiss. The result is a bloated 
imagination, sickly judgment, and disgust towards all the real businesses of life” (166). But he 
viewed novels based on true events (of which The Coquette is an example) differently: “This 
mass of trash, however, is not without some distinction; some few modelling their narratives, 
although fictitious, on the incidents of real life, have been able to make them interesting and 
useful vehicles of sound morality” (91). 
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from a specific nexus of historical and cultural circumstances that positioned it as a way to 
understand automatic action, the links among discrete mental processes, and the nature of the 
relationship between mind and body. “If,” philosophers Tom Sparrow and Adam Hutchinson 
write, “Cartesianism trades in a dualist metaphysics that regards mind and body, spirit and matter 
as distinct substances, and then assumes this basic dualism and its accounts of thought, passion, 
behavior, and action,” then “the philosophy of habit encourages us to conceive these phenomena 
as occurring between mind and body, spirit and matter” (4). It is therefore “indispensable for 
constructing a nondualist metaphysics along with new accounts of subjectivity” (4). In the 
context of the early American republic, habit provided a new account of subjectivity in which an 
individual was understood to be both plastic (able to form habits) and rigid (formed by habits). 
The thought of John Locke, the late seventeenth-century philosopher and education 
theorist whose ideas about habit’s role in binding discrete mental processes reverberates through 
the eighteenth century, created the epistemic conditions under which such new forms of 
subjectivity could coalesce. He identifies habit as guiding the “trains of motions in the animal 
spirits”: 
Custom settles habits of thinking in the understanding, as well as of determining in the 
will, and of motions in the body: all which seems to be but trains of motions in the animal 
spirits, which, once set a going, continue in the same steps they have been used to; which, 
by often treading, are worn into a smooth path, and the motion in it becomes easy, and as 
it were natural. As far as we can comprehend thinking, thus ideas seem to be produced in 
our minds; or, if they are not, this may serve to explain their following one another in an 
habitual train, when once they are put into their track, as well as it does to explain such 
motions of the body. (Essay 275) 
 
English physician Thomas Willis, one of Locke’s teachers at Oxford, theorized animal spirits 
(from anima, or soul) in De anime brutorum (1672) as minute substances that course through the 
body and allow the brain to communicate with the muscles (Yolton 163-64). The animal spirits 
travel via the nerves, structures that in Willis’s account (derived from that of Descartes) resemble 
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hollow tubes, and produce voluntary motion. For Locke, the motions of the animal spirits are 
what “settles" habits of thought, willful determination, and motion in the human body (275). He 
figures the nervous system as like a series of footpaths, some of which become worn and more 
easily traversable with use. And much as such footpaths only become more devoid of grass and 
more packed as more feed tread upon them, once a neural path begins to be worn it only 
becomes more so until the connection it forms seems “natural” (275).  
 Locke’s idea that an individual’s habits become part of his or her nature, echoed in his 
pedagogical treatise Some Thoughts Concerning Education (1693)—habits are “woven into the 
very principles of [a person’s] nature”—suggests that he views one’s nature as impressible by 
experience (44). Jay Fliegelman writes that a Lockean habit is thus “more than a reasoned act or 
an emotional response”: it is “second nature” (181). Habits, he writes, for Locke “more than 
formed man, it renatured him” (181). Part of habit’s property of shaping human nature is forming 
associative connections between discrete mental processes, making it so that one necessarily 
leads to another. In this way distinct processes such as sensation and judgment become so 
habitually aligned that one perceives them as the same phenomenon: 
This, in many cases by a settled habit in things, whereof we have frequent experience, is 
performed so constantly and so quick, that we take that for the perception of our 
sensation which is an idea formed by our judgment; so that one, viz. that of sensation, 
serves only to excite the other, and is scarce taken notice of itself;—as a man who reads 
or hears with attention and understanding, takes little notice of the characters or sounds, 
but of the ideas that are excited in him by them. (83) 
 
Habit causes sensation, defined by Locke as “an impression or motion, made in some part of the 
body, as produces some perception in the understanding” to seem the same as judgment, which 
confers meaning to perception (60). Thus the motions of the animal spirits that comprise certain 
sensations, in Locke’s psychology the most basic elements of mental experience, over time 
produce smooth paths to certain judgments, e.g. how one automatically perceives the symbol 
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“&” to mean the word “and” without having to take the time to consciously find it in one’s 
memory. We perceive the world as we do, then, partly because we are in the habit of perceiving 
it so. Further, we make certain connections, draw certain conclusions, and make certain 
judgments not because they have some transcendental existence to be perceived but because 
experience, impressed upon the body through habit, leads us to do so. 
This psychology of habit provides an account of how voluntary actions and thoughts 
might become automatic, seemingly instinctual or part of a person’s nature, with repetition. Such 
actions also become pleasurable: 
Habits have powerful charms, and put so strong attractions of easiness and pleasure into 
what we accustom ourselves to, that we cannot forbear to do, or at least be easy in the 
omission of, actions, which habitual practice has suited, and thereby recommends to us. 
Though this be very visible, and every one's experience shows him he can do so; yet it is 
a part in the conduct of men towards their happiness, neglected to a degree, that it will be 
possibly entertained as a paradox, if it be said, that men can make things or actions more 
or less pleasing to themselves; and thereby remedy that, to which one may justly impute a 
great deal of their wandering. Fashion and the common opinion having settled wrong 
notions, and education and custom ill habits, the just values of things are misplaced, and 
the palates of men corrupted. Pains should be taken to rectify these; and contrary habits 
change our pleasures, and give a relish to that which is necessary or conducive to our 
happiness. (181) 
 
Locke’s view of habit as making actions not only easy and automatic but also pleasurable does 
not persist to any great degree today, but it is the cornerstone of his belief “that men can make 
things or actions more or less pleasing to themselves” through the conscious acquisition of 
habits. Such habits would not be the “ill habits” of “education and custom” but rather those that 
“give a relish to that which is necessary or conductive to our happiness” (181). In other words, 
he advocates undertaking programs of habit-building that will reshape the paths of the animal 
spirits and smooth the road to human happiness. His thought, then, combines a proto-
physiological account of habit-formation with a hope of personal and public melioration—a 
combination that, I argue, makes possible the habit-forming schemes of Rush and Franklin.  
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 This is not to argue that Rush, for example, at some point read An Essay Concerning 
Human Understanding and decided to found his ideas about habit on Locke’s. Rather, I argue 
that Locke’s ideas helped form a set of epistemic conditions or ways of understanding habit that 
made possible yet more ways of conceptualizing it, including Rush’s. Yet Locke, despite his 
apparent interest in the material aspects of the animal spirits, shies from making any 
investigation into a possible material basis for mental processes: “I shall not at present meddle,” 
he writes, “with the physical considerations of the mind … speculations which, however curious 
and entertaining,” he does not follow (1).  
Because Locke’s philosophical works were so influential, his investigations into the links 
between habit and association were available to the speculations of others, among them English 
philosopher and physician David Hartley, whose neurophysiological theory of association 
influenced such thinkers as Benjamin Rush, Erasmus Darwin, and John Stuart Mill (Smith 123). 
Hartley’s 1749 Observations on Man, His Frame, His Duty, and His Expectations unifies human 
physiology (“his frame”), morality (“his duty”), and heavenly reward (“his expectations”). 
Historian of science Roy Porter writes that Hartley offers a materialistic associationism, for he 
“drew heavily upon Locke’s associationist empiricism, but whereas the wary Locke had avoided 
entangling himself with the material basis of thought, the younger man plunged in boldly, 
persuaded that the mysteries of the mind could be resolved by modern physical science” (180). 
“Drawing on associationism as an explanatory principle,” Porter writes, “Hartley went beyond 
Locke and set it upon physical foundations, that is, the anatomy of the nervous system and the 
physiology of ‘motions excited in the brain’” (180). Hartley’s system translated Locke’s 
associationism into the language and conceptual structures of mid-eighteenth-century 
neurophysiology, grounding such mental processes as perception and judgment in the brain and 
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nerves.    
Hartley’s “Doctrine of Vibrations and Association” combines “the Hints concerning the 
Performance of Sensation and Motion, which Sir Isaac Newton has given at the End of his 
Principia, and in the Questions annexed to his Optics” with “what Mr. Locke, and other 
ingenious Persons since his Time, have delivered concerning the Influence of Association over 
our Opinions and Affections” (5). “The Doctrine of Vibrations,” he writes, “may appear at first 
Sight to have no Connexion with that of Association; however, if these Doctrines be found in 
fact to contain the Laws of the Bodily and Mental Powers respectively, they must be related to 
each other, since the Body and Mind are” (6). The relationship between these doctrines in 
Hartley’s neurophysiology is that vibrations of the “infinitesimal medullary Particles” suspended 
in the ethereal “nervous fluid” of the brain and nerves underwrite corresponding chains of 
associations in the mind (72). He writes that “the Powers of generating Ideas, and raising them 
by Association, must also arise from corporeal Causes, and consequently admit of an Explication 
from the subtle Influences of the small Parts of Matter upon each other”: the movements of the 
“medullary Particles,” then, provide the basis for association. 
Because the body’s nervous vibrations are responsible for mental associations, they are 
also responsible for habit and automatic action. Of automatic movements Hartley writes: 
The Motions of the Body are of two kinds, automatic and voluntary. The automatic 
Motions are those which arise from the Mechanism of the Body in an evident manner. 
They are called automatic, from their Resemblance to the Motions of Automata, or 
Machines, whose Principle of Motion is within themselves. Of this kind are the Motions 
of the Heart, and peristaltic Motions of the Bowels. The voluntary Motions are those 
which arise from Ideas and Affections, and which therefore are referred to the Mind. (iii) 
 
Hartley’s distinction between automatic and voluntary motion is simple and maintains a 
comfortable dualism of body and mind: automatic motions arise from the body, whereas 
voluntary motions arise from the mind. Yet his theory of habit, predicated upon his doctrines of 
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vibration and association, renders the seemingly firm boundary between automatic and voluntary 
permeable. Habit, he writes, alters the distances between and the “mutual actions” of “the small 
constituent particles” such that they vibrate differently, changing what was once a voluntary 
action into an automatic action (61). The medullary particles, once habituated to vibrate in 
certain ways given certain stimuli, become only ever more ready to do so again over time. This is 
why, Hartley explains, “the Sensations of the Ends of the Fingers give us so much more precise 
Information concerning the tangible Qualities of Bodies, than those of the Ends of the Toes,” 
despite the fingers and the toes having, to the naked eye, similar structures: because we more 
often touch objects with our fingers, they are habituated to communicating sensation to 
consciousness. Over time and with repetition, a habitual action may come to be triggered by “the 
most diminutive Sensations, Ideas, and Motions, such as the Mind scarce regards, or is conscious 
of; and which therefore it can scarce recollect the Moment after the Action is over” (106). And 
this stimulus-response process might happen so quickly that it escapes the notice of 
consciousness altogether and render the habitual action involuntary. “Hence it follows,” Hartley 
continues,” that the associative bonds forged by habit convert “voluntary [actions] into 
automatic” (106). 
 Habit, for Hartley, causes the body to take the mind’s place as the origin of action: “For 
these Actions, of which the Mind is scarce conscious, and which follow mechanically, as it were, 
some precedent diminutive Sensation, Idea, or Motion, and without any Effort of the Mind, are 
rather to be ascribed to the Body than the Mind” (106). Hartley’s physiology thus makes 
distinctions between voluntary and automatic, mind and body, only to suggest their 
impermanence. Benjamin Rush, as Donald J. D’Elia writes, found in Hartley’s work a 
naturalistic grounding for his own synthesis of philosophy, medicine, and politics: in Rush’s 
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unpublished lecture “On the Applications of Metaphysicks to Medicine,” written in 1794, he 
says that his own “system of physiology” is founded on Observations on Man (qtd. in D’Elia 
110). He admires Hartley for “prov[ing] that all the exercises of the mind depend upon certain 
vibrations communicated to the brain through the medium of the nerves,” which he writes 
“greatly extended our knowledge of the moral & theological as well as the mental and physical 
worlds” (110). By joining the association of ideas and the eternal laws of motion, Rush believed, 
Hartley shined a light on the inner mechanisms of God’s most beloved creation. For the 
Philadelphian, D’Elia writes, Hartley was a “‘Newton’ of morality and religion, demonstrating 
for all to read and understand the certain, irreversible operations of the scientific law in 
producing good from evil in the natural world” (110). 
 The idea that association, education, and habit form one’s character and behavior made it 
possible to imagine a scientific approach to morality that leaders of the fledgling republic could 
use to create a virtuous nation. The new scientific view of morality, writes Francis Martin 
Dodsworth, “undermined the notion that sin was inherently wilful, or that it could be combated 
simply through exhortation or moral example,” the prevailing modes of moral education (86). 
“Instead,” he continues, “the role of government was to habituate people into correct behaviour 
through education and precise enforcement of the law”—Hartley’s physics of mind made it 
possible to imagine a naturalistic basis for such a government (86). It is within this context that 
Rush made the bold assertion that the citizens of the early republic might be made into 
“republican machines” able “to perform their parts properly, in the great machine of the 
government of the state” (14-15). The very “wills of the people … must be fitted to each other by 
means of education before they can be made to produce regularity and unity in government” 
(15). In Rush’s vision, the mechanistic body politic, like any mechanistic body, functions best 
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when its constituent parts cause it to function with “regularity and unity” (15). And this vision is 
not, as it might seem to today’s sensibilities, an effort to rob the American people of their 
individuality and self-determination; rather, it is an attempt to understand, given his conception 
of human capabilities, how the new body politic might regulate itself.  
 In “On the Mode of Education Proper in a Republic,” the 1798 address in which Rush 
gives his thoughts on “republican machines,” he prescribes means by which young people might 
better learn the “religious, moral and political instructions” he argues schools should offer: 
To obviate the inconveniences of their studious and sedentary mode of life, they should 
live upon a temperate diet, consisting chiefly of broths, milk and vegetables. The black 
broth of Sparta, and the barley broth of Scotland, have been alike celebrated for their 
beneficial effects upon the minds of young people. They should avoid tasting Spirituous 
liquors. They should also be accustomed occasionally to work with their hands, in the 
intervals of Study, and in the busy seasons of the year in the country. Moderate sleep, 
silence, occasional solitude and cleanliness, should be inculcated upon them, and the 
utmost advantage should be taken of a proper direction of those great principles in human 
conduct,—sensibility, habit, imitations, and association. (13) 
 
For Rush, diet, occupation, and other ways of affecting the body are as important to his nation-
building pedagogy as the subject matter of any curriculum could be. The conscious use of what 
he later calls “physical causes”—the mechanical forces that act upon the body—counteracts “the 
inconveniences of their studious and sedentary mode of life” (13). Here “regulate” and “regular” 
meet: the youth in Rush’s plan are required to habituate themselves to a regular, patterned, 
“temperate,” “moderate” way of living, guided by their teachers’ application “of those great 
principles in human conduct,—sensibility, habit, imitations, and association” (13). The influence 
of such a life, he continues, will affect not only the intellect but also “the principles and morals 
of young people” (13). Rush, then, understands the physical state of the human body as the 
horizon of both intellectual achievement and moral capability. To habituate the body—to 
discipline it—is to shape that horizon. 
  
26 
 At the same time Rush was translating Hartley’s physiological theories of habit into 
pedagogical policy and moral theory, another iconic American thinker, Benjamin Franklin, was 
disseminating the results of his attempt to attain “moral perfection” through habit (66).8 As Betsy 
Erkkila writes, Franklin’s Autobiography (1793) narrates his life “as an on-going struggle 
between ‘Reason’ and ‘Inclination,’” or between his willpower and his subconscious impulses 
(718). He wished to “conquer all that either natural inclination, custom, or company might lead 
me into” by breaking “contrary habits” that “took the advantage of inattention” and forming 
“good ones” so that he might gain a “steady, uniform rectitude of conduct” (presumably even in 
the circumstance of inattention) (66). Franklin thus, like Rush, viewed habit as a “general law in 
our natures” that concretizes repeated actions over time, be they “contrary” or “good.” This 
view, which he does more than perhaps anyone else to popularize, conceives of “human nature 
as malleable, manageable, and (perhaps) perfectible rather than fixed, fallen, and given” (Erkkila 
727).  
 Famously, Franklin set out “to acquire the habitude” of thirteen virtues: temperance, 
silence, order, resolution, frugality, industry, sincerity, justice, moderation, cleanliness, 
tranquility, chastity, and humility (67-68). Attaining each one, he theorized, would make the 
ones that follow it come more easily: temperance, for example, “tends to procure that coolness 
and clearness of head, which is so necessary … against the unremitting attraction of ancient 
habits,” making the acquisition of new ones easier (68). Habit makes the performance of any 
                                                
8 As a young man, Franklin adopted dietary routines similar to those Rush would recommend for 
students. He adopted vegetarianism after reading Thomas Tryon’s The Way to Health (1691), 
which recommends a vegetarian diet (12). Therafter, he writes, he was a better scholar: “My 
brother and the rest going from the printing-house to their meals, I remained there alone, and, 
dispatching presently my light repast, which often was no more than a bisket or a slice of bread, 
a handful of raisins or a tart from the pastry-cook's, and a glass of water, had the rest of the time 
till their return for study, in which I made the greater progress, from that greater clearness of 
head and quicker apprehension which usually attend temperance in eating and drinking” (12-13). 
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given action easier over time until it becomes automatic; in Franklin’s system, acquiring a few 
habits makes acquiring the rest easier. Terrell writes that by founding his system of virtue on 
habit, he seeks to make “good” behavior “as far as possible a reflexive, often unthinking 
response” (122). In this scheme, virtue “does not consist in the conscious resistance of 
temptation” but in making that resistance automatic: if Rush hopes to leverage habit to create 
“republican machines,” Franklin hopes to show how the same tool might be used to create 
virtuous machines (122). 
 Or so it seems: Franklin freely admits that his project of moral improvement fails because 
“voyages and business abroad, with a multiplicity of affairs that interfered” interrupt it, although 
he saw the faults he tried to correct “diminish” because of his efforts (71). In the Autobiography 
he offers a portrait of Rushian physiological policy set into motion at the scale of the individual, 
a scale that turns out to be messier and more given to circumstance and interruption than Rush’s 
abstract physio-political theories admit. I bring up this difference not to adjudicate it but to 
illustrate how in the late eighteenth century habit (as a physiological theory of unconscious 
action, of politics, of self-determination, and of morality) was not a stable ontological structure 
waiting to be discovered and about which someone might be “right” but rather an unstable 
epistemological structure constituted by a set of beliefs about human nature current at the time. 
Locke, Hartley, Rush, and Franklin are some of the principle contributors to and disseminators of 
that structure, but its explanatory power led to it taking on forms other than those they intended. 
Bad Habits 
 Most prominently, habit, precisely because it offers an explanation of how certain 
characteristics or behaviors become fixed in the malleable human nature assumed by most 
Enlightenment thinkers, offered a way to account for and punish crime. Social scientist Francis 
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Martin Dodsworth writes that habit “played a key role in legitimizing the various programmes 
for moral reform that were so prominent during the 18th century” because it made “reform and 
improvement” of criminals, previously thought incorrigible, “appear realistic possibilities”  (86). 
It also became a way of understanding how individuals become criminals in the first place. 
Dodsworth credits the popularity of “criminal biographies” and autobiographies, or “published 
accounts of the lives and last speeches of condemned prisoners,” for popularizing the idea that 
the accretion of “bad” habits would, over time and with repetition, lead to a hardened criminality 
(87). “One of the most common patterns in these discourses,” he writes, “is for the individual to 
succumb to the temptation of vice, often initially by missing divine service on a Sunday, and 
being seduced by a prostitute, drink, or gambling” (87). Thereafter, the individual would 
progress to greater and greater vices (habitual behaviors becoming more automatic and gratifying 
over time), until he or she “ended their life at the gallows” (87). Virtue thus consisted, in part, of 
avoiding the first step, however minor, into vice. 
 William Hunting Howell argues that the psychology of Locke and Hartley inculcated in 
the early republic an imitative ethics by which imitating “proper exemplars” was “the surest 
route to ethical subjectivity”; this is why, he says, Franklin’s method of acquiring the habit of 
humility consists of imitating Jesus and Socrates (13, 23). And indeed, Franklin conceptualized 
virtue more as a craft to be perfected through practice and imitation than through good 
intentions. Terrell calls our attention to Franklin’s 1760 letter to Henry Home Kames, in which 
he gives his thoughts on “the Science of Virtue”:  
“Many people lead bad lives that would gladly lead good ones … [Virtue] is as properly 
an art as painting, navigation or architecture. If a man would be come a painter, 
navigator, or architect, it is not enough that he is advised to be one, that he is convinced 
by the arguments of his adviser, that it would be for his advantage to be one, and that he 
resolves to be one, but he must also be taught the principles of the art” (qtd. in Terrell 
113).   
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For Franklin, an individual becomes morally righteous not because she decides to be that way or 
because someone else makes a strong argument for being that way but because she treats virtue 
as an “art” to be mastered. And just as Franklin learned the printer’s trade through his 
apprenticeship to his brother, an individual seeking virtue can find it by imitating the right people 
(Franklin, tongue perhaps in cheek, writes that he sought to imitate Jesus and Socrates). The 
reverse of this imitative virtue, made possible by habit, is imitative vice: Dodsworth points to the 
example of the British servant Harry Sims, who writes in his criminal autobiography that he 
“contracted a Habit of Idleness, Extravagance and Debauchery” from “a Number of the Ladies of 
the Town” (88). If imitative virtue might be thought of as a set of behaviors unrooted in any 
particular intention, character, or state of mind and communicated between persons through 
imitation, then imitative vice can be thought of as a sort of behavioral contagion spread by 
keeping the wrong company. Harry Sims “contracted” his habits the same way he might have 
contracted smallpox: through infelicitous contact. 
 English novelist and magistrate Henry Fielding, Dodsworth argues, makes the connection 
between habit and contagion clear: totally preventing bad habits, he says, is “as impossible in the 
Political Body as in the Natural. Vices and Diseases, with like physical Necessity, arise from 
certain Habits in both; and to restrain and palliate the evil Consequences, is all that lies within 
the Reach of Art” (qtd. in Dodsworth 91). “[B]ad Habits,” he writes later, “are as infectious by 
Example, as the Plague itself is by Contact” (qtd. in Dodsworth 91). So-called “bad” habits are 
conceived by Fielding as infections of the body politic, “restrain[ed] and palliate[d]” (but, as 
Franklin learns, not eradicated) only by through the force of moral reform. Rush, in a 1787 essay 
titled “Enquiry into the Effects of Public Punishments Upon Criminals, and Upon Society,” 
originally read at a meeting of the Society for Promoting Political Enquiries held at Franklin’s 
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home, recommends that public punishments such as the stocks should be abolished in favor of 
punishments “accommodated to the constitutions and tempers of the criminals,” including their 
habits (154). “[T]he utmost possible advantages,” he writes, “should be taken of the laws of the 
association of ideas, of habit, and of imitation” (154-55). His vision of criminal punishment 
treats rehabilitation as something like a modern medical treatment plan, which seeks to use 
medicine’s tools for affecting the body to turn an individual’s particular ailments into a more 
standard, less individuated state of health. Crime and punishment, for Rush, is less about 
cleansing souls than it is about restoring bodies’ virtuous equinamity. 
 The story of habit in the eighteenth century suggests that although few Americans in the 
earliest years of the republic were likely to understand themselves as “republican machines” set 
into automatic motion by the needs of the nation, many could well have understood themselves 
as having unconscious, habitual tendencies. Tracing habit’s transformation from the conceptual 
linchpin of Locke’s associationism in the beginning of the eighteenth century into a core concept 
in politics and morality in the second half of the century points up how scientific theories of 
human nature, once broadly disseminated, lend themselves to speculative answers to enduring 
questions about vice and virtue: are “bad” people inherently so? How do “good” people become 
that way? Who can be considered accountable for his or her actions? Habit adds to these 
questions three key ideas: 1. that the body’s habitual processes affect behavior; 2. that habit 
offers ways to mold human nature; 3. that habits are contagious. These ideas, like habit 
generally, dissociate action from choice and the will. In other words, habit makes moral life less 
a matter of conscious deliberation and more a matter of making virtuous actions automatic.  
 Neglecting the emerging moral theories and practices sparked by habit in all its 
eighteenth-century permutations means missing the ways that Americans of the early republic 
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attempted to turn “general law[s] in our natures” to the good of the nation and the individual. It 
also means missing how habit provided entirely new ways to think of accountability: take for 
example Franklin, who wishes to locate virtue at once in the free choosing of good actions and in 
their automation. Yet Hartley’s work suggests that habit, as a bodily principle that calcifies 
voluntary actions into involuntary actions, calls hard-and-fast distinctions between voluntary and 
involuntary into question; in doing so, it makes ascribing praise or blame an epistemologically 
fraught venture. In the following section of this chapter, I argue that literature provided 
Americans of the early republic ways to navigate that venture’s terrain. 
A Reformed Rake 
 The discourses about habit that I have discussed were held mostly through the rarified 
media of philosophical works (Locke), physiological treatises (Hartley), and political speeches 
and essays (Rush). Franklin’s popular Autobiography was more accessible to the general public, 
as were the criminal biographies and autobiographies that disseminated the idea of contagious 
vice. These genres created new ways of thinking about accountability in the abstract, but they did 
not provide means through which individuals might engage the new moral situations they made 
possible. This is to say that they tend not to offer ways to understand how habit plays out at the 
scale of the individual; they do not show, for instance, how an idea such as contagious vice 
works in a given moral situation. Take the case of a man who, after some unhappy, even 
accidental contact with vice, acquires habits that lead to ever-greater depravities and, eventually, 
the dissolution of his character. Rush would recommend that after the man inevitably commits a 
crime and is imprisoned, the authorities should do what they can to instill good habits in him so 
that he might eventually return to society reformed. But what of the man whose habits incline 
him not to crime but to immorality? 
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 That task, I argue, falls to literature and, here, to the seduction novel specifically. 
Theorist Georg Lukács writes that “the novel seeks, by giving form, to uncover and construct the 
concealed totality of life,” including fine-textured representations of psychological phenomena 
such as moral systems (60). Mikhail Bakhtin writes that the novel as a genre consists of “the 
zone of direct contact with inconclusive present-day reality,” the stuff of everyday life and its 
possibilities (39). “At its core,” he continues, “lay personal experience and free creative 
imagination” (39). This is to say that novels provide individuals ways to experience imaginative 
realities that are still within the realm of possibility. By depicting characters’ cognitive states as 
they react to a given set of circumstances, novels offer readers the opportunity to observe minds 
in action: cognitive literary theorist Lisa Zunshine agues that fiction engages readers’ theory of 
mind, or the “ability to explain people’s behavior in terms of their thoughts, feelings, beliefs, and 
desires” (6).9 And by observing how fictional minds react to moral circumstances that could very 
well happen in “real” life, readers gain the opportunity to experience entirely plausible moral 
situations from a safe remove. That is part of why literary scholar Blakey Vermeule writes that 
fictional characters “are the greatest practical-reasoning schemes ever invented”: their minds and 
interactions make novels rich sites for one to think through and exercise moral judgment (xii). In 
a novel one finds a sort of moral laboratory, or a delineated space within which the results of a 
given moral hypothetical can be worked out. The reader differs from the scientist in that she has 
no need to be or seem objective: she can freely agree with, dispute, explain away, apply, or 
                                                
9 For more scholars who bring present-day theories of cognition to bear on narrative, see 
especially Alan Richardson, The Neural Sublime: Cognitive Theories and Romantic Texts 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press), 2010 and Patrick Colm Hogan, What Literature 
Teaches Us About Emotion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 2011. 
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ignore the laboratory’s results.10 Similarly, novels differ from laboratories in that they might 
arrange the particulars of a moral hypothetical—the villain in the hypothetical is made even more 
villainous—so that a predetermined moral response is more likely. 
 Such is the goal of the seduction novel, an immensely popular genre in the United States 
during the last decades of the eighteenth century. Novels such as William Hill Brown’s The 
Power of Sympathy; or, The Triumph of Nature (1789), Susanna Rowson’s Charlotte Temple 
(1791), and Hannah Foster’s The Coquette; or, The History of Eliza Wharton (1797) that dissect 
seduction and its consequences were bestsellers well into the nineteenth century. The broadest 
intent of these novels was to educate readers, particularly young women, about the dangers of 
seduction: in each narrative, a young woman is seduced, after which she loses her reputation, her 
ties to family and friends, and her life. Their plots, melodramatic to twenty-first-century 
sensibilities, are structured in ways that represent seduction as a process comprised of a series of 
discrete events, every one of which an opportunity for the reader to exercise judgment or to ask 
herself what she would do in the situation. 
 In what follows I analyze The Coquette as an exemplar of its genre and as a literary work 
in dialogue with a historically and culturally particular set of moral theories, some of which are 
made visible to a current-day reader by the above analysis of habit. I argue that the novel 
inoculates readers against the contagion of vice by allowing them to experience its consequences 
in the realm of imagination. The novel depicts “bad” habits as maladies of the body politic, 
contagiously spreading across the web of social relations. I claim that Foster avoids the ethical 
morass of assessing responsibility for habitual actions by articulating a consequentialist approach 
to responsibility that judges actions, regardless of their intent or ultimate motivation, by their 
                                                
10 I do not mean to imply that scientists are necessarily objective but rather to illustrate a contrast 
between objectivity and the epistemologically fraught adventure of everyday moral judgment. 
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results. This argument itself cuts through the critical reception of The Coquette, which, as Daniel 
Diez Couch writes, is divided into two camps: “one argues for the novel’s insistence on female 
autonomy, while the other argues for Foster’s codification of conservative gender relations” 
(684).11 The former sees Eliza Wharton’s retreat from her friends and family after she conceives 
a child with rake Peter Sanford as a laudable act of resistance, whereas the latter sees the novel 
as affirming patriarchal oppression by “punishing” Wharton for her sexuality (684). “Both these 
approaches,” Couch argues, “share the mistake of historical anachronism, since they seek to 
locate Eliza at the opening of a long, later history of gender relations and feminism” (684). 
Instead of celebrating the novel as a tale of feminist liberation or condemning it for not being 
sufficiently transgressive, I read it as a sort of experimental theater of moral situations in which 
readers are enabled by its epistolary structure to observe the plot from a variety of viewpoints. 
Reading the novel this way, I argue, situates it within a historical context in which fiction’s 
powers of representation were taken seriously as a mode of moral experience.  
 The Coquette begins with a letter from Eliza Wharton to her friend Lucy Freeman 
narrating the death of Wharton’s fiancé, Mr. Haley. Haley, Wharton writes, was selected by her 
parents to marry her, and although he “was a man of worth” and “a man of real and substantial 
merit,” she feels no attraction to him: “no one acquainted with the disparity of our tempers and 
dispositions, our views and designs,” she writes, “can suppose my heart much engaged in the 
alliance” (15). She is soon to leave her parents’ home for that of family friends, where she hopes 
to “cultivate” the “disposition of mind … Calm, placid, and serene; thoughtful of my duty, and 
                                                
11 For a representative of the camp that views The Coquette as emphasizing female autonomy, 
see Sharon M. Harris, “Hannah Webster Foster’s The Coquette: Critiquing Franklin’s America.” 
Redefining the Political Novel: American Women Writers, 1797–1901. Ed. Harris. Knoxville: U 
of Tennessee P, 1995. 1–22. For a representative of the camp that views Foster as reinscribing 
contemporary gender politics, see Cathy Davidson, Revolution and the Word: The Rise of the 
Novel in America. New York: Oxford UP, 1986. 
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benevolent to all around me” consequent to Haley’s death (16). Earlier in the letter, she 
expresses her hopes that “if I have wisdom and prudence to follow his advice and example; if his 
prayers for my temporal and eternal welfare be heard and answered, I shall be happy indeed” 
(15). A reader in 1797 reading a novel titled The Coquette would know these hopes are ironic 
and that Wharton does not have the “wisdom and prudence” necessary for her “temporal and 
eternal welfare”: in other words, the reader knows that Wharton will experience a decline. The 
causes of that decline are the stuff of the narrative.  
 The novel does not provide Freeman’s reply to the first letter; instead, it moves 
immediately to Wharton’s next letter to her, in which she describes the return of her “accustomed 
vivacity” (16). Her mother misreads this change of temperament as a stoic effort to present a 
happy face despite her “heavy bereavement”; “Poor woman! She little thinks that my heart was 
untouched; and when that is unaffected, other sentiments and passions make but a transient 
impression” (16). Freeman’s reply to her first letter must have admonished her to make good on 
her resolution to cultivate a “disposition of mind” more “placid,” for she calls it a “moral 
lecture”; in response, she assures her friend that “your monitorial lessons and advice shall be 
attended to. I believe I shall never again resume those airs; which you term coquettish” (16). 
 Yet soon, against the repeated warnings of her friends and family, Wharton spurns the 
kind, honorable, unexciting minister Mr. Boyer in favor of the dissipated but more interesting 
Peter Sanford, conceives, gives birth, goes insane, and dies. Sanford, in a letter to his friend 
Charles Deighton, records her didactic plea to the young women of America: 
May my unhappy story serve as a beacon to warn the American fair of the dangerous 
tendency and destructive consequences of associating with men of your character, of 
destroying their time, and risking their reputation by the practice of coquetry and its 
attendant follies! But for these, I might have been honorably connected; and capable, at 
this moment, of diffusing and receiving happiness! But for your arts, I might have 
remained a blessing to society, as well as the delight and comfort of my friends! (100) 
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In this passage, Wharton makes the most obvious moral argument of the narrative clear: consider 
this story a warning against “the practice of coquetry and its attendant follies.” She characterizes 
the consequences of those follies as a blow not only to herself but to her society: she is no longer 
“honorably connected” and so has lost her place as a node in her social network “diffusing” 
happiness as she receives it. By emphasizing the social repercussions of Wharton’s seduction, 
The Coquette foregrounds the Rushian linking of personal and national ethics.  
 Two of Wharton’s closest connections, her best friend Lucy Sumner (Lucy Freeman after 
she marries) and her mother Mrs. Wharton, likewise situate personal behavior within a wider 
societal context. Sumner, trying to warn her friend away from Sanford, cautions her that she does 
not act in a social vacuum: “Slight not the opinion of the world. We are dependent beings; and 
while the smallest traces of virtuous sensibility remain, we must feel the force of that 
dependence, in a greater or less degree” (86). And Mrs. Wharton:  
With regard to its being a dependent situation [marriage], what one is not so? Are we not 
all links in the great chain of society, some more, some less important, but each upheld 
by others, throughout the confederated whole? … Let us conduct uprightly and justly; 
with propriety and steadiness; not servilely cringing for favor, nor arrogantly claiming 
more attention and respect than our due; let us bear with fortitude the providential and 
unavoidable evils of life, and we shall spend our days with respectability and contentment 
at least. (35) 
 
For Sumner and Mrs. Wharton, mutual dependence forges “links in the great chain of society.” 
Eliza Wharton’s following her own desires, in this view, is detrimental not only to herself but to 
those close to her: they rend the fabric of her community. Both advisors also use the Rushian 
ethical language of mechanical force (“we must feel the force of that dependence”; “each upheld 
by others, throughout the confederated whole”) and regulation (“steadiness”). Describing their 
ethical language as mechanical is not to say that it is simple or not cognitively rich; rather, these 
characters’ epistemological horizons are such that they understand the ethical claims an 
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individual’s community places on her in the terms made available by materialist psychology. In 
The Coquette, to be mechanical is not to be a mindless automaton—the mind’s mechanisms are 
what allow cognition to exist. When Boyer first feels affection for Wharton, he writes his friend 
Mr. Selby that “With all the boasted fortitude and resolution of our sex, we are but mere 
machines. Let love once pervade our breasts, and its object may mold us into any form that 
pleases her fancy, or even caprice” (54). To be a machine in this novel is not to be rigid but to be 
moldable. 
 Yet that molding, in Boyer’s case, is in the hands of his beloved—just as Sumner and 
Mrs. Wharton emphasize the social roots of ethical well-being, Boyer embraces his sense of 
dependence on Eliza Wharton. They model Rush’s great machine of government, comprised of 
“republican machines” acting codependently and in concert. Peter Sanford, Wharton’s seducer, is 
also changeable, but he does so at his own discretion: “I am a mere Proteus,” he writes in a letter 
to his friend Charles Deighton, “and can assume any shape that will best answer my purpose” 
(25). He is a rake, acting independently of the social networks that connect the other characters, 
changing himself not for another’s sake but for his own. Freeman dissects the danger he poses to 
her friend, who thinks that “a reformed rake makes the best husband”: 
I believe that rakes very seldom do reform, while their fortunes and constitutions enable 
them to pursue their licentious pleasures. But even allowing this to happen, can a woman 
of refinement and delicacy enjoy the society of a man, whose mind has been corrupted, 
whose taste has been vitiated, and who has contracted a depravity both of sentiment and 
manners, which no degree of repentance can wholly efface? Besides, of true love they are 
absolutely incapable. Their passions have been too much hackneyed to admit so pure a 
flame. You cannot anticipate sincere and lasting respect from them. They have been so 
long accustomed to the company of those of our sex, who observe no esteem; that the 
greatest dignity and purity of character can never excite it in their breasts. They are 
naturally prone to jealousy. Habituated to an intercourse with the baser part of the sex, 
they level the whole, and seldom believe any to be incorruptible. (44) 
 
Although Sanford thinks himself a “mere Proteus,” Freeman characterizes his dissipated life as 
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altering his character for the worse: in her view, he is not a Proteus in charge of his shape but, 
like all humans, a person molded by his experiences into a creature of habit, for better or worse. 
Her use of the present perfect tense when she writes that his “mind has been corrupted” and that 
his “taste has been vitiated” as opposed to “his mind is corrupt” or “his taste is vitiated” 
emphasizes that Sanford’s past experiences affect his present: “no degree of repentance can 
wholly efface” his degeneracy. She maintains the present perfect tense as she delineates how he 
and other rakes “have been so long accustomed” to women “who observe no esteem” that “their 
passions have been too much hackneyed,” or overused, to partake of “true love.” He is 
“[h]abituated to an intercourse with the baser part of the sex” and so views all women as liable to 
seduction. Even if he were to reform, which Freeman thinks unlikely, his depravities will have 
taken their toll. Echoing contemporary theories of habitual criminality, she situates Sanford 
within a timeline of past experiences, especially probable contact with prostitutes, that shaped 
him into a rake. In her view, rakes are not born but formed through a specific process of moral 
degeneration.  
  That Freeman views Sanford’s actions as habitual, “contracted” from others, does not 
mean that she thinks him unaccountable for his actions (44). In another letter to Wharton 
warning her of Sanford, she writes that his “vicious habits, and abandoned character … have 
more pernicious effects on society, than the perpetrations of the robber and the assassin” (47). 
Robbers and assassins “are rigidly punished by the laws of the land,” but the seducer, “the 
assassin of honor, the wretch, who breaks the peace of families … is caressed” by both men and 
women (47). If more women avoided seducers, she writes, it would be good for “the public weal, 
and to their personal respectability”: again, Freeman sees Wharton’s personal moral choices as 
connected not only to the well-being of all women but to that of the public generally (47). 
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Similarly, she views Sanford’s responsibility for his actions not in terms of whether he freely 
wills them or some other psychological metric but in terms of how they reverberate through the 
social chain. This is to say that she is less concerned with Sanford himself than with how his 
habits infect the body politic.   
 Wharton’s education, taste, and sensibility, her friends think, should make her resistant to 
the effects of such habits because they ought to make her unlikely to converse with rakes. 
Throughout the novel, her friends express their surprise that she would “associate” with Sanford, 
given that she is a “lady of delicacy” (21). In her final letter of the novel, Sumner (now Freeman) 
writes that “the American fair” should learn from Wharton’s story “to reject with disdain every 
insinuation derogatory to their true dignity and honor … To associate [with rakes], is to approve; 
to approve, is to be betrayed!” (105). Wharton’s misstep was spending time with Sanford and 
exposing herself to his contagious dissipation. In The Coquette, social association becomes 
psychological association at a larger scale: just as Locke and Hartley viewed psychological 
association as binding separate biological processes through repetition and experience, repeated 
association and the affective bonds it puts into place form a conduit for the consequences of 
Sanford’s habits to spread. 
 If bad habits can be “contracted” and spread through the tissue of the social body, then 
we can think of Foster’s novel as a sort of inoculation against vice. Jennifer Harris writes that 
late eighteenth-century American culture attempted to prevent women from even knowing about 
vice, so for Foster to “write knowingly of her heroine’s illicit acts was to make Foster, herself, 
vulnerable to charges of obscenity, impropriety, indelicacy, and the possession of knowledge that 
no respectable lady should, in fact, possess” (365). Yet Sumner’s hope that Wharton’s tale will 
teach “the American fair” not to associate with seducers suggests that a little knowledge of bad 
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habits’ consequences might protect young women in ways that conduct manuals and moral 
lectures cannot. The novel’s epistolary structure enables readers to observe the processes by 
which Sanford seduces Eliza, placing them among Wharton’s friends and family as spectators of 
her downfall. Foster thus places the reader in a position to draw moral conclusions, as Wharton’s 
friends do, thus building up their own habits of rake resistance. 
 Reading The Coquette not as part of a transcendent feminist history but as situated in the 
cultural and moral structures of its time shows it to be invested in working through contemporary 
theories about habitual vice. Rush and others portrayed criminal habits as potentially limiting 
individuals’ accountability, creating a sort of distributed agency in which a single act of vice 
might have roots in past actions and experiences or even those of others; Foster articulates a 
distributed justice that carries the logic of contracted habits forward by focusing not on the 
individuals who possess them but on their consequences. Rakes such as Sanford are carriers of 
bad habits and so should be shunned to isolate their contagion. This approach’s view of 
responsibility cuts through the ethical tangle created by habit by focusing on actions’ 
consequences rather than the mental states of those who perform them. As The Coquette 
demonstrates, the moral capabilities of seduction novels extend beyond sexual politics into 
pressing questions about one’s accountability for “contracted” habits. 
The Empire of Mechanical and Habitual Impulses 
 In The Coquette, Sanford believes that he is the master of his own fate, able to become 
anything he wishes; it is Lucy Sumner who identifies him as a creature of habit and makes his 
habits, rather than his motives, the basis of her moral condemnation of him. The novel thus 
brings clarity to the ethical complexities consequent to habit’s explanatory power in the late 
eighteenth century. Yet Wieland, what Laura H. Korobkin calls “a highly forensic novel in which 
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every reader and every character is cast as a juror at whose ‘bar’ evidence of crime is presented 
for judgment,” dramatizes the epistemological and ethical veil habit throws over judgments of 
motive, plunging readers into a world devoid of moral clarity (723). Readers of the novel are cast 
as jurors, but the character they are most called to judge, Carwin, claims that his actions being 
habit-driven exculpates him of their consequences. Embracing habit’s automation of behavior, he 
attempts to make habit the basis of innocence rather than guilt. In the argument that follows I 
will not attempt to ascertain his guilt or innocence, as others have; rather, I will examine the 
ways that Brown translates the ethical quandaries habit poses into narrative form.12 In his preface 
to the novel, Brown writes that he “aims at the illustration of some important branches of the 
moral constitution of man” (3). If “the act of reading itself and the continuous judgments it 
simultaneously necessitates and problematizes” comprise the moral work of the novel, as Frank 
Shuffelton argues, and if Brown, like Foster and other contemporaries, views reading as an 
opportunity for moral training, then Wieland trains readers to realize the difficulty, complexity, 
and even impossibility of sure moral judgment in a world where the moral constitution might be 
misled and behavior plausibly attributed to mechanical habit. 
 Whereas The Coquette offers a straightforward, easily discernable moral (avoid rakes), 
and, as I have argued, provides in Lucy Freeman a way to exercise moral judgment without 
concern for motive, Wieland is, as many scholars have argued, decidedly equivocal about 
judgment.13 The arrival of Carwin, an enigmatic stranger and “biloquist” able to throw his voice 
                                                
12 See especially Korobkin and Toni O'Shaughnessy, “‘An Imperfect Tale’: Interpretive 
Accountability in Wieland. Studies in American Fiction 18.1 (1990): 41-54.   
 
 
13 See especially Michael T. Gilmore, “Calvinism and Gothicism: The Example of Brown’s 
Wieland.” Studies in the Novel 9.2 (1977): 107–118. and Roland Hagenbüchle, "American 
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and mimic others’, into the lives of Clara Wieland and her family begins a train of events that 
leads to their doom. Immediately prior to Carwin’s first appearance, Clara, her brother Theodore, 
his wife Catharine, and Catharine’s brother Henry Pleyel hear voices with no discernable source: 
Theodore and Pleyel on separate occasions hear what seems to be Catharine’s disembodied voice 
warning them of dangers ahead, and Clara faints in terror after hearing two unfamiliar voices in 
her closet arguing over whether to shoot or strangle her (66).14 After Carwin arrives as a guest in 
the house where Clara and her loved ones live, Theodore, fulfilling a lifelong desire for divine 
communion, obeys a voice that he takes to be that of God telling him to kill Catharine and their 
four children. At his trial, he mounts an antinomian defense of his actions:  
Thou, Omnipotent and Holy! Thou knowest that my actions were conformable to thy 
will. I know not what is crime; what actions are evil in their ultimate and comprehensive 
tendency or what are good. Thy knowledge, as thy power, is unlimited, I have taken thee 
for my guide, and cannot err. To the arms of thy protection, I entrust my safety. In the 
awards of thy justice, I confide for my recompense. (201) 
 
When asked if he has anything more to say, he states that his “motives have been truly stated,” 
which is true: it is his sincere belief that God, whose perfection trumps all human laws, 
instructed him to kill his family much as He instructed Abraham to kill Isaac (201). Earlier, Clara 
comments that because the “will is the tool of the understanding, which must fashion its 
conclusions on the notices of sense,” if one’s senses are deranged, “it is impossible to calculate 
the evils that may flow from the consequent deductions of the understanding”: the murders of 
Catharine and her children are “evils” that result from Theodore’s senses not aligning with 
reality (39).  
                                                
Literature and the Nineteenth-Century Crisis in Epistemology: The Example of Charles 
Brockden Brown." Early American Literature 23.2 (1988): 121-51. 
 
 
14 In the interest of clarity, I will refer to the Wielands by their first names. 
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 The interpretation of Theodore’s murders as Brown’s commentary on the impossibility of 
a rational, democratically governed nation is influential enough to be the default reading for 
numerous scholars.15 This reading typically emphasizes the ease with which the senses, and 
therefore the understanding and will, might be misdirected, which they take as a warning of how 
easily minds are misled. But I wish to emphasize instead how the novel involves the reader in 
assessing the Wielands’ murders. Wieland, I argue, asks readers to make judgments about 
madness, intent, and habit not so that they might reach a certain conclusion about them but so 
that they experience how fraught reaching any conclusion about them might be. Frank Shuffelton 
writes that “Brown’s democratic lessons emerge not out of the content, the ‘moral,’ of his fiction 
but out of the act of reading itself and the continuous judgments it simultaneously necessitates 
and problematizes” (91). In Brown’s novel, any given moral judgment the reader might make—
who is responsible for the deaths of Theodore’s wife and children, Carwin or Theodore?—is 
contested by the possibility of alternative judgments. Carwin might be responsible, for his 
fraudulent impersonation of the Almighty is the first step to Theodore’s religious madness. Yet 
careful readers will note that Theodore was disposed to religious mania even before Carwin’s 
arrival. Assessing the case in an evidence-oriented, lawyerly fashion so that a definitive, “true” 
judgment might be reached is a foregone conclusion, for Clara’s mental state and narration grow 
more disturbed and unreliable as the novel progresses and as she struggles to form her own moral 
judgments. “In Wieland,” Shuffelton argues, “not only is the judgment of the protagonists 
disorganized, but the understanding of the nature of crime itself is called into question, as is 
ultimately its very location, whether in the heart of the so-called criminal or in those of the 
                                                
15 See especially Shirley Samuels, “Wieland: Alien and Infidel.” Early American Literature 25.1 
(1990): 46-66 and Rombes Jr, Nichols, “‘All Was Lonely, Darksome, and Waste’: Wieland and 
the Construction of the New Republic.” Studies in American Fiction 22.1 (1994): 37-46. 
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witnesses and potential judges” (102). And habit, as the naturalistic foundation of Carwin’s 
defense, lies at the heart of the novel’s ethical morass.  
  Carwin never faces a jury for his actions, although Theodore does, and is found guilty; 
instead, he makes his case to Clara personally (it is “at your bar am I willing to appear,” he says) 
(225). His account of the events leading to the murder of Theodore’s family follows the pattern 
of a contemporary criminal autobiography: as a youth “[u]nfortified by principle, subjected to 
poverty, stimulated by headlong passions,” he “cultivated this gift” of biloquism (227). He left 
America for Europe (and does not say why), and met an unnamed man “who called himself my 
friend” but who “betrayed” him into using his talent for “acts which cannot be justified, though 
they are susceptible of apology” (227). Like the criminal autobiographer, he attributes his first 
step down the wide road to Hell to contact with someone who led him to it. Upon his return to 
America, he took up walking in the lands around Clara’s home and spent time in the “Temple,” a 
nearby neoclassical structure where the Wielands gather for recreation. One evening in the 
Temple, Carwin heard Theodore approaching; because of “the aukwardness attending such an 
interview,” he threw his voice to lead him elsewhere (228). A single use of his talent, he says, 
triggered the habit of deception and meddling he acquired in Europe: “A thousand times had I 
vowed never again to employ the dangerous talent which I possessed; but such was the force of 
habit and the influence of present convenience, that I used this method of arresting his progress” 
(228). After the first triggering of the habit, it recurred more frequently and with greater force. 
When Carwin overheard Theodore and Pleyel debating a move to Europe, he found it 
“irresistible” to “interfere”: his “inveterate habits” led him to impersonate Catharine, in the aural 
guise of whom he convinced the men to remain in America (229).  
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 This “second lapse into error,” the second habitual ill-use of his talent, “made my 
recovery more difficult. I cannot convey to you an adequate idea of the kind of gratification 
which I derived from these exploits; yet I meditated nothing. My views were bounded to the 
passing moment, and commonly suggested by the momentary exigence” (229). At this stage of 
his narrative, he fully embodies the aspect of the habitual criminal, whose habits of vice only 
become more pleasurable and automatic over time. He portrays himself as almost entirely 
reflexive, unreflective, incapable of intention or deliberation, and bound by the stimulus-
response of habit. In doing so, he attempts to distance himself from accountability: “I intended 
no ill,” he says, “but my folly, indirectly and remotely, may have caused” the murders (223-24). 
By emphasizing how habitual regimes of vice overwhelm intent, he hopes to convince Clara to 
dissociate him from his actions. He implicitly posits a “real,” internal Carwin (a Cartesian 
homunculus) whose control over behavior is contested by habit. Why punish me, the “real” 
Carwin, he seems to ask, for what I did not will to happen? His excuses are made plausible by 
habit’s force as an explanatory principle for automatic action and criminality. The novel, then, 
enlists the reader in joining Clara’s attempt to adjudicate not only the particular case of 
Theodore’s family’s murders but also the general case of whether moral responsibility rests on 
intent or consequences. And in the absence of a Lucy Freeman to provide counsel, the reader, 
like Clara, must come to her own conclusions. 
The remainder of Carwin’s confessions depicts him almost like a sleepwalker or 
automaton: “involuntarily and by a mechanical impulse,” he convinces Pleyel that Clara, who 
loves him, desires another; “subjected to the empire of mechanical and habitual impulses,” 
“actuated” by habit, he frightens Clara with voices outside her door (239-40, 244).16 In Rush’s 
                                                
16 The phrase “empire of habit” appears in Locke’s On the Conduct of the Understanding: 
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view, an “empire of mechanical and habitual impulses” would function as efficiently and 
harmoniously as clockwork, properly guided; in Wieland, such an empire is a chaotic tyranny of 
whim and compulsion. When Carwin learns of Catharine’s death, he wonders if he had not 
“rashly set in motion a machine, over whose progress I had no controul, and which experience 
had shewn me was infinite in power?” (246). This question at first seems like a confession, 
despite its explicit dissociation of Carwin from the “machine” of his biloquism, but he insists that 
“You tell me an horrid tale of Wieland being led to the destruction of his wife and children, by 
some mysterious agent. You charge me with the guilt of this agency; but I repeat that the amount 
of my guilt has been truly stated. The perpetrator of Catharine's death was unknown to me till 
now; nay, it is still unknown to me” (246). 
 Clara is unmoved by Carwin’s claims, for despite his “attempts to give an human 
explanation of these phantasms,” she concludes that he is “the agent; his tale is a lie, and his 
nature devilish … now do I behold the author of all our calamities!” (246-47). Immediately after 
this declaration, Theodore appears with the intent of murdering Clara, who he believes deserves 
punishment for “eternally questioning the behests of thy Maker,” or Carwin’s disembodied voice 
(248). Carwin retreats from the room and uses his ability to take the guise of God again: doing 
so, he forbids Theodore from killing his sister and commands him to “cease to cherish thy 
delusion” (262). Upon returning to rationality, Theodore kills himself (264). Clara, formerly 
certain of Carwin’s guilt in her family’s doom, suddenly “ceased to upbraid or accuse. His guilt 
was a point to which I was indifferent. Ruffian or devil, black as hell or bright as angels, 
                                                
“Many men firmly embrace falsehood for truth, not only because they never thought otherwise, 
but also because, thus blinded as they have been from the beginning, they never could think 
otherwise, at least without a vigor of mind able to contest the empire of habit, and look into its 
own principles, a freedom which few men have the notion of in themselves, and fewer are 
allowed the practice of by others” (41) 
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thenceforth he was nothing to me. I was incapable of sparing a look or a thought from the ruin 
that was spread at my feet” (264-65). Her capacity to render moral judgment overwhelmed by 
grief, she ceases to care “from what source these disasters have flowed,” and Carwin moves to a 
remote farm in rural Pennsylvania (266). In the final paragraph of the novel, she challenges 
readers to do what she cannot: “I leave you to moralize on this tale” (278). Yet doing so, I have 
argued, is a task the novel makes nigh impossible: Wieland’s narrative makes attributing motive 
or intent to Carwin an unsure venture. 
Moralizing on the Tale 
 Habit allowed Americans of the early republic to understand themselves simultaneously 
(and paradoxically, from a current-day perspective) as moldable and fixed, providing a pivot 
point between an eighteenth-century voluntarism emphasizing the disembodied mind and a 
nineteenth-century determinism emphasizing embodiment. An individual was malleable, free, 
and agential in that her very physical makeup was plastic and open to impression by experience; 
experience affected her physiology, altering, in Hartley’s neurophysiology, the vibrations of the 
infinitesimal particles suspended in her nervous fluid and enabling Rush’s edu-physiological 
speculations. Yet she was fixed, determined, and instinctual in that she was understood as 
habituated to and by her experiences and bound, in time, to her habits. In the context of this 
theory of human nature, to moralize—to interpret something as containing a moral lesson—is to 
take into account how habit encompasses not only malleability and fixedness but also similar 
“oppositional concepts like freedom/determination, natural/artificial, active/passive, cause/effect, 
spontaneity/instinct, and agent/patient” (Sparrow and Hutchinson 4-5). As it became more 
difficult to imagine others’ behaviors and one’s own as deliberate and intentional, it became 
more difficult to ascribe moral agency. In The Coquette, Lucy Freeman, who attempts to educate 
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her friend on the dangers Sanford poses, articulates a consequentialist approach to habitual vice 
yet finds that her moral lectures are of no avail. But Foster enacts the role of the Rushian habit-
forming pedagogue by creating a narrative that allows readers to experience and be affected by, 
albeit at a remove, the consequences of Eliza’s seduction. In Wieland, Brown dramatizes how 
habit’s dissociation of action and intent makes it difficult to make sure assessments of moral 
accountability. In both novels, literary form reveals the ethical worlds habit makes available. In 
turn, both novels show how narrative might intervene in the debates those worlds provoked. 
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CHAPTER TWO: BETWEEN VICE AND DISEASE: MORAL INSANITY, SHEPPARD LEE, 
AND THE ETHICS OF EMBODIMENT  
 
“Who in the rainbow can draw the line where the violet tint ends and the orange 
tint begins? Distinctly we see the difference of the colors, but where exactly does 
the one first blendingly enter into the other? So with sanity and insanity. In 
pronounced cases there is no question about them. But in some supposed cases, in 
various degrees supposedly less pronounced, to draw the exact line of 
demarkation few will undertake tho' for a fee some professional experts will.” 
 Herman Melville, Billy Budd 
 
In the beginning decades of the nineteenth century, questions about impulsive, 
uncontrollable, or irrational behaviors that were at least partly answered by habit came to be 
addressed in the more specifically medical terms offered by so-called “alienists,” physicians 
specializing in diseases of the mind and brain. Such physicians increasingly found that they 
occupied an important role in Europe and the United States as arbiters of the boundary between 
virtue and vice. Led by Philippe Pinel’s pioneering research on insanity conducted as chief 
physician of Paris’s Hospice de la Salpêtière, physicians of the early nineteenth century began to 
understand insanity not as a permanent and total state of delirium (the prevailing view) but as 
encompassing a wide range of psychological afflictions. This shift broadened the medical 
definition of insanity dramatically. Newly categorized “partial” insanities such as Pinel’s manie 
sans délire (mania without delirium) posited that different faculties of mind might be disordered 
independently of one another. In Pinel’s A Treatise on Insanity (1801, translated into English 
1806), he describes the disorder as follows: 
The powers of preception and imagination are frequently disturbed without any 
excitement of the passions.17 The functions of the understanding, on the other hand, are 
                                                
17 A “preception” is a principle governing personal behavior. 
  
50 
often perfectly sound, while the man is driven by his passions to acts of turbulence and 
outrage. In many lunatics, a periodical or continued delirium are united to extravagance 
and fury. (135) 
 
The concept of partial insanity raised for physicians and laypersons alike questions about what 
insanity meant and whether one could be only partially insane (or only partially sane). It also 
raised questions about how to distinguish between insane persons and those who act in unusual 
or undesirable ways but are still sane. Writing on partial insanity, Benjamin Rush questions in 
Medical Inquiries and Observations, upon the Diseases of the Mind (1804) precisely “where the 
line should be drawn that divides free agency from necessity, and vice from disease” (360). 
James Cowles Prichard, a prominent English physician and early theorist of evolution, wonders 
in A Treatise on Insanity, and other Disorders Affecting the Mind (1835) where “eccentricity of 
character” ends and insanity begins (383). Neither physician offers a firm answer. 
 In this chapter I argue that physician, novelist, and playwright Robert Montgomery Bird’s 
Sheppard Lee (1836) harnesses the discourse of partial insanity to satirically emplot popular 
fears that opportunistic criminals might exploit new ways of understanding and diagnosing 
insanity to escape punishment. In doing so, I explore how fiction might intervene in debates 
about the ethical aspects of medical ideas by inviting the reader to assess them him- or herself in 
the absence of a character like Lucy Freeman to dispute the opportunist’s claims of inculpability. 
The chapter’s first section explores debates surrounding a type of partial insanity termed “moral 
derangement” by Rush and “moral insanity” by Prichard that is characterized by a disorder of 
one’s temperament, feelings, and habits that does not affect the intellect. A morally insane 
person might have no difficulty conducting herself rationally in most areas of daily life but still 
find herself irresistibly driven to steal even when she knows she will be caught. Moral insanity 
proved to be the most controversial of the partial insanities because it bears directly on ethics and 
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the law: it challenged the prevailing view that a rational person is, by virtue of being rational, 
fully responsible both morally and legally.  
In the chapter’s second section, I situate moral insanity and the debates it inspired within 
contemporary and controversial efforts on the part of phrenologists to advance biological 
theories of the mind that, like moral insanity, constituted a break with prevailing views on moral 
responsibility. Drawing this connection means demonstrating the ways that moral insanity 
corresponds with phrenologists’ locating the brain as the organ of the mind. It also means tracing 
the biological aspects of moral insanity, which proved central to the contentiousness of the 
debates surrounding it. Describing moral insanity as a disorder of the body means locating 
morality itself within the body. Thus, I argue, moral insanity participates in the broader early 
nineteenth-century shift, most commonly associated with phrenological and physiological 
discourses, from metaphysical and spiritual to physical views of the mind-body relationship. As I 
will discuss, Rush and Prichard show themselves to be more than aware of how sensitive an 
issue locating the causes of moral insanity within the body could prove: just as they decline to 
find the line demarking vice from disease, they decline to state definitively whether they view 
moral insanity as rooted in the body. Instead, they diplomatically and circumspectly hint at its 
somatic causes. 
Two sets of responses answered moral insanity’s shifting of the boundaries between vice 
and disease. One set viewed the shift as a laudable move towards justice and mercy. The 
Professor of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Sr.’s Elsie Venner: A Romance of Destiny (1861), best 
sums up the sentiment: “moral insanity … has done more to make men charitable and soften 
legal and theological barbarism more than any one doctrine I can think of since the message of 
peace and good-will to men” (227). For those like the Professor, moral insanity meant an end to 
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punishing those who act as they do because they are sick, not because they are malicious. The 
other set of responses viewed moral insanity as the first step on a slippery slope to the abolition 
of moral responsibility. Is murder not so atrocious and unthinkable an act that any murderer 
might be considered insane? If rationality is no guarantee of moral agency, what is?  
In the chapter’s third section I argue that Sheppard Lee dramatizes the latter set of 
responses.18 Specifically, I argue that the novel offers a wide-ranging satire of the ethical 
ramifications of early nineteenth-century medical theories of embodiment.19 After Sheppard Lee, 
a languid young Jerseyman, strikes his foot with a mattock while digging for buried treasure in 
the woods, his spirit is expelled from his body (47). The disembodied Lee wanders until he 
comes across the corpse of Squire Higginson, a local brewer, and to his surprise, he finds that he 
can house his spirit in the dead man’s body and reanimate it (52). He discovers that Higginson’s 
body carries within it an innate character that changes his natural affections and instincts. 
Drawing on the language of embodiment, he says that the new body’s power over his thought 
and behavior is such that he becomes a completely different person. Over the course of the novel, 
                                                
18 Other scholars have attended to American literature’s treatment of moral insanity, typically in 
connection to Edgar Allan Poe. John Cleman, writing on Poe’s engagement with the insanity 
defense in his fiction, notes that concurrent “asylum reform and the increased popularity of what 
was known as ‘moral treatment’ of the insane certainly contributed to the public perception that 
to be acquitted on the basis of insanity was to avoid punishment” (625) Likewise, Dan Shen 
argues that Poe’s “The Tell-Tale Heart” should be read with moral insanity’s implications for the 
insanity defense in mind: as Shen points out, the narrator of the tale “retains his rationality in 
‘calmly’ telling the story, premeditating the crime, cunningly carrying it out and trying to hide it; 
but on the other hand, he displays ‘dreadful’ nervousness, the lack of a rational motive for 
killing” (340). 
 
 
19 It would be reasonable to ask why Bird wrote a novel instead of a medical text to protest 
medicine’s new relationship to morality. One reason is that Bird quit practicing medicine a few 
years before publishing Sheppard Lee; afterwards, he worked full-time on plays and novels. 
Another reason is that writing a novel allows Bird to stage the ethical repercussions of 
embodiment and to show their possible effects. Writing a medical text would limit what he could 
say about the subject. 
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he inhabits the bodies of I. D. Dawkins, a Philadelphian dandy; Abram Skinner, a rapacious 
moneylender; Zachariah Longstraw, a Quaker, and Tom, a Virginian slave, reporting throughout 
that his original identity is overwhelmed by the physiological makeup of their bodies. That the 
bodies Lee inhabits are dead, with the consciousness in each presumably extinguished, 
emphasizes the degree to which he views the body’s materiality itself as determinative: “much of 
the evil and good of man’s nature,” he states, “arise from causes and influences purely physical” 
(140).  
I detail the ways that Lee’s views of embodiment dovetail with those of contemporary 
science and medicine before turning to how Lee’s use of the language of embodiment comically 
subverts itself in a way that coheres into a sharp satire of how such language may be turned 
towards eliminating moral responsibility. That Bird appears to endorse that which, I argue, he 
subverts is a feature of the novel’s satiric mode: much as Jonathan Swift’s A Modest Proposal 
(1729) enthusiastically recommends cooking and eating Irish children as a way of drawing 
attention to their plight, Bird’s novel hyperbolically asserts contemporary science and medicine’s 
claims about embodiment to comically shine a light on their ethical pitfalls. 
Another comedic form at play in Sheppard Lee, is one that was, like satire, popular in the 
early republic: blackface minstrelsy. The fourth section of this chapter argues that the novel 
poses a powerful if submerged counter-narrative to Lee’s tale by weaving his discourse of 
medical, material embodiment with that of blackface minstrelsy during Lee’s troubling tenure in 
the body of Tom, a Virginia slave. Blackface minstrelsy provides the representational foundation 
of Lee’s portrayal of racial blackness, for Lee narrates his account of the consciousness and 
behavior of Tom and his fellow slaves through blackface minstrel music and imagery drawn 
from such popular songs as “Jump Jim Crow” (1832) and “Clare de Kitchen” (1832). I draw on 
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recent scholarship on blackface minstrelsy to argue that minstrelsy both models and contradicts 
the circumstances of Lee’s embodiment within a black body. Minstrelsy models Lee’s 
embodiment in that both his embodiment and minstrelsy involve a white man appropriating dark 
skin towards staging racist, stereotyped depictions of racial blackness. Minstrelsy contradicts his 
embodiment, however, by indicating the ways that race is not bound to the physical body but is 
rather a product of social constraints and expectations.  
This is not to say that minstrelsy is straightforwardly antiracist: far from it. Turning to 
minstrelsy means, as I will discuss, turning to its repertoire of racist stereotypes, and Bird does 
not shy from recirculating those stereotypes. At the same time, white performers’ appropriation 
of these stereotypes illuminates the racial malleability of the body, implying that bodies are not 
physiologically determinative of our selves but are rather sites at which selves can find 
intentional expression. In my reading, Lee is like a blackface minstrel who colors himself with 
Hunt’s polish. Though the changes he undergoes as he hops from body to body might at first 
appear such that Lee cannot properly be said to be Lee, upon closer inspection what lies beneath 
the skin has remained the same.  
The stakes of this reading resonate at both the smaller scale of the novel itself and the 
larger scale of nineteenth-century American literary studies. At the smaller scale, Lee’s use of 
medical embodiment to deny his own free will and moral agency comes under suspicion. That 
denial positions him to exculpate himself for actions he lays at the doors of others’ bodies; in his 
view, the mind is so subject to bodily states that he cannot be held responsible for what he does 
while not inhabiting his own flesh (209). His argument thus makes a moral claim from 
physiological circumstance: bodies determine behavior, so he cannot be held responsible for 
  
55 
what bodies not his own make him do. Minstrel embodiment asks us to regard that argument 
skeptically.  
At a larger scale, my reading offers an exploration of how attending to comedic forms 
prevalent in Bird’s time might add to contemporary texts’ interpretive opportunities.20 Satire and 
minstrelsy, the two comedic modes most at play in Sheppard Lee, are each predicated on 
imitation; satire imitates towards ironically lampooning the object of imitation, and minstrelsy 
imitates towards performing racial caricature. The novel, of course, is at its broadest level a tale 
of imitation, given that Lee’s habitation of others’ bodies allows Bird to depict life as a brewer, a 
dandy, or a slave while using Lee’s dissociated consciousness to provide the distance from those 
lives needed to lampoon them. In this chapter’s coda, I discuss how being attuned to these 
distinct yet intersecting imitative modes can give scholars new perspectives on nineteenth-
century literature’s relationship to science and medicine. 
A Perfectly Sound Judgment 
Lee’s ability to jump from body to body gives him the opportunity to sample a range of 
identities and to live many lives. Unfortunately for those around him, his actions in others’ 
bodies often lead to disaster, chaos, and death. Some episodes, such as his turn as a philanderer 
in Dawkins’ body, are relatively harmless; others, such as his role in an unsuccessful and bloody 
slave rebellion in Tom’s, are catastrophic. Throughout, he repeatedly contends that he is 
blameless for what he says are the bodies’ actions, not his. In others’ bodies, he states, “I found 
myself invested with new feelings, passions, and propensities—as it were, with a new mind—
and retaining so little of my original character, that I was perhaps only a little better able to judge 
                                                
20 Satire has existed since antiquity, but it was particularly prevalent in Bird’s time due in part to 
debates on the character of the country and to the rise of national political parties. A discussion 
of the challenges involved in historicizing satire can be found on page 27. 
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and reason on the actions performed in my new body, without being able to avoid them, even 
when sensible of their absurdity” (140). To change bodies is to change minds; therefore, we are 
not to blame Lee for what others’ “feelings, passion, and propensities” make him do. 
Lee’s claim that altered affections and tendencies strip him of his moral agency reprises 
the claims of early nineteenth-century physicians researching moral insanity. We can trace moral 
insanity’s origins to Benjamin Rush’s attempt to define the ways that the physical world could 
impede what he calls the moral faculty. Rush made what historian of criminology Nicole Rafter 
writes is “one of the earliest scientific attempts to conceptualize crime and insanity as anything 
other than sin” in an address on “physical causes upon the moral faculty” given to the American 
Philosophical Society on February 27, 1786 (Rush 1; Rafter 21). In this speech, dedicated to 
Benjamin Franklin, Rush defines the moral faculty as “a capacity in the human mind of 
distinguishing and choosing good and evil; or, in other words, virtue and vice” (3). It is a 
separate faculty from the conscience in that it “is to the conscience, what taste is to the judgment, 
and sensation to perception” and is “quick in its operations, and like the sensitive plant, acts 
without reflection, while conscience follows with deliberate steps” (2). Rush remarks the 
similarity of the moral faculty to Francis Hutcheson’s moral sense, Adam Smith’s sympathy, and 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s moral instinct (3). However, he understands the moral faculty as 
distinct from its European counterparts in a crucial way: it is susceptible to influence from 
“physical causes,” including climate, diet, hunger, and disease (17-20). Turning to nervous 
disease’s effect on the moral faculty, he remarks that “preternatural irritability—sensibility—
torpor—stupor or mobility of the nervous system” can “dispose [one] to vice”; it is futile, in such 
cases, “to attack these vices with lectures upon morality” (20). Instead, vices rooted in nervous 
disorders “are only to be cured by medicine”; treatment takes the place of punishment and illness 
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that of blameworthiness (20). As Rush acknowledges, this heretofore unexplored conception of 
morality traces “the shape, texture, and conditions of the human body” itself; the ability to 
distinguish virtue from vice is thus construed as a psychophysiological process subject to disease 
and the material world (30). 
Rush was fully aware of the controversies his ideas could provoke: he compares himself 
to Aeneas “when he was about to enter the gates of Avernus, but without a Sybil to instruct me in 
the mysteries that are before me” (16). He writes that he is “aware, that in venturing upon this 
subject, I step upon untrodden ground” (16). He identifies two objections to address, both of 
which concern the ethical and theological effects of locating the moral faculty in the body and 
both of which will reappear throughout this dissertation. The first objection is that “the doctrine 
of the influence of physical causes upon the moral faculty” appears to “favor the opinion of the 
materiality of the soul” (14; emphasis Rush’s). But, he writes, “I do not see that this doctrine 
obliges us to decide upon the question of the nature of the soul, any more than the facts which 
prove the influence of physical causes upon the memory—the imagination—or the judgment” 
(14). He argues that it does not follow to make the immorality of the soul dependant on its 
immateriality, for the soul’s immorality “depends upon the will of the Deity, and not upon the 
supposed properties of spirit” (14; emphasis Rush’s). Indeed, he writes, matter is itself immortal: 
though it might change form, “it requires the same Almighty hand to annihilate it, that it did to 
create it” (14). Even if the soul were material (and Rush is careful not to attempt to answer the 
question), it could still exist forever. 
The second objection Rush addresses is the “idea of the necessary influence of physical 
causes upon the freedom of the will” (15; emphasis Rush’s). The specific objection is that 
physical causes upon the moral faculty would undermine moral agency. He responds that “I 
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believe in the prescience of the Deity, because I conceive this attribute to be inseparable from his 
perfections; and I believe in the freedom of moral agency in man, because I conceive it to be 
essential to his nature as a responsible being” (15). Rush’s endorsement of “the freedom of moral 
agency in man” appears to undermine much of his speech, but his is a qualified affirmation:  
In those cases where the moral faculty is deprived of its freedom, by involuntary diseases, 
I conceive that man ceases as much to be a subject of moral government, as he does to be 
a subject of civil government, when he is deprived by involuntary diseases, of the use of 
his reason. (15) 
 
The moral faculty is to moral responsibility, then, as reason is to legal responsibility. If that is so, 
then just as the loss of reason’s freedom is legally exculpatory, the loss of the moral faculty’s 
freedom is morally exculpatory. The key phrase in the above passage is “involuntary diseases”: 
one does not choose to be sick, so one cannot be held responsible for the consequences of 
sickness. If one of those consequences is a disordering of the moral faculty, the sick person 
should not be considered morally agential at all. Rush thus seems to reject the idea of moral 
agency by degrees: one is either within or without the sphere of “moral government.” 
 Though Rush appears to view “moral government” in either/or terms, he understands 
disorders of the moral faculty as occurring within degrees.21 He corrects “the defects of the 
nosological writers, by naming the partial or weakened action of the moral faculty, 
MICRONOMIA. The total absence of this faculty, I shall call ANOMIA” (16). The physical 
causes that could provoke micronomia or anomia include climate, diet, alcohol, extreme hunger, 
disease, idleness, excessive sleep, pain, cleanliness, solitude, silence, music, “the eloquence of 
the pulpit,” odors, airs (dephlogisticated air generates cheerfulness), and certain medicines (17-
27). Despite this expansive range of causes, Rush does not mention whether some are more 
                                                
21 Whether this means that Rush saw even the most minor of disorders to the moral faculty as 
exculpatory is unclear. 
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influential than others or by which degrees they might affect the moral faculty. He is far more 
interested in using medicine as a tool to reduce moral disease in the same manner as physicians 
reduced the incidence and mortality of smallpox and tetanus: doing so would create a more 
virtuous republic (36). 
 Rush followed up on his speech decades later in 1804, when he published Medical 
Inquiries and Observations, upon the Diseases of the Mind. The book remained influential 
throughout the early nineteenth century and was republished in five editions, the last of which 
was published in 1835. In it Rush largely repeats his thoughts of 1786, and he terms the 
condition arising from a disordered moral faculty “moral derangement” (357). He also remains 
as wary as ever of fully embracing the ethical and theological implications of his ideas. He 
declines to say to what degree the morally deranged “should be considered as responsible to 
human or divine laws for their actions, and where the line should be drawn that divides free 
agency from necessity, and vice from disease,” but he maintains that “it will be readily admitted 
that such persons are, in a pre-eminent degree, objects of compassion” (357). It is best, he writes, 
to treat moral derangement as a disease to be cured with “confinement, labour, simple diet, 
cleanliness, and affectionate treatment, as means of reformation and forgiveness” rather than a 
vice to be punished (365). 
Rush’s conception of moral derangement is one in that explicitly concerns one’s ability to 
distinguish right from wrong. For physician and nosologist Philippe Pinel, trained in Lockean 
empiricism rather than the Scottish faculty psychology that underpins Rush’s thinking, the mind 
does not contain an innate moral faculty. This difference in philosophical commitments resulted 
in the two men approaching the same nosological gap (mental derangement that does not affect 
the intellect) from different angles. In A Treatise on Insanity (1801), Pinel writes:  
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We may very justly admire the writings of Mr. Locke, without admitting his authority 
upon subjects not necessarily connected with his enquiries. On resuming at Bicêtre my 
researches into this disorder [mania without delirium], I thought, with the above author, 
that it was inseparable from delirium; and, I was not a little surprized to find many 
maniacs who at no period gave evidence of any lesion of the understanding, but who 
were under the dominion of instinctive and abstract fury, as if the active faculties alone 
sustained the injury. (150) 
 
The phrase “active faculties” indicates Pinel’s philosophical commitments to Locke, who 
distinguished between passive (sensory) and active (mental) sources of ideas. Pinel proposing 
that the active faculties sustain maniacal fury thus means that the disorder arises from a deranged 
mind rather than any external source. He breaks with Locke, though, in identifying instances of 
mania without accompanying delirium. To illustrate the concept he gives the example of a young 
man whose “weak and indulgent mother” supported him “in the gratification of every caprice 
and passion, of which an untutored and violent temper was susceptible” (151). He became totally 
unable to control his temper so that any “instance of opposition or resistance, roused him to acts 
of fury”: he instantly killed any animal that “offended him” and incited fistfights whenever in the 
company of others (151). Despite these issues, he “possessed a perfectly sound judgment” when 
not angered and “proved himself fully competent to the management of his estate” (151). 
Eventually, though, he pushed a woman into a well in a fit of rage and was permanently 
committed to Bicêtre (152). 
 The case of the maniacally furious young man illustrates an important difference between 
Rush and Pinel. Whereas Rush focuses on the derangement of one’s ability to tell right from 
wrong, Pinel focuses on the derangement of one’s emotions. Despite Rush’s international 
reputation, his ethical approach was largely ignored by subsequent psychiatrists, while Pinel’s 
manie sans délire found durabilitly through its affirmation in the acclaimed work of his pupil 
Jean-Étienne Dominique Esquirol. Esquirol’s 1805 Des Passions considérées comme causes, 
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symptômes et moyens curatifs de l'aliénation mentale situates manie sans délire under the 
broader umbrella of “affective monomania,” or insanity that disorders the affections only. That 
Esquirol follows Pinel’s rather than Rush’s thinking in his definition of the disorder is significant 
because of the debt James Cowles Prichard, who coined the term “moral insanity,” owes to his 
work. Prichard was a personal friend of Esquirol’s and even dedicated his groundbreaking A 
Treatise on Insanity and Other Disorders Affecting the Mind (1835) to him. Despite his 
admiration of Esquirol, Prichard does not follow him in describing moral insanity as an affliction 
of the emotions only: he also views it as disordering one’s moral dispositions.22  
Prichard’s use of the term “moral insanity” to describe a derangement of the emotions has 
resulted in confusion for those who came after him. Historian of science Jan Verplaetse writes 
that though it is clear that he views moral insanity as an insanity of the emotions, it is uncertain 
whether he saw it “also as an impairment of the moral sense or the moral faculty” (195). Because 
he trained in medicine in Edinburgh, Verplaetse notes, he would have been familiar with both 
options (195). He adds that historians of science are “divided on this subject”: one camp argues 
that moral insanity deranges the moral sense or moral faculty, and the other argues that it 
deranges the emotions (195). But I find in Prichard’s writing no reason to assume that he viewed 
moral insanity in either/or terms: 
[Moral insanity is] madness consisting in a morbid perversion of the natural feelings, 
affections, inclinations, temper, habits, moral dispositions, and natural impulses, without 
any remarkable disorder or defect of the intellect or knowing and reasoning faculties, and 
particularly without any insane illusion or hallucination. (6) 
 
For Prichard, moral insanity is as much a disorder of one’s “moral dispositions” as it is of one’s 
“affections.” He illustrates the disorder with the case of a young man held in the York Lunatic 
                                                
22 This is not to say that Prichard endorses Rush’s thinking. Rush understands the moral sense in 
a specific way, i.e. as one’s instinctive ability to tell right from wrong. Prichard’s view of moral 
dispositions is more general and refers to a one’s moral habits, constitution, or character. 
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Asylum, “a youth of good temper, cheerful and active, having no defect of understanding that 
could be discovered, even after long observation,” who nonetheless “is continually prone to 
commit every kind of mischief in his power, and not long ago escaped from his confinement and 
made his way to Bishopthorpe Palace, with the design to set it on fire” (22). As the example 
makes clear, Prichard does not simply twine Rush’s and Pinel’s descriptions of moral insanity: 
one’s “moral dispositions,” or one’s general moral commitments, are distinct from the moral 
faculty, having more in common with what Rush calls the conscience; a “morbid perversion” of 
the affections is less specific than Pinel’s manie sans délire, a state of uncontrollable fury that 
leaves the intellect intact. Rather, for Prichard moral insanity is a more general “morbid 
perversion of the affections and moral feelings” (22). 
 I suspect that Prichard’s generality has contributed a great deal to the confusion of those 
who have come after him. His description of the disorder, quoted above, reflects the degree to 
which he views the affected mental processes as interrelated. A more detailed description makes 
the connections clear: 
[Moral insanity is] a form of mental derangement in which the intellectual faculties 
appear to have sustained little or no injury, while the disorder is manifested principally or 
alone, in the state of the feelings, temper, or habits. In cases of this description the moral 
and active principles of the mind are strangely perverted and depraved; the power of self-
government is lost or greatly impaired; and the individual is found to be incapable, not of 
talking or reasoning upon any subject proposed to him, for this he will often do with great 
shrewdness and volubility, but of conducting himself with decency and propriety in the 
business of life (4). 
 
For Prichard, deranged “feelings, temper, or habits” leads to a significant lessening of one’s 
ability to govern oneself and to an inability to go about daily life “with decency and propriety.” 
The terms “self-government, “decency,” and “propriety,” encumbered as they are with moral 
weight, indicate the degree to which Prichard views damaged affections as afflicting one’s moral 
life. And later he describes moral insanity as “disorder affecting merely the moral character, the 
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propensities, habits, temper, and feelings, without involving any notable lesion of the 
understanding,” placing the moral character first among the afflicted mental phenomena (246). 
The moral affliction Prichard describes is thus not Rush’s conception of a disorder of one’s 
ability to know right from wrong but rather a disorder of one’s moral character, or one’s personal 
moral commitments. 
Though Prichard does not necessarily agree with Rush’s work on what he calls moral 
derangement—he favorably refers to the Philadelphian many times on the subject of bloodletting 
but does not mention insanity—both physicians show concern for those who suffer from moral 
insanity only to a certain degree. Prichard notes that such persons might display “a singular, 
wayward, and eccentric character” that causes others to “entertain doubts as to their entire 
sanity” (12). Occasionally the disorder comes on so slowly that it appears to be “an exaltation 
and increase of peculiarities, which were always more or less natural and habitual” (13). The 
afflicted might arouse “apprehension and solicitude” to their loved ones as they pursue “wild 
projects and speculations” that can lead to “absolute ruin” (13). Prichard here teeters on 
pathologizing mere oddness: if everyone who chased get-rich-quick schemes or obsessed over 
niche projects were insane, the bar for sanity would be set too high to be useful. However, he is 
careful to add (though much later in his treatise) that the exact line between “insanity and 
eccentricity of character is very difficult to discover, and I shall not attempt to sift this matter to 
the bottom on the present occasion (383). He is, though, “fully persuaded” that some cases of 
“extreme oddity or eccentricity” are “cases of madness” (383). 
Prichard thus solidifies a set of medical concerns that had percolated since the beginning 
of the century: partial insanity, which afflicts either the intellect or the affections but not both; 
what deranged affections mean for moral agency; and whether one can be insane by degrees. 
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Like Rush, he recognizes that his research into these concerns, specifically his thinking on how 
disease affects moral agency, differs from contemporary legal standards of non compos mentis 
and exculpatory insanity. He includes in his Treatise a chapter on “unsoundness of mind in 
relation to jurisprudence” that offers some proposed changes to the law (352). Prichard defines 
“mental unsoundness” as “a disordered of defective state of the mind, impeding in such a manner 
the exercise of its faculties as to render an individual incapable of performing correctly the duties 
of life, and of maintaining over himself those restraints with are necessary for the intercourse of 
society” (352). Consequently, it “impairs or destroys moral responsibility” (352). Prichard writes 
that addressing the jurisprudence of such knotty questions as “what constitutes soundness and 
unsoundness of mind?” and whether insanity can exist in degrees is the role of “both lawyers and 
physicians” (352). Physicians, “as observers of nature,” study “the phenomena displayed by the 
human constitution under disease, and from the relations of these phenomena to deduce such 
results as common sense, aided by the habit of reflecting on similar subjects, may enable them 
satisfactorily to establish” (353-53). From those conclusions, “legal regulations are to be 
constructed” (353). Here, Prichard demonstrates the extent to which he views the law’s role in 
medical jurisprudence as subservient to medicine: laws “must be made to accommodate 
themselves” to physicians’ views on the limits of moral agency” (353). 
Prichard is well aware that moral insanity’s challenge to the idea of rationality as the sole 
guarantor of moral agency would also challenge the English courts, which in 1835 recognized 
only “idiots, who are properly idioae ex nativitate, idiots from birth, and lunatics or madmen, 
styles ‘non compotes mentis’” (355). “This indeed,” he writes, “would reduce the classes of 
incompetent persons recognized by law within very narrow limits indeed” (355). For the courts 
to recognize cases of moral insanity as exculpatory would be a radical broadening of those 
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limits; thus, whether “such an affection really exists or not is very important in connexion with 
medical jurisprudence” (380). But convincing the English legal system of the existence of moral 
insanity would be an uphill battle, for “no such disorder has been recognized in the English 
courts of judicature, or even admitted by medical writers in England” (380). He writes that 
English physicians and lawmakers only recognize cases of insanity insofar as they consist of 
cases of “mental illusion” (380).23 Moral insanity, though, consists precisely of a disorder of the 
affections with no accompanying delusions or damage to the intellect. Regardless of what 
Prichard sees as England’s sluggishness to adapt to new research on mental disease, he remains 
“fully persuaded that the time is not far distant when the existence of mental disorder 
unaccompanied by illusion or any lesion whatsoever of intellect, will be generally recognized” 
(382). 
Prichard’s vision did not prove completely true. In the 1843 trial of Daniel M’Naghten, 
who attempted to murder British Prime Minister Robert Peel, M’Naghten’s defense counsel 
extensively deployed the work of American physician Isaac Ray, whose 1838 Treatise on the 
Medical Jurisprudence of Insanity championed Prichard’s arguments the jurisprudence of moral 
insanity (Diamond 651). The trial resulted in M’Naghten’s acquittal on grounds of insanity, a 
controversial decision that prompted a group of judges to construct a test for exculpatory insanity 
that juries would thenceforth be instructed to apply: “To establish a defence [sic] on the grounds 
of insanity, it must be clearly proved that, at the time of the committing of the act, the party was 
                                                
23 Prichard explains how the courts view insanity as necessarily including delusion with a 
passage from the “Report on the judgement [sic] in Dew v. Clarke and Clarke, Delivered by the 
Right Hon. Sir J. Nicholl. Lond. 1826”: “… the true criterion is—where there is delusion of mind 
there is insanity; that is, when persons believe things to exist which exist only, or at least in that 
degree exist only in their own imagination, and of the non-existence of which neither argument 
nor proof can convince them, they are of unsound mind; or, as one of the counsel accurately 
expressed it, ‘it is only the belief of facts which no rational person would have believed, that is 
insane delusion.’” (380)  
  
66 
labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and 
quality of the act he was doing; or if he did know it, that he did not know that he was doing what 
was wrong” (qtd in Maeder 33). This test makes two key revisions to standing practice: first, 
insanity need no longer be permanent to be exculpatory; second, the degree of derangement need 
no longer be total but only to the degree that the sufferer could not tell right from wrong. Though 
this shift, known as the M’Naghten rules, instituted many changes advocated by physicians, it 
did not recognize affective derangement as cause for acquittal on the basis of insanity. That the 
M’Naghten rules were adopted in both Britain and the United States suggests the degree to 
which courts on both sides of the Atlantic sought a middle ground between new and old ways of 
viewing insanity. 
The courts did not incorporate moral insanity into the M’Naghten reforms because the 
disorder was, as legal historian Janet A. Tighe writes, a site of both “interest” and “bitter 
conflict” among physicians and jurists (231). The popular association of insanity with a deranged 
intellect, she argues, was too powerful to easily overcome (231). And laypersons viewed moral 
insanity as “shield[ing] people who were evil rather than ill,” a concern that Rush and Prichard 
both anticipated but proved unable to persuasively counter (231). By midcentury, moral insanity 
gave way to degeneration, which, as I will discuss in depth in Chapter 4, blamed psychological 
and social problems such as insanity and criminality on heredity (Rafter, “Horse-Slasher” 995). 
Before midcentury, though, moral insanity was the most well-known and controversial 
part of a broader “concern with what effect the expansion of medical definitions of insanity 
would have on traditional legal and moral concepts like responsibility” (Tighe 232). Moral 
insanity’s notoriety in popular, judicial, and medical contexts makes the similarities between 
moral insanity and Sheppard Lee’s description of his mind as it flits from body to body more 
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than merely coincidental. Further, Bird’s having Lee deny responsibility for his actions because 
his new feelings and temperament strip him of moral agency echoes moral insanity’s core 
question and controversy: to what extent does it requires rethinking moral responsibility? In the 
next section I demonstrate the ways that moral insanity participates in broader early nineteenth-
century shifts from “theories stressing volition and absolute moral responsibility to theories 
which emphasized some form of ‘scientific’ determinism,” which were viewed as “threat[s] to 
traditional institutions and seemingly related values such as free will, moral culpability, and just 
retribution.” Specifically, I argue that the moral insanity controversy and the more general shift 
from vice to disease in the early nineteenth century are best understood in context with 
phrenology, the early nineteenth century’s popular science of the brain. 
 The Limitations of Human Responsibility 
 In A Treatise on Insanity, Prichard writes that the “conditions of the mind and of the 
nervous system connected with moral insanity, is a subject involved in deep obscurity” (112). As 
he was well aware, the question of whether moral insanity corresponds to debility of the brain or 
nervous system is ethically significant. To ground moral insanity in the body is to take a step 
towards grounding one’s affections and moral temperament in the body rather than in the mind 
or soul. Prichard does not at first offer a firm opinion on the body’s connection to moral insanity. 
The disease is so “difficult to explain,” he writes, that some “might be tempted to doubt its 
existence as a primary affection” at all, regardless of the nature of its causes (112). He appeals to 
his own “experience and observations” as proof of moral insanity’s existence, but he 
acknowledges that evidence of an accompanying physical debility—a tattered corpus callosum, a 
lesioned frontal lobe—would be stronger proof. He notes that François-Joseph-Victor Broussais 
locates the physical cause of moral insanity in “irritation of the trisplanchnic apparatus, and 
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especially in that of the stomach, acting on the brain” (112). Prichard agrees that irritation of the 
digestive system also irritates one’s temper, but not to the extent that it could render one 
murderous (114). He would seem, then, to reject the body as a cause of moral insanity. 
 Later, in a chapter on the pathology of insanity, Prichard changes tack. He states as 
before that of all mental disorders, moral insanity is most difficult to trace to “the presence of 
disease in the brain” (246). He notes that it is impossible to prove that “the passions and 
propensities are seated in the brain,” and that to do so is to ally oneself with the view that the 
brain is the “instrument in all the manifestations of mind or the attributes of the soul” (246). But 
here he goes further than previously: despite his qualms, he writes that it is “probable that moral 
insanity depends, in some instances at least, on disease of the brain” (246). Again, though, he 
says nothing conclusive on the subject. 
In what follows I tie Prichard’s deliberations on the physical causes of moral insanity to 
phrenology, a discipline that forms the scientific and cultural backdrop for the moral insanity 
controversy. Phrenology offered a biological explanation for mental phenomena that was popular 
and influential in both Europe and the United States throughout the early nineteenth century. 
Though many today dismiss phrenology as a pseudoscience at odds with “real,” professionalized 
science, the discipline has its roots in neuroanatomy and was taken seriously in its time. It is also 
an important precursor to a variety of developments in modern neurology.24 Franz Joseph Gall, 
an Austrian neuroanatomist and the father of phrenology, published Discours d'ouverture, lu par 
                                                
24 Edwin Clarke and J.S. Jacyna write that Gall was actually the first to insist that the mind is 
situated within the brain, “to us a very obvious conclusion,” and later note that Gall’s concept of 
brain localization is “generally accepted” today (4, 213). Mary Brazier argues that Gall “may be 
regarded as a pioneer in emphasizing the importance of the grey matter for intellectual 
processes” (“Electrical Activity” 199). Robert Young argues that the founders of modern 
psychology owe a “direct debt” to Gall (250). Denis Leigh agrees, writing that Gall’s map of the 
human skull “was an early forerunner of the magnificent work on localization of nervous 
functions which still continues” (245). 
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M. le Dr Gall à la première séance de son cours public sur la physiologie du cerveau, a speech 
made during a public course on the physiology of the head, in 1808. In it he explains that discrete 
mental faculties are located within specific areas of the brain and that the head’s physiological 
structure can offer clues to the strengths and weaknesses of these mental faculties in any given 
person. This connection between cranial morphology and brain size is phrenology’s foundational 
concept.25 He also lays out some of the implications he thinks his ideas will have for philosophy. 
In the speech, he says: 
Si j'arrive maintenant à l'étude de l'homme lui-même, dont l'organisation est si 
prodigieusement compliquée, et dont les variétés générales et individuelles sont infinies, 
je ne vois qu'un petit nombre de philosophes qui se soient attachés à l'analyse de l'homme 
Intellectuel. Mais ceux-ci ont trop souvent négligé les influences des causés physiques. 
En même-temps, la plupart des philosophes et des métaphysiciens se sont égarés dans des 
abstractions et dans des théories qui les éloignolent de la nature. (5)26 
 
Gall demonstrates a preoccupation with a specifically materialistic conception of human nature 
and cognition.27 Because he views humanity as part of “nature,” he echoes Rush in his attention 
                                                
25 Some historians argue that only later phrenologists, not Gall, claimed that these mental organs 
were made legible from examining bumps on one’s head and that Gall believed that only 
individuals with extraordinarily large neural bumps would have bumps that are discernable 
(Clarke and Jacyna 223-4). However, he writes in the first volume of Sur les fonctions du 
cerveau…, his systematic treatise on the brain and skull, that “the form of the head or cranium 
should represent, in most cases, the form of the brain, and should suggest various means to 
ascertain the fundamental qualities and faculties, and the seat of their organs” (Gall, trans. Lewis, 
55). 
 
 
26 “To come now to the study of man himself, whose composition is so prodigiously complex, 
and whose general and individual varieties are infinite, I see a small number of philosophers who 
analyze Intellectual Man. However, they have often neglected the influence of physical forces 
[upon the mind]. At the same time, most philosophers and metaphysicians are lost in abstractions 
and theories that are removed from nature.” 
 
 
27 George Combe, more widely read than Gall in America, would write in A System of 
Phrenology (1830) that contemporary charges of phrenology being materialistic were false, 
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to the ways that “causes physiques” affect the mind. Whereas Rush focuses on physical causes 
that are extrinsic to the affected person, e.g. climate and silence, Gall attends to the brain itself as 
the physical cause of all mental phenomena. Gall and those who followed him mapped different 
mental characteristics to specific areas of the brain. One’s abilities in such as areas as wit, 
perseverance, and poetic talent could be measured by feeling the bumps their correspondent 
neural locations pushed into the skull. So-called “lower propensities” such as “amativeness 
[lust], philoprogenitiveness [love of children], combativeness, secretiveness, and 
acquisitiveness,” thought to be shared with animals, were pertinent to vice (Fink 3). 
 Phrenology shares many of moral insanity’s assumptions about the mind, particularly the 
view that some mental functions can be disordered independently of others. Earlier I wrote that 
the Professor in Oliver Wendell Holmes’ Elsie Venner could summarize the views of those who 
thought moral insanity an avenue towards justice and mercy. I turn to him again to suggest the 
connection between moral insanity and phrenology: 
The limitations of human responsibility have never been properly studied, unless it be by 
the phrenologists. You know from my lectures that I consider phrenology, as taught, a 
pseudo-science, and not a branch of positive knowledge; but, for all that, we owe it an 
immense debt. It has melted the world's conscience in its crucible, and cast it in a new 
mould, with features less like those of Moloch and more like those of humanity. If it has 
failed to demonstrate its system of special correspondences, it has proved that there are 
fixed relations between organization and mind and character. It has brought out that great 
doctrine of moral insanity, which has done more to make men charitable and soften legal 
and theological barbarism than any one doctrine that I can think of since the message of 
peace and good-will to men. (227) 
 
It is not the case that moral insanity is a branch of phrenology, as the quoted passage can be read 
as suggesting. I understand the Professor as saying that phrenological ideas helped make it 
possible for moral insanity to exist as a theory of mental illness. The disorder can be traced to 
                                                
unless “the science is held to be a true interpretation of nature,” in which case phrenology would 
be a danger to theology for making the material nature of the universe known (412).  
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Rush’s and Pinel’s work, as I have explained, but phrenology provided a conception of the brain 
in which different mental abilities were located in discrete cerebral locations that were 
independent of each other. One location, or “mental organ,” as phrenologists termed it, might 
wilt while another flourishes. Phrenology thus shares the logic of partial insanity, in which one’s 
intellectual abilities might be afflicted without damage to one’s affections or vice versa. 
 Nicole Rafter writes that phrenology “made it easy to think of morality as a faculty or 
organ of the brain that could go bad while others parts operated normally”: thus, phrenology 
“nurtured the concept of moral insanity” by providing a popular and systematic way of thinking 
about the brain and mind (“Born Criminals” 76). The work of Johann Gaspar Spurzheim, Gall’s 
chief disciple and the man responsible for popularizing phrenology in the United States, 
illustrates how moral insanity and phrenology dovetail. In A View on the Elementary Principles 
of Education, first published in America in 1832, Spurzheim separates idiocy into “complete” 
idiocy, or a total and permanent debility of all mental functions, and “partial” idiocy, which 
affects one or several mental organs but not others (295). Like Prichard, he complains that the 
courts “are not yet convinced that there are various faculties of the mind, and that the 
manifestations of each power depend on a particular part of the brain; that one or several organs 
may be very active, while others are in a state of idiotism” (295). Such a state of partial idiotism 
explains, he writes, how a person might have strong “perceptive faculties” but no “powers of the 
moral will” (295). Again like Prichard, he references both Rush and Pinel in his description of 
what he calls “moral idiotism,” which deprives the afflicted of “sufficient moral motives,” 
rendering them unable to be considered as “accountable beings” (299). He differs from Prichard, 
though, in his full-throated support of the idea that the brain manifests the mind.  
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 Despite Prichard’s reluctance to definitively locate moral insanity within the body, the 
disorder’s conceptual similarities to phrenology fueled the objections of those who viewed it as a 
materialist get-out-of-jail-free card for perfectly sane criminals. David Meredith Reese, a 
Philadelphian physician, complained as much in an 1858 report to the American Medical 
Association: 
It is only on the theory that the brain is congeries of organs, each of with has its 
appropriate function, and severally developing instinctive, moral and intellectual results; 
and on the still bolder hypothesis that the organs of each separate function may be 
arbitrarily mapped our, or designated by the science, that this conception of moral 
insanity could ever have been engendered. (qtd in Fink 68) 
 
For Reese, whose 1838 Humbugs of New-York castigates phrenology as incompatible with 
Christianity, moral insanity is not a path towards enlightened mercy but rather the wide road to 
hell. The idea that one’s emotions and moral character might be deranged independently of one’s 
intellect was controversial by itself, but to locate what Spurzheim called “moral idiotism” in the 
body was to radically break from earlier metaphysical and theological theories of moral agency.  
Causes and Influences Purely Physical  
In Sheppard Lee, Lee takes full advantage of the shift to embodied models of the mind-
body relationship. His actions lead to disaster, chaos, and death, but throughout the novel he 
defends himself to the reader. Some episodes, such as philandering in the body of I. D. Dawkins, 
the wannabe lothario, harm few other than himself; others, as his role in a slave rebellion as Tom 
demonstrates, are catastrophic. However, he repeatedly contends to the reader that he is 
blameless for what he says are the bodies’ actions, not his. After describing a dubious set of 
financial practices he keeps in Skinner’s body, he requests “the reader to remember that I had got 
into Abram Skinner’s body, and that the burden of my acts should be therefore laid upon his 
shoulders” (202). He places the moral burden of his actions, quite literally, on Skinner’s body.  
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Though he defends his actions to the reader by blaming others’ bodies, he learns early in 
the novel that other characters view, for example, Lee’s animation of Higginson as Higginson, 
not as Sheppard-Lee-in-Higginson’s-body. When Lee first inhabits Higginson’s body, he enjoys 
an afternoon of shooting woodfowl (Higginson’s favorite pastime) before his newfound 
corpulence and asthma tire him (60). He begins to walk to a nearby village for dinner but is 
stopped by a group of men accusing him of “having murdered Sheppard Lee—that is, my own 
identical self!” (61). They arrest him on the testimony of several neighbors who’d seen 
Higginson and Lee arguing politics in weeks past and who’d found a “freshly-dug grave” (the 
result of Lee’s treasure-hunting) and a bloody shoe (the result of Lee’s hitting his foot with his 
mattock) in the woods. Before the trial, he decides to inform the prosecutor of his transformation, 
“after which, I had no doubt, he would throw his bill of endictment into the fire” (64). The 
prosecutor responds to Lee’s story with disbelieving laughter, but works to release him from 
prison due to “the poor squire’s hallucination,” a total delusion of the sort expected by early 
nineteenth-century courts (67). Lee resolves to never again to attempt to “keep up the character 
of Sheppard Lee while in another man’s body” and works “to be Mr. John H. Higginson, and 
nobody else, for the future … for I did not like the idea of being clapped into a mad-house by my 
new friends” (69). Consequently, he addresses only the reader, whose credulity he demands in 
the novel’s opening pages, when he blames his actions on others’ bodies: “Doubt” his story, he 
says, “and be hanged” (8). He “writes for the world at large, which is neither philosophic nor 
skeptical; and the world will believe me; otherwise it is a less sensible world than I have all 
along supposed it to be” (8). Here, he seems to imply that a philosophical or skeptical reader will 
not believe his tale. 
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In this section I argue (as a philosophical if not a skeptical reader) that Bird writes Lee’s 
tale as a satire of the shift from vice to disease, a shift consequent to the emergence of embodied 
models of the mind-body relationship in the early nineteenth century. Scholars who have written 
about Sheppard Lee tend to understand Bird as in agreement with Lee’s embodied account of 
selfhood because that account dovetails with early nineteenth-century medical discourses on the 
mind-body relationship. Bird was, after all, a physician.28 But that reading overlooks the ways 
that Bird’s novel again and again makes embodiment itself a target of ridicule. Like his 
contemporary and admirer Edgar Allan Poe, the likely author of a favorable review of Sheppard 
Lee in the Southern Literary Messenger, Bird delights in lampooning all elements of Jacksonian 
life.29 Specifically, Sheppard Lee explores embodiment’s use as a vantage point from which to 
satirize contemporary politics and culture. Though critics are correct to view Lee as endorsing a 
strongly determinative version of embodiment, it does not follow to say the same of Bird, as 
                                                
28 Samuel Otter offers an insightful reading of the ways Lee’s account of embodiment calls 
attention to the soul’s ties to “the material it inhabits”; this account, Otter asserts, “stem[s] from 
[Bird’s] medical training” (100, 95). Christopher Looby, similarly, writes in his introduction to 
the novel that its “physiognomic determinism … must owe a good deal to Bird’s experience as a 
medical doctor” (xvii). Recently, Jordan Alexander Stein and Justine Murison have read the 
novel as having a less straightforward relationship to Lee’s portrayal of embodiment. In 
particular, both attend to how Bird uses Lee’s materialist metaphysics of consciousness as a 
source of comedy. Stein notes that Lee’s philosophical materialism “erases the distinction 
between the willed or chosen, on the one hand, and the inevitable, on the other,” and that the 
novel plays Lee’s materialism “largely for comedy”; he does not, though, pursue in depth what 
comedic materialism might mean for how we read the novel (34). Instead, he argues that Lee’s 
materialism, because it downplays the power of individuals to control their bodies, is part of a 
wider critique of Jacksonian democracy, a political movement predicated upon the idea that the 
common man is fit to govern himself (36). Justine Murison’s brilliant analysis reads the novel as 
a satire of “the politics of physiological sympathy” that indicates the absurdity of 
sympathetically conflating one person with another (27). 
 
 
29 In an anonymous review of Bird’s 1835 novel The Hawks of Hawk-Hollow written for the 
Southern Literary Messenger, the anonymous critic (likely Poe), writes that he is “in the very 
first rank of American writers of fiction” (43). Of Sheppard Lee the critic writes that “the novel 
is an original in American Belles Lettres at least” (662).  
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many do; doing so conflates author and narrator. In a way, merging Bird with Lee parallels the 
determinative force Lee says bodies bring to bear on his personality. It is a dual monism: 
writer/character and Lee/body. But just as Bird is discrepant from his character, his character is 
discrepant from the bodies he inhabits. Far from endorsing what Lee says about embodiment, 
Bird finds it laughable.  
In his work on African-American satire, Darryl Dickson-Carr notes that “defining satire 
can be a challenging and frequently confusing endeavor,” especially when one wishes to discuss 
a particular stitch in the fabric of a genre that spans millennia and continents (15). As in the case 
of African-American satire, though, Bird’s satire is marked by its situation within historically, 
politically, and philosophically specific circumstances, one of which is the shift from vice to 
disease already outlined. The novel’s satiric take on embodied approaches to moral agency 
extends to moral insanity. I argue that both Lee’s explanation of embodiment and contemporary 
definition of moral insanity describe a disruption in the normal functioning of one’s feelings, 
inclinations, and natural character without disordering one’s ability to think and know. Lee’s 
transmigrations into other bodies offer a narrative model of the medical symptoms of moral 
insanity: his native affections, propensities, and habits purportedly shift radically through the 
influence of others’ bodies, though he remains able to converse and reason “shrewdly” (Prichard 
4). For Bird, whose medical training would have made him familiar with contemporary thinking 
on insanity, such a similarity is not incidental. Rather, the confluence of Lee’s exculpatory 
embodiment and the symptoms of moral insanity is a focal point of the novel’s satire of 
embodiment’s ethical repercussions. 
Charles A. Knight writes that satire works by “imitat[ing] other genres” and discursive 
modes: it can thus sometimes be difficult to tell satire apart from the object of its derision (32). 
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In Sheppard Lee, that means that it is easy to confuse, as many critics have, jokes at the expense 
of embodiment for endorsements of it. In contrast to readings of Sheppard Lee that presume that 
Bird agrees with Lee’s portrait of embodiment because that portrait mirrors contemporary 
science, I argue that mirroring is more a satirical evaluation of what it doubles than a mimesis. 
As is true of other satirical works from Bird’s period, from Irving’s A History of New-York 
(1809) to Poe’s “Lionizing” (1835), he finds exaggeration a powerful satirical tool: he often has 
Lee make pronouncements on the body’s ascendency over the mind that are bold enough to 
make Lee seem foolish.  
The most sustained of Lee’s explanations of how his exotic form of embodiment works, a 
quasi-medical “morsel of metaphysics,” shows exaggeration’s satirical work in the novel (38). 
He first briefly touches on morality, stating that:  
much of the evil and good of man’s nature arise from causes and influences purely 
physical; that valour and ambition are as often caused by a bad stomach as ill-humour by 
bad teeth; that Socrates, in Bonaparte’s body, could scarcely have been Socrates, 
although the combination might have produced a Timoleon or Washington; and, finally, 
that those sages who labour to improve the moral nature of their species, will effect their 
purpose only when they have physically improved the stock. (140-141) 
 
Lee’s comments reveal a complex picture, one that comically vexes the idea of morality—“the 
evil and good of man’s nature”—as having “purely physical” influences.30 He locates the roots 
of high-flown, desirous qualities such as valor and ambition within the decidedly more everyday 
“bad stomach.” That he does so comically exaggerates the body’s influence on the mind, 
especially compared to the more commonsense idea of “ill-humour” being caused by tooth pain 
(140). It is true, as Murison notes, that afflictions of the stomach were often thought to 
sympathetically affect the nervous system in Bird’s time; it is possible, then, Lee’s comment, 
                                                
30 Contemporary moral reform societies such as the Society for the Suppression of Vice, or 
“those sages who labour to improve the moral nature of their species,” are also targets of Bird’s 
satire in this passage (141). 
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being representative of much contemporary medicine, ought to be taken as representative of 
Bird’s (24). However, the comic nature of the juxtaposition of valor and dyspepsia (especially 
when dyspepsia was thought more likely to lead to madness) indicates that Bird does not work 
within the logics of embodiment, as Lee seems to do, so much as he ridicules them.  
Having addressed and satirically punctured the “purely physical” nature of moral 
character, Lee explains how the body and mind are joined: “Strong minds may be indeed 
operated upon without regard to bodily bias … but ordinary spirits lie in their bodies like water 
in sponges, diffused through every part, affected by the part’s affections, changed with its 
changes, and so intimately united with the fleshly matrix, that the mere cutting off of a leg, as I 
believe, will, in some cases, leave the spirit limping for life” (141). The pattern of comic 
juxtaposition previously established obtains in this passage: Lee’s describing the mind-body 
relationship by analogizing it to water in a sponge comically boils one of philosophy’s most 
hoary and intractable problems down to a household cleaning tool. In this reduction, the 
irreconcilability of the sponge’s banality and the physiology it purportedly explicates comically 
void the sponge as a serious and practicable model for the human body, which cuts at 
contemporary mechanistic explanations of consciousness.  
Though both Justine Murison and Samuel Otter acknowledge the comedy of this passage 
in their influential readings of Sheppard Lee, they miss Bird’s satiric point. Murison rightly 
claims that though Lee’s ideas about embodiment are “humorously deflated,” he “expresses the 
standard view of the sympathetic body” (29). She goes on to identify the sponge as a workable 
metaphor for Bird to express sympathy as “a lounging and slothful exercise of ‘ordinary spirits,’” 
lazing in their bodies as water sits in a sponge (29). However, there is more to the sponge than its 
aptness for Bird’s critique of contemporary models of embodiment, including sympathy: it is the 
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humorousness of the sponge, not just its porosity, that animates Bird’s satirization of 
embodiment. Otter, in turn, argues that the passage, by switching the properties of matter and 
spirit—“[s]ponges acquire affections and spirits limp”—comically “deflate[s] notions that 
elevate or detach spirit from body” (101). I see quite the opposite: the humorousness of spiritual 
sponges and hobbling spirits ridicules not the separation of spirit and body but rather the “fleshly 
matrix” they analogize (141). Lee ends his explanation of embodiment by asserting that he is 
“not writing a dissertation on metaphysics, nor on morals either,” but what the metaphysics of 
consciousness means for morality is precisely what is at stake in the novel (141).  
The mental changes Lee undergoes when he changes bodies mirrors the symptoms of 
moral insanity, which is a significant similarity given the disorder’s centrality to the shift from 
vice to disease. This is not to say that Sheppard Lee is “about” moral insanity but rather that it is 
in conversation with the broader moral issues moral insanity raised. Both Lee’s narration of his 
experiences in others’ bodies and moral insanity describe disruptions in the normal functioning 
of the feelings, inclinations, and natural character without disordering the ability to think and 
know. Compare Lee’s description of embodiment in others’ bodies—“I found myself invested 
with new feelings, passions, and propensities”—with Prichard’s definition of moral insanity:  
[Moral insanity is] a form of mental derangement in which the intellectual faculties 
appear to have sustained little or no injury, while the disorder is manifested principally or 
alone, in the state of the feelings, temper, or habits. In cases of this description the moral 
and active principles of the mind are strangely perverted and depraved; the power of self-
government is lost or greatly impaired; and the individual is found to be incapable, not of 
talking or reasoning upon any subject proposed to him, for this he will often do with great 
shrewdness and volubility, but of conducting himself with decency and propriety in the 
business of life. (352) 
 
Lee’s transmigrations into other bodies offer a narrative model of the medical symptoms of 
moral insanity: his native affections, propensities, and habits purportedly shift so radically 
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through the influence of others’ bodies that he cannot govern himself, though he remains able to 
converse and think. 
 The similarities between Lee’s embodiment and moral insanity means that Sheppard Lee 
dramatizes the aspects of moral insanity that led many to view it as the first step towards the 
elimination of moral responsibility. The novel reprises moral insanity’s challenges: how can you 
tell definitively whether another person’s strange or undesirable behavior is due to insanity? Are 
disordered affections exculpatory? What is the body’s role in moral agency? The stakes of these 
questions, as Prichard puts it, are that insanity “impairs or destroys moral responsibility” 
although eccentricity does not (352). Opponents of moral insanity insisted that a medicine-savvy 
criminal could easily pretend to have been temporarily and partially insane at the time of his or 
her crime and escape punishment. Antebellum jurists approached the problem by greatly 
increasing their reliance on medical testimony: they believed that physicians could help to 
separate the sane from the insane and thus demarcate the bounds of responsibility (Eigen 127). 
Yet even for physicians, as the writings of Rush, Pinel, and Prichard make clear, moral insanity 
makes the visibility and permanence of such bounds a live question.  
As previously discussed, the moral insanity controversy was fueled by concerns that it 
joined phrenology in locating the mind within the body. Doing so, it was feared, would mean 
that moral responsibility would be merely a matter of one’s bodily conditions. Sheppard Lee 
recapitulates this fear by having Lee insist throughout the novel that others’ bodies’ feelings and 
dispositions absolve him of moral responsibility. While in Skinner’s body, Lee directly asks the 
reader to blame his actions on his borrowed flesh:  
A swearing gentleman once borrowed a Quaker’s great-coat, with a promise not to 
dishonour it by any profanity while it was on his back; upon returning it to his friend, he 
was demanded if he had kept his promise. ‘Yes,’ said the man of interjections, with one 
of the most emphatic; ‘but it has kept me lying all the time.’ I never heard anybody doubt 
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that the lying was the fault of the coat; and, in like manner, I hope that the reader will not 
hesitate to attribute all my actions, while in Abram Skinner’s body, to Abram Skinner’s 
body itself. (202)  
 
This passage is satirical because of Bird’s method of offering a complex physiological analogy 
and moral argument by way of a simple object; it is also nonsensical in obvious ways, a house of 
cards Bird constructs specifically to showcase its points of failure. Lee identifies the coat as the 
cause of the “man of interjections” having to lie (202). However, it is not really the coat, but 
rather the swearing gentleman’s promise not to curse while wearing it, that “has kept [him] lying 
all the time” (202). The coat itself has no power. In this way, Lee’s parable of the coat analogizes 
not Lee’s portrait of exculpatory embodiment but rather Bird’s satiric twist on the same: both the 
coat and the human body in themselves have no intrinsic moral agency. The passage works 
satirically not only by redirecting the explanatory power of Lee’s analogy but also in its pointed 
indication of the logical fallacies he brings to bear in verifying it. His proof of the coat’s 
exculpatory power is that he “never heard anybody doubt that the lying was the fault of the 
coat”; this assertion is nonsensical because it shifts the burden of proof from him to whoever 
might care to ask others if they doubt that the coat exculpates the swearing gentleman. By such 
logic, he could just as easily make the dubious argument that “Socrates was a man because I 
have never heard anyone doubt that he was a man.”  
Soon after, Lee asserts that “a man’s body is like a barrel, which, if you salt fish in it 
once, will make fish of every thing you put into it afterward.” (209). What goes into the barrel 
loses whatever unique qualities it might have possessed. It becomes, simply, fish. Bird sets a 
pattern: Lee reaches for banal objects to explain how one’s mind is inflected by one’s body. The 
banality and simplicity of the objects Lee uses to analogize bodies—sponges, coats, fishy 
barrels—offer a satiric subversion of the mechanical language used in medicine to describe 
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embodiment. Much like Poe, who characterizes his narrator in “Loss of Breath” (1832) as 
unreliable through his florid, self-absorbed storytelling, Bird invites us not to take what Lee says 
about embodiment seriously. If satire is a type of ironic doubling, then to read Lee as true to his 
word risks mistaking the satiric point for what it doubles. In other words, we should take care not 
to miss the joke.  
The Popular Actor 
Lee’s vision of embodiment hinges on the idea that bodies shape one’s range of possible 
behaviors. Metempsychosis, for Lee, is thus more than the assumption of a new appearance: it is 
the assumption of a new character altogether. As Bird composed his novel, he kept lists of other 
bodies Lee could have inhabited, including a “genteel forger, counterfeiter, and bank robber,” a 
“soldier in [the] black Hawk War, where the gen’ls get all the credit,” and “The patriot—the 
ardent young virginian [sic] elected to Congress, where he finds nothing but miserable 
selfishness” (Looby xvi-xvii). Bird also lists as a possibility “The popular actor”: Looby finds 
this a missed opportunity, and he wishes “that Bird had at least had Sheppard Lee do a turn as an 
actor: after Bird’s own falling-out with Forrest, he doubtless had a rich trove of reflections on 
what might be called professional metempsychosis” (xvii).31 In what follows I claim that Bird 
does have Lee take a turn as a type of actor, one whose talent for metempsychosis lies at the 
center of his popular appeal: the blackface minstrel. Scholars such as Eric Lott and W. T. 
Lhamon have recently argued that blackface minstrelsy suggests that race is a construction 
                                                
31 See Clement Foust, The Life and Dramatic Works of Robert Montgomery Bird. PhD 
dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1919. 
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rooted in cultural expectations and social display rather than a natural fact rooted in the body.32 
Because it toys with prevailing ideas about race and the body, the genre is, like Sheppard Lee, a 
comedy of embodiment. Both minstrelsy and Bird’s novel trade in stock characters—the happy 
slave, the big-city dandy—and part of the comedic appeal in each case is the interplay between a 
character’s exterior (burnt cork, a rejuvenated corpse) and his interior (a white actor, Lee’s soul). 
The key difference between minstrelsy and Lee’s serial embodiment is that the minstrel’s 
audience knows that he is not the character he is playing, but Lee, especially in Tom’s case, 
purports to be the same person whose body he haunts. By twining metempsychosis and 
minstrelsy, Bird’s novel suggests that the stereotyped behaviors Lee construes as inherent to 
Tom’s body are in fact drawn from the popular stage. 
Each body Lee inhabits comprises a separate book of the novel, and the heading of Tom’s 
announces that it is the book “In which Sheppard Lee finds every thing black about him” (331). 
We could interpret the word “about” in “every thing black about him” to mean “around”; the 
phrase might then refer to the darkness of unconsciousness because the book begins just as Lee 
first gains consciousness in Tom’s body. But we may also interpret “every thing black about 
him” to mean everything (racially) black about Sheppard Lee. At a broad level, the phrase is a 
simple play on Lee’s inhabiting a black man’s body. More specifically, though, it suggests that 
                                                
32 Kwame Anthony Appiah and Walter Benn Michaels, among others, have made important 
criticisms of the idea of race as a social construction. Appiah writes that “culture talk is not so 
very far from the race talk that it would supplant in liberal discourse” (136). See Kwame 
Anthony Appiah, The Ethics of Identity. Princeton: Princeton UP, 2005. Michaels argues that to 
view race as a social construction is to view race as culture, to him an impotent conflation: “If 
race really were culture, people could change their racial identity, siblings could belong to 
different races, people who were as genetically unlike each other as it's possible for two humans 
to be could nonetheless belong to the same race. None of these things is possible in the United 
States today” (133-34). See Michaels’ Our America: Nativism, Modernism, and Pluralism. 
Durham: Duke UP, 1995. But minstrelsy is precisely about changing race, even if temporarily, 
artificially, and for others’ entertainment.  
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Lee’s blackness will come not from Tom’s body but from Lee himself: Lee will face everything 
black about himself, not everything black about Tom. If Lee’s experience of racial blackness 
comes from his own repertoire of troubling racial imagery, then any attribution of Lee’s actions 
to Tom’s body stands on shaky ground. 
Bird weaves blackface minstrelsy into his investigation of medical embodiment by 
routing Lee’s narration of his experiences in Tom’s body through minstrel music and 
iconography. Tellingly, the novel foreshadows the minstrelsy of Tom’s section even before Lee 
transmigrates into the slave’s body. In the course of being forcibly transported to Louisiana by 
abolitionist-hunting Southerners in Zachariah Longstraw’s body, he hears music from a 
farmhouse, “a great sawing of fiddles and strumming of banjoes, with a shuffling of feet, as of 
people engaged in a dance, while a voice, which I knew, by its undoubted Congo tang, could be 
none but a negro’s, sang, in concert with the fiddles— 
 Ole Vaginnee! Nebber ti—ah! 
 Kick’m up, Juba, a leetle high—ah,—” (311). 
 
It is important to keep in mind that Lee cannot actually see the singer: his legs are bound, so he 
has limited mobility in his captors’ wagon, and his assertion that the singer’s voice is a “negro’s” 
is only substantiated by the singer’s dialect (311). Lee’s certainty of the singer’s race—the 
“undoubted Congo tang”—being predicated on sound rather than the usual racial marker of skin 
color actually introduces uncertainty about the singer’s race when we consider this passage in 
light of the blackface minstrel practice of imitating and exaggerating African-American speech.33 
                                                
33 Jack Kerkering writes about the ways that specific “formal effects” in text and music have 
been thought of as “perform[ing] [the] function of expressing a people’s identity,” whether that 
identity is national or racial (19). He argues that certain musical features were and are viewed as 
essentially black. He does not extend his argument on race to the early nineteenth century, but it 
would follow that in Bird’s time sound might have been as determinative a racial marker—the 
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Such uncertainty would not be unfounded, for the line “Old Virginny never tire” is sung in the 
immensely popular song “Clare de Kitchen,” dated to 1832 and performed by the character Jim 
Crow and many others (Lhamon, Jump Jim Crow 137).  
 “Old Virginia never tires” was a phrase common in the nineteenth century (perhaps more 
so in Virginia than elsewhere) meant to express Virginians’ hardworking nature. In “Clare de 
Kitchen,” it is part of the chorus emphasizing the cleaners’ energy: “Oh! Clare de kitchen, old 
folks, young folks, / Clare de kitchen, old folks, young folks, / Old Virginny never tire.” (137). 
The line “Kick’m up, Juba, a leetle high—ah,—” refers to the Juba dance, a step-dance 
performed by a ring of dancers who would stomp, shuffle, and raise one leg (or “kick’m up”) as 
they turned on the other. A more subtle reference to minstrelsy is Lee’s wondering “what could 
make a negro in Pennsylvania chant the praises of Virginia,” likely a nod to minstrel songs’ 
propensity for aggrandizing the South despite (or because of) their typically being performed in 
theatres in Northern cities such as New York City and Philadelphia (Cockrell 35).34 Though we, 
much like Lee, cannot be sure if he is passing by an actual slave gathering or a minstrel show, I 
suggest that the music is an early instance of the novel’s interest in vexing the notion that racial 
blackness necessarily originates in black bodies.  
 This interpretation is corroborated by recent research on minstrelsy that understands the 
genre, particularly in its early years, as expressing the constructedness of race by probing what 
Eric Lott calls the “social relations of ‘racial’ production” (39). Specifically, he writes, 
                                                
“undoubted” mark of blackness, says Lee—as skin color. If so, then minstrelsy’s troubling of the 
color line would be as much about race’s sonic elements as its visual elements. 
 
 
34 An early version of “Clare de Kitchen,” for example, concludes with the singer lamenting, “I 
wish I was back in old Kentuck” (Lhamon, Jump Jim Crow 139). The minstrel song “Dixie,” 
which begins with “I wish I was in the land of cotton,” is a later iteration of this tendency. 
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minstrelsy is predicated upon “small but significant crimes against settled ideas of racial 
demarcation” (4). J. Martin Favor argues, “Minstrelsy suggests at its root that ‘race’ is 
performable, if not always already performed. … ‘Race’ is theatrical—it is an outward 
spectacle—rather than anything internal or essential” (123). Favor’s and Lott’s arguments should 
not be taken to mean that minstrelsy is antiracist: at a fundamental level, the “joke” of blackface 
minstrelsy is at the expense of black Americans represented on stage by stock racist stereotypes. 
Bird’s use of minstrelsy as a vehicle for critiquing embodiment means that he seems to endorse 
those stereotypes: Tom’s section of the novel depicts slaves as lazy and childish. I thus echo 
Lott’s stance of not being “one of those critics who see in a majority of minstrel songs an 
unalloyed self-criticism by whites under cover of blackface” (119). However, minstrels’ efforts 
to “try on blackness” crossed and reimagined the color line in ways that make it something more 
complex than a straightforward mockery of black Americans (6). While I would not go so far as 
W. T. Lhamon’s assertion that blackface performers were “enacting miscegenation” onstage, it is 
clear that blackface minstrelsy can at some times blur and sidestep racial boundaries even as it 
reasserts them at others (Raising Cain 42). 
When Lee gains consciousness in Tom’s body, he finds himself startled by his new 
appearance: “I saw a fragment of looking-glass hanging on the wall within my reach. I snatched 
it down, and took a survey of my physiognomy. Miserable me! my face was as black as my 
arms—and, indeed, somewhat more so—presenting a sable globe, broken only by two red lips of 
immense magnitude, and a brace of eyes as white and as wide as plain China saucers, or peeled 
turnips” (331-332). This passage, anchored by the “physiognomy” of Tom’s face, is strikingly 
visual. “Physiognomy” is itself a suggestive term for Bird to use, as it can refer to either the 
physical features of a face or the contemporary practice of divining personal traits from the 
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human face. Bird’s choice of “physiognomy”—he easily could have written “features” instead— 
and his italicization of the word “face” invites us to attend closely to Tom’s. When we do so, we 
may notice that Tom’s face is somewhat out of sorts, given the thingness of its component parts: 
a black sphere, enormous red lips, and eyes pale and round as “saucers” or “turnips.” This 
unnatural, object-oriented description implies some degree of manufacture to Tom’s face, and 
indeed, blackface minstrelsy trades in such manufacture. If Virginia is where Lee discovers 
everything black about himself, then this moment tells us that Lee’s conception of racial 
blackness is characterized by its reliance on minstrel imagery. His descriptions of other bodies’ 
appearances do not rely on such caricature: when he looks into a mirror in Dawkins’ body, he 
sees “his exact representation, perfect in beard and visage, save that the former was in great 
disorder, and the latter somewhat white, and equally perfect in figure” (105). And Bird’s nod to 
blackface minstrelsy during Lee’s first awareness of his black embodiment is only one thread of 
a broader pattern of minstrel imagery. 
That pattern, which persists throughout Tom’s section, creates a counter-discourse to 
Lee’s portrayal of embodiment. By exploring the friction between how that that portrayal depicts 
the mind-body relationship and how minstrelsy does the same, Bird anticipates Steven Johnson’s 
argument that “the blacked-up white performer only pretends to lose control, but in fact is 
expressing just how controlled and controlling he is” (96). Lee performs a similar song and 
dance: he contends that he acts as he does because he does not control his body, and that 
contention is the basis of his abdication of moral agency. But the blackface imagery in Tom’s 
section suggests that, like a blackface minstrel, he “only pretends to lose control.” I argue that 
the same holds for Lee. If his portrayal of embodiment allows him to claim that the body controls 
the mind, then his minstrel performance of Tom emphasizes the very opposite: the white minstrel 
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directs his purportedly black body’s actions, not the other way around. Lee places moral blame 
on others’ bodies, but in this novel bodies are not nearly so agential as Lee says. Rather, Bird 
seems to suggest, they are like the minstrel’s boot polish mask: without the animating power of a 
willful actor, they are only dead material. The body, then, cannot hold the moral weight Lee 
places upon it. 
Much as he does in other sections of the book, Lee often expresses his experience as Tom 
in ways that undercut his claims about the body’s determinative power over behavior. After he 
recovers from the shock of seeing Tom’s face in the mirror, he addresses an old woman standing 
next to his bed, he calls her “Aunty,” and explains, “why I addressed the old lady thus I know 
not; but I have observed that negroes always address their seniors by the titles of uncle and aunt, 
and I suppose the instinct was on me” (332-333). Lee begins his explanation of the term “Aunty” 
by asserting that he does not know why he said it, but he then posits that “instinct” prodded him. 
However, his warrant for supposing that “instinct”—presumably Tom’s body insinuating itself 
into Lee’s consciousness—led him to say “Aunty” is only validated by post-hoc observance of 
black Americans. Further confounding his explanation is that he can only “suppose” that instinct 
was the driving force behind his speech. Per Lee’s account of embodiment, he should be able to 
provide a physiological explanation of his new behavior predicated upon the first-hand 
experience of being in Tom’s body, but he does not. Instead, he explains Tom only in relation to 
other black Americans he has observed. 
 Lee’s recourse to observation as validating purportedly authentic “black” behavior and 
speech mirrors and invokes the same practice in blackface minstrelsy. A legend surrounding T. 
D. Rice’s performances as Jim Crow is that he learned his song and dance from observing an old 
African-American stablehand singing and dancing (Cockrell 63). Surprisingly, many observers 
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appear to have believed that his performances were exact replicas of African-American dances. 
Lhamon presents three contemporary accounts of his performances precisely to that effect, one 
of which raves over Rice’s “close delineations of the corn-field negro, drawn from real life” 
(Lhamon, Raising Cain 169). Through blackface minstrelsy, then, the discourses of mimesis and 
social display collude in the production of purportedly authentic blackness.35 Lee’s explanation 
of his use of “Aunty” follows similar lines, authenticating Tom’s “instinct” to say the word with 
his observations of other black Americans doing so. Lee’s explanation, by dramatizing the 
appropriative process of blackface minstrels, calls attention to his reliance on minstrel imagery in 
his depictions of black subjectivity. 
Lee adjusts with speed to live as a slave. He describes his owner’s kindness at length, 
does no more work than he cares to do, and dreams of “eating Johnny-cake and fried bacon” 
while lounging by a riverbank, behaviors he ascribes to his black body (336). As Christopher 
Looby remarks, Lee’s contentment makes “Tom, the happy slave” the novel’s “most unsettling 
invention”; it is also a sign of Bird’s willingness to reinscribe minstrelsy’s racist imagery in the 
course of exploring its twist on embodiment (xxxiv). The other slaves demonstrate the same 
contentment as Lee. After Lee’s fellow slave Governor finds an illustrated abolitionist pamphlet 
in a cart filled with timber, he launches into a comical pantomime of the whipped slaves he sees 
depicted: “he rubbed his back, now here, now there, now with the right, now with the left hand; 
now ducking to the earth, now jumping into the air, as though some lusty overseer were plying 
                                                
35 Lara Cohen’s The Fabrication of American Literature makes the compelling argument that 
mass cultural interest in blackface minstrelsy culminated in the displacement of the fraudulence 
inherent to minstrelsy onto black Americans themselves; thus, “at the very moment when white 
Americans began to imitate African Americans, they also began to claim that African Americans 
possessed an innate talent for imitation” (96-7). Even “authentic” blackness, then, would be a 
type of social display.  
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him, whip in hand, with all his might” (347). As Governor leaps and jumps—or dances—along 
with his imaginary flogging, he looks at a picture of a slave tied to a gum tree and yells: 
Oh! de possum up de gum-tree, 
 ‘Coony in de hollow: 
Two white men whip a nigga, 
 How de nigga holla! (348) 
 
The lines “possum up de gum-tree, / ‘Coony in de hollow” appear in two separate popular early 
minstrel songs, “Jump Jim Crow” (1832) and “Zip Coon” (1834), suggesting Bird’s consciously 
choosing blackface minstrel lyrics for Governor’s song (Lhamon, Jump Jim Crow 97 and 
Cockrell 95). Indeed, most of the scenes in which the slaves gather depict them in ways 
reminiscent of minstrel shows, which offers a possible explanation for why the plantation slaves 
seem so peculiarly content. They sing and dance at every opportunity, for example: on pleasant 
evenings the field-hands play “banjoes, fiddles, and clacking-bones,” causing Lee to feel “an 
unaccountable desire to join them, which I did, dancing with all my might,” a sight that would 
have been familiar to audiences of minstrel shows in the 1820s and 30s (339). 
A more visual gesture towards blackface minstrelsy is Lee’s choice of clothing in Tom’s 
body that aligns him with Zip Coon, a minstrel character popularized by the minstrel George 
Washington Dixon as a preening “pretender, a charlatan, a confidence man,” a black dandy who 
imitates the white upper class (Mahar 209). This alignment is important because Zip Coon, more 
than other minstrel characters, provides insight into blackface minstrelsy’s particular twist on the 
body’s indexical relationship to race: Zip Coon is a white man pretending to be a black man who 
in turn takes on the habiliments of the white upper class, zigzagging rather than crossing the 
color line and calling attention to the ways that minstrel disguise unsettles attempts to locate a 
single, natural character within the body. As Lee settles into his new identity, he begins to 
admire his visage more than he initially does, becoming “something of a coxcomb” (342). On 
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Sundays he dresses up “in one of my master’s coats well brushed up, a bran-new rabbit-fur hat, 
the gift of little Tommy, a ruffled shirt, and a white neckcloth, with a pair of leather gloves 
swinging in one hand, and a peeled beechen wand by way of cane in the other” (342). Such a 
close sartorial invocation of a popular minstrel character, to say nothing of Lee’s meeting a 
“fiddler and banjo-player” named Zip (short for Scipio), strongly suggests that Bird wishes to 
evoke Zip Coon (360).  
The novel stages the confluence of minstrelsy and embodiment through Lee’s 
speculations about his purported inability to remember his original self while in Tom’s body: “I 
forgot that I once had been a freeman, or, to speak more strictly, I did not remember it, the act of 
remembering involving an effort of mind which it did not comport with my new habits of 
laziness and indifference to make, though perhaps I might have done so, had I chosen. ... I could 
not have been an African had I troubled myself with thoughts of any thing but the present (341). 
In the passage, Lee claims that remembering his past selves requires mental effort that Tom’s 
laziness and indifference cannot support. Laziness is indeed Lee’s primary characteristic in 
Tom’s body, but Lee himself is extraordinarily lazy. Early in the novel, Lee describes his 
“natural disposition” as “placid and easy,—I believe I may say sluggish. I was not wanting in 
parts, but had as little energy or activity of mind as ever fell to the share of a Jerseyman” (10). 
This intimates that his “new habits of laziness and indifference” are not new at all, but rather a 
part of Lee’s original personality. Further, he says he “might” have been able to remember if he 
had chosen to do so, suggesting that Tom’s body is not the cause of his forgetting himself, but 
rather in his role as Tom he chooses not to remember—doing otherwise, he “could not have been 
an African.” Lee’s portrayal of black subjectivity, then, is in many ways merely an exaggerated 
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rendition of his own sloth: remember that it is in Virginia that Lee discovers “every thing black 
about him” (331). Just as Lee   
 If Lee’s claim that he cannot remember his past selves in Tom’s body is true, then Lee in 
Tom’s body is “simply Tom”; the implication, as Lee notes, is that he cannot be held responsible 
for Tom’s actions (341). Lee’s purported inability to remember his past selves underwrites his 
blamelessness for his role in the violent slave revolt that closes Tom’s section. The seeds of the 
revolt are planted by the abolitionist pamphlet found by Governor. Because the other slaves are 
illiterate, Lee volunteers to read it aloud, though if he had truly forgotten his past selves he 
would not be able to do so: “nevertheless, I had a feeling in me as if I could read” (350). He 
makes out the title of the pamphlet to be “THE FATE OF THE SLAVE” and finds within its 
pages a discourse between a Quaker and a slaveholder in which the abolitionist declares slaves to 
be “unjustly, treacherously, and unrighteously held in bonds” (350, 353). As Murison and others 
have noted, the document is a reference to the American Anti-Slavery Society’s 1835 campaign 
to pour abolitionist print material into the South (Murison 15). The tract causes a radical change 
in the affections of Lee and his fellows: reading the pamphlet causes the slaves to undergo “a 
revolution in our feelings as surprising as it was fearful” (355). They fill with “sentimental 
notions about liberty and equality,” making Lee “a willing listener to, and sharer in, the schemes 
of violence and desperation which my fellow-slaves soon began to frame” (357). The pamphlet 
provokes a change in Lee’s feelings that rehearses the symptoms of moral insanity: he says that it 
“infected” him, a term that makes the pamphlet as much a disease as an argument (377). He and 
the other slaves fall, as Pinel writes, under the “domination of instinctive and abstract fury” and 
act upon it by revolting (150). 
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The revolt is bloody and seems inspired by Nat Turner’s rebellion rather than a minstrel 
show: Lee’s master, his younger daughter, her older sister, and that sister’s suitor are all killed in 
the skirmish (369).36 In a gruesome scene, the younger daughter, flung by her sister from the 
rooftop presumably to save her from being raped, is “cruelly mangled” by the fall and takes 
hours to die (369). Lee finds himself in no way responsible for the events he catalyzed, however, 
because he had forgotten that he was anyone but Tom: “It is wonderful, that among the many 
thoughts that now crowded my brain, no memory of my original condition arose to teach me the 
folly of my desires. But, and I repeat it again, the past was dead with me; I lived only for the 
present” (357). However, the minstrel iconography shadowing Tom’s section of the novel 
indicates that his “original condition” as Lee is not at all “dead,” but rather masked. Despite 
Lee’s efforts to displace moral agency onto Tom’s body, minstrelsy reminds us that white men 
can hide under black skins. 
Coda: Comedy and Interpretation 
If Sheppard Lee teaches us anything, it is that comedy does not allow for tidy 
conclusions. Satire and minstrelsy, especially, offer multiple meanings because they are 
essentially imitative; the minstrel’s dance can be received as an authentic rendition of racial 
blackness or as a white man’s winking parody of the same. Missing minstrelsy’s doubled, 
imitative nature might mean thinking, as many did, that T. D. Rice actually was Jim Crow. 
Likewise, as I have argued, reading satire in a way unattuned to its ability to at once duplicate 
and mock its target risks conflating it with what it derides. The recent critical reception of 
Sheppard Lee stands as an example; scholars such as Otter have read the novel straightforwardly 
                                                
36 As the references to the Nullification Crisis in “Jump Jim Crow” attest, minstrelsy did not 
ignore the possibility that slaves would take up arms in a sectional conflict. But the revolt in 
Sheppard Lee much more closely fits the circumstances of Turner’s rebellion.  
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(and with straight faces) as an endorsement of what they assume is Bird’s own medicine-
inflected vision of embodiment. Part of the appeal of that reading, I suspect, is how Sheppard 
Lee seems custom-made for the “physiological turn” in literary studies.37  
But attending to Bird’s comedy reveals an interaction between literature and medicine is 
more ambivalent than has previously been acknowledged in readings of Bird’s work. There is a 
looseness and openness to comedy that is able to capture just how equivocal such interactions 
can prove to be. As minstrelsy demonstrates, the artful, comedic play between seemingly 
contradictory terms (black/white, interiority/exteriority, authentic/counterfeit) a central feature of 
one of the early nineteenth century’s most popular entertainments. Bird, who mocks all he 
surveys and thus denies conclusive interpretation, asks us to confront what this sort of play 
means for how we read. In the case of Sheppard Lee, it means attuning ourselves to 
misdirections and uncertainties that dramatize a relationship between literature and medicine that 
is no less tangled than it is vibrant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
37 See especially Jane F. Thrailkill’s Affecting Fictions, Justine Murison’s, The Politics of 
Anxiety in Nineteenth-Century American Literature, and Randall Knoper, “American Literary 
Realism and Nervous ‘Reflexion,’” American Literature 74, no. 4 (2001): 715-745. 
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CHAPTER THREE: DIGESTING MOBY-DICK: STOMACH, BRAIN, AND TEXT 
 
Thus the habitual manner in which digestion is performed or affected, makes us either sad, gay, 
taciturn, gossiping[,] morose or melancholy, without our being able to doubt the fact, or to resist 
it for a moment. 
Jean Anthelme Brillat-Savarin 
The Physiology of Taste; or, Transcendental Gastronomy (228) 
 
We resumed business; and while plying our spoons in the bowl, thinks I to myself, I wonder now 
if this here has any effect on the head?  
 
Herman Melville 
Moby-Dick (NN MD 67) 
 
At roughly the same time that theorists of moral insanity such as James Cowles Prichard 
turned to the nervous system to understand seemingly irrational and insane behavior, other 
physicians looked to the digestive system as a way to understand how best to care for the 
nervous system. Sheppard Lee’s final borrowed body, that of the dyspeptic Arthur Megrim, 
leaves him so bedeviled by digestive disorders that the revolt is the last significant opportunity 
for Lee to make trouble before he returns to his original body, conveniently preserved by 
Feuerteufel, a German physician. Megrim’s sister, Ann, worries endlessly over her brother’s 
health: she feels her “chief duty of existence” to be “the care of [Megrim’s] digestive apparatus” 
and nerves (386). As this chapter explores in detail, the digestive system was believed to be in 
sympathetic resonance with the nervous system in Bird’s time; thus, Ann’s worry is that 
Megrim’s discomfited stomach might be a sign of a debilitated nervous system. Indeed, Ann is 
well-read in the literature of dyspepsia, at one point interpreting her brother’s involuntarily 
winking eye as a “sign” that his “digestive apparatus is getting out of order”; she goes on to 
remark that he is “beginning to look yellow and bilious” and that “the alkalis of [his] biliary 
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fluids … were beginning to fail to coalesce, in the natural chymical way, with the acids of the 
chymous mass; and that no better argument could be made to prove that [his] digestive apparatus 
was getting out of order” (389-90). Ann delivers this diagnostic assault, Lee remarks, “with a 
pertinacity equal to the disease itself” (390). Her ceaseless care becomes, finally, one of his 
disorder’s “worst symptoms” (390). 
Far from an anomaly, Ann’s obsession with digestion’s effects on the nervous system is 
part of a broader system of beliefs about the stomach and brain that pertained in midcentury 
America. Antebellum physiology envisioned neural and alimentary structures as anatomically 
and functionally linked, joined by the “sympathetic nerve” (now termed the vagus nerve) 
stretching from brain to stomach. Eating the right food, many reasoned, makes for a healthy 
brain; conversely, a stomach irritated by improper digestion might disorder the brain and corrode 
the mind. This view was held by a diverse group including dietary reformers, cookbook authors, 
and physicians: while domestic guides such as Catharine Beecher’s popular Treatise on 
Domestic Economy (1841) urged the centrality of food to mental function, medical works such as 
Wilson Philip’s Treatise on Indigestion and its Consequences, Called Nervous and Bilious 
Complaints (1824) and James Johnson’s Essays on the Morbid Sensibility of the Stomach and 
Bowels (1827) and popular dietary reform movements such as Grahamism emphasized that 
common digestive troubles could lead to insanity. Earlier in the century, British Romantics such 
as Percy Bysshe Shelley, author of A Vindication of Natural Diet (1813), believed that “all 
bodily and mental derangements” could be traced to the consumption of meat and alcohol (16). 
These and other writings argue that attending to one’s digestion by carefully monitoring the 
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circumstances of one’s ingestion—specifically, what is ingested and in what manner—is the best 
way to maintain mental control.38 
In this chapter I argue that Herman Melville’s Moby-Dick (1851) puts into motion the 
ethical and religious aspects of dietary reformers’ ideas about the connections between the 
stomach and the brain by depicting, through the lens of Ishmael’s own dyspeptic narration, how 
its characters’ diets affect their moral and spiritual lives.39 I argue that reformers’ ideas enabled 
nineteenth-century Americans to view their dietary choices as shaping their mind-bodies and 
therefore their very selves.40 Political theorist Jane Bennett writes that the philosophical projects 
of Thoreau and Nietzsche affirm the “productive power intrinsic to foodstuff, which enables 
edible matter to coarsen or refine the imagination or render a disposition more or less liable to 
                                                
38 The nineteenth-century idea that healthy digestion benefits the brain bears some resemblance 
to the present-day interest in so-called “brain foods” rich in omega-3 fats, i.e. fish, soybeans, 
and, perhaps unsurprisingly, brains. Despite this similarity, the two concepts have no strict 
genealogical relation.  
 
 
39 Other literary scholars have addressed digestion reform. Michelle C. Neely’s recent work on 
Thoreau’s vegetarian dietary practices, which were borrowed from reformer Sylvester Graham, 
asks us to reevaluate Walden’s (1854) “embodied politics” (34). When we do so, she argues, we 
understand how antebellum theories of diet and digestion are situated within “consequential 
debates over capitalism, citizenship, freedom, and the body” (34). Likewise, Sean Ross Meehan 
draws on the history of physiology and medicine to describe what he calls “the poetics of 
digestion” in Emerson’s and Whitman’s writing (101). For Meehan, digestion’s ability to break 
down matter and assimilate it into new forms “offers a paradox of identity through change” that 
complicates prevailing ways of thinking about Emerson’s influence on Whitman (101). And 
Kyla Wazana Tompkins studies the ways that nineteenth-century writers figure racially black 
bodies as both edible and prodigiously hungry.  
 
 
40 A note on terms: dietary reformers understood the mind-body relationship as so entwined that 
to write of them as distinct—“the mind” and “the body”—would be ahistorical. I therefore use 
the term “mind-body” to more accurately capture the ways dietary reformers and their followers 
understood themselves. By “self” I mean one’s experience, whether embodied or not, of a 
personal identity with consciousness and agency. 
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ressentiment, depression, hyperactivity, dull-wittedness, or violence” (49). Digestion is thus “the 
formation of an assemblage of human and nonhuman elements, all of which bear some agentic 
capacity” (49). Nineteenth-century Americans’ attempts to guide the formation of such 
assemblages by exercising control of their diets, I claim, made their choices about how and what 
they consumed a technology for sculpting the embodied self.41 Working within this analytical 
framework, I argue that Moby-Dick addresses the philosophical, religious, and racial aspects of 
this technology. Attending to digestion in Moby-Dick, I claim, illuminates Melville’s attempts to 
counter Emersonian hopes of transcending the body. I conclude that examining digestion and 
efforts to control it yields new ways of thinking about embodiment in both Moby-Dick and the 
mid-nineteenth century generally.  
The chapter’s first section traces the emergence of the idea that the stomach affects the 
brain in antebellum medicine. I demonstrate that late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century 
theories of the nervous system understood the body’s organs, including the brain and stomach, as 
interconnected in ways that spread any one organ’s disorders to the others. Because these 
theories, collected in their time under the term “nervous sympathy,” posited the brain-stomach 
connection as especially close, physicians such as Alexander Philip Wilson Philip and James 
Johnson characterized indigestion as detrimental to neural and therefore mental health. Philip 
and Johnson both identify dietary management as key to avoiding this dangerous condition; I 
thus argue that they make dietary management thinkable as a tool of reform. The second section 
surveys the mid-nineteenth-century dietary reform movement, with a focus on Sylvester Graham, 
by far the most influential dietary reformer in America. Dietary reform, I claim, constructed a set 
of beliefs about the stomach that led nineteenth-century Americans to attempt to control their 
                                                
41 I use the term “technology” in its broadest sense to refer to the combination of skills and 
resources to attain desired goals.  
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digestions to mold and improve their selves. Drawing on Nikolas Rose’s and Joelle M. Abi-
Rached’s work on self-governance, I analyze the strange duality to be found in dietary reform: 
reformers figured digestion as an unconscious bodily process that affects consciousness, 
sometimes intensely, an idea that would strike many today as deterministic, but the technology of 
dietary management allowed eaters to understand themselves as taking charge of their own 
embodiment. The moral insanity debate, treated in Chapter 2, concerns in part the ethical 
ramifications of mental processes being influenced by bodily processes; dietary management 
promises to regulate that influence. 
In the chapter’s third section, I turn to Moby-Dick; I argue that the novel takes dietary 
reform as an opportunity to examine the body’s role in philosophy, religion, and race. I argue 
that in the novel Melville counters such thinkers as Emerson and Goethe, who seek to transcend 
their bodies to enjoy unity with all things, with dietary reformers’ insistence on the primacy of 
the body in human experience. I claim that he portrays metaphysical speculation, philosophical 
and theological alike, as grounded in and answering to the body. For Melville, the hope of 
becoming a transparent eyeball—permeable, without physical substance yet still able to perceive 
the surrounding world—is, because it ignores the human body, just that: a hope (or an illusion). 
The fourth section argues that Moby-Dick counters contemporary theories about racial 
differences in digestion by positing self-control, not race, as determining how one eats. Reading 
the harpooners’ dinner, the officers’ dinner, and Fleece’s sermon to the sharks alongside one 
another, I claim that the novel depicts, as Fleece says, governing one’s voracious nature as the 
point of virtue, regardless of race (295). The fifth section reads the gam on the Samuel Enderby 
as posing indigestion as a cause of Moby Dick’s violence.  
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My argument diverges from other scholars’ work on Melville and embodiment. Ralph 
James Savarese writes on the centrality of dyspepsia to the cultural commentary of “Bartleby, the 
Scrivener” (1853) and “Cock-A-Doodle-Doo!” (1853), but he primarily treats it as one item of a 
“long list of sociomedical afflictions attributed to the stress of industrialization” instead of 
treating it on its own terms (20). Paul Brodtkorb’s phenomenological study of Ishmael’s 
narrative emphasizes the primacy of Ishmael’s bodily experience in his consciousness (9). His 
approach, however, does not take into account how contemporary discourses about the body 
might have influenced Melville’s work. Samuel Otter argues that the novel “gives access to the 
excess of the extraordinary nineteenth-century quest for bodily knowledge,” amassing “an 
anatomy of anatomies, a viscerally immanent critique of nineteenth-century efforts to get inside 
the body, and to gauge and rank its character” (102). He charts how Ishmael discovers, as he 
calls upon the sciences of dermatology, craniometry, physiognomy, and phrenology to disclose 
Moby Dick’s secrets, that they and similar nineteenth-century sciences make the epistemological 
mistake of conflating interior and exterior (154). To this insight I would add that Moby-Dick also 
emphasizes the futility of, on one hand, disengaging interior from exterior altogether, or, on the 
other, reversing the two.  
The Most Varied of All Diseases 
 The forty-third chapter of Moby-Dick, titled “Hark!,” depicts a line of sailors transferring 
buckets of water hand-to-hand from one of the Pequod’s fresh water butts to the scuttle-butt in 
the middle of the night (196). One sailor, Archy, asks his neighbor, Cabaco, if he hears coughing 
under the after-hatches (as readers soon discover, the coughing comes from the “five dusky 
phantoms” headed by Fedallah whom Ahab secretly stows on the ship) (196, 228). Cabaco, 
intent on his work, replies, “Cough be damned! Pass along that return bucket” (196). Archy 
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insists he also hears sleepers turning over underdeck, to which Cabaco retorts, “Caramba! have 
done, shipmate, will ye? It’s the three soaked biscuits ye eat for supper turning over inside ye—
nothing else. Look to the bucket!” (196-97). Echoing Ebenezer Scrooge’s dismissal of Jacob 
Marley’s ghost as “an undigested bit of beef, a blot of mustard, a crumb of cheese, a fragment of 
an underdone potato,” Cabaco assumes that indigestion has affected Archy’s senses. 
Beginning in the early nineteenth century, physicians understood the stomach and the 
brain as mutually affecting. The concept underlying this understanding is nervous sympathy, 
which historian of science Evelyn L. Forget writes “characterize[s] the unconscious 
communication between different organs in the human body” via the nerves (282). Physiologists 
used nervous sympathy to conceptualize the organs’ communication as a series of reflexive, 
unconscious feedback loops. Nervous sympathy explained why a stomachache can become a 
headache, why blood temperature remains constant, and how diverse organs can act in concert to 
produce one functioning being. Robert Whytt, who as a professor of medicine in Edinburgh 
influenced nerve scientist William Cullen, first described the workings of nervous sympathy in 
the mid-eighteenth century (291).42 Whytt conceptualized the nerves as coterminous with what 
he called the “sentient principle,” which coordinates organs’ responses to stimuli through 
nervous sympathy (291). The sentient principle, acting as the switchboard operator of the nerves, 
puts even the most distant organs into sympathetic relation. If “the nervous system, and nervous 
function, became the mechanism that coordinated the actions of the human body,” Forget writes, 
then “nervous sympathy was the tool of its communication” (291). The brain was no longer 
                                                
42 As Christopher Lawrence writes, Cullen “presented a totally naturalistic account of health and 
disease based on the laws of the environment-organism relationship” in which the nervous 
system played a central role (171). 
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considered to be in charge of the nervous system but rather a part of it.43 Such an understanding 
of the brain’s place in the nervous system meant that the brain was thought to be vulnerable to 
the ailments of the organs to which the nerves connected it.  
 In the early nineteenth century, the stomach emerged as among the organs most in 
sympathy with the brain. I trace this idea to Alexander Philip Wilson Philip, a Scottish physician 
who received much of his education from William Cullen, Whytt’s disciple. As the title of his 
foundational work on indigestion, A Treatise on Indigestion and Its Consequences, Called 
Nervous and Bilious Complaints; with Observations on the Organic Diseases in Which They 
Sometimes Terminate, first published in 1821 and revised and reprinted until 1842, suggests, 
Philip viewed “nervous” as synonymic with “bilious.” If his mentor William Cullen’s 
contribution to medicine was to view most diseases as nervous in nature, then Philip’s was to 
explore the ways that nervous disorders could be understood as either causing or having been 
caused by indigestion. He writes that the “sympathies of the stomach” are so widespread and 
powerful that “whatever greatly disorders the function of any important organ may be ranked 
among the causes of Indigestion” (87). The resultant indigestion, in turn, “so re-acts on the 
digestive organs” as to further sympathetically afflict the originally disordered organ (75). A 
disease can thus flow back and forth from the liver to the stomach, for example, feeding on itself 
and worsening rapidly: Philip writes that in this way disease sometimes leads to death “with a 
rapidity which at first view appears unaccountable” (76). And because the brain “is one of those 
                                                
43 For outstanding histories of studies of the nervous system, see especially Mary Brazier, A 
History of Neurophysiology in the Nineteenth Century. New York: Raven Press, 1988; Edwin 
Clarke and L.S. Jacyna, Nineteenth-Century Origins of Neuroscientific Concepts. Berkeley: U of 
California P, 1987; and Sidney Ochs, A History of Nerve Functions: From Animal Spirits to 
Molecular Mechanisms. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2004.  
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parts which are most apt to sympathize with the digestive organs,” even slight digestive 
complaints can result, if untreated, in impaired mental function (295). 
 Because Philip views indigestion as having the potential to damage or even destroy the 
body’s organs, he devotes a large portion of his treatise to a set of complex and exacting dietary 
guidelines. Similarly complex dietary rules reappear in the works of physicians, dietary 
reformers, and cookbook writers through the mid-nineteenth century. I read them as arising not 
from xenophobic fear of “foreign” foods, as Tompkins asserts of Graham’s rules, but from the 
real sense that to ignore one’s diet was to endanger one’s life (Tompkins 81). Philip’s guidelines 
comprise “diet and exercise both of mind and body” (125). Of the diet, he writes that one should 
“eat moderately and slowly” to ensure the food is “masticated and mixed with saliva” before 
traveling to the stomach (126). One ought to avoid “[t]ough, ascescent, and oily articles of food 
with a large proportion of liquid” because they dilute the gastric juices; “a diet, composed pretty 
much of animal food and stale bread, is the best” for those suffering mild indigestion (128). Yet 
beef is “most apt to excite fever,” so game meats are preferable (129). Because, he says, “meat 
most mixed with fat” is “most oppressive” to the stomach, fatty meats such as pork, geese, 
pheasant, and duck are difficult to digest (130).44 Turkey (without the skin) and the “lean part of 
venison” are preferable (130). Fish, he writes, is less easily digestible than “the flesh of land 
animals,” and less nutritive (130). Because any food that might create a paste-like consistency in 
the stomach is difficult to digest, Philip recommends avoiding new bread, “[a]ll articles 
composed of strong jellies, and food carefully mashed” (132). Fresh vegetables, which, he 
writes, ferment in the stomach, are “injurious,” but “mealy potatoes, turnips, and broccoli” may 
be boiled and eaten. He also counsels avoiding fruit, butter, milk, oil, anything fried, alcohol, 
                                                
44 Dietary restrictions against fat continue into the present day, although we differentiate between 
so-called “healthy” (unsaturated) fats and “unhealthy” (saturated) fats. 
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coffee, tea, and iced drinks (136-37, 145, 153). Moderate exercise in the open air also, he says, 
prevents and treats mild cases of indigestion (169). 
 Philip’s characterization of indigestion as “the most varied of all diseases,” a disorder that 
“so undermines every power of the system, that it is difficult to give a view of its symptoms,” 
establishes one of dyspepsia’s defining qualities: its protean range and power (4). “It is,” he 
writes, “an affection of the central part of a most complicated structure [the nervous system], 
capable of influencing even its remotest parts, and each, through many channels, and in various 
ways” (4). This model of dyspepsia as affecting and affected by the rest of the body “through 
many channels, and in various ways” enables Philip and those he influenced to construe any 
ailment as in some way connected to the stomach. When Philip writes that in dyspepsia “the 
organic affection rarely takes place in the original seat of the disease [the stomach], but in other 
organs with which the stomach sympathizes, the liver, pancreas, spleen, mesenteric glands, lower 
bowels, heart, lungs, brain, &c,” he makes it possible to view all diseases as varieties of 
indigestion (42). His foregrounding of the stomach lays the groundwork for digestive reformers 
to locate the stomach as the site of all bodily problems and therefore the site of all possible cures 
for those problems. 
 When Irish physician James Johnson followed Philip’s research in An Essay on Morbid 
Sensibility of the Stomach and Bowels, as the Proximate Cause, or Characteristic Condition of 
Indigestion, Nervous Irritability, Mental Despondency, Hypochondriasis, &c. &c. (1827), he 
sought to limit the extent to which all diseases could be traced to the stomach. “In short,” he 
writes, “while I agree with Dr. Philip, that every part of the body sympathizes readily with the 
stomach, whether in health or disease, I do contend, from attentive observation and long 
experience, that these sympathetic affections of distant parts end, comparatively speaking, but 
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rarely, in organic disease” (36). He asserts that Philip’s “doctrine is calculated to excite a great 
deal too much alarm in the mind of the patient, as well as in that of the inexperienced 
practitioner” (36). Although Johnson downplays Philip’s insistence on the stomach’s centrality to 
all disease, he emphasizes the stomach’s influence on the brain much more than Philip. For 
Johnson, the brain “is the first to sympathise with disorder of the abdominal viscera” (43). 
Echoing Philip, he asserts that sympathy can volley disease back and forth between organs, “by 
which the temper is broken and the health impaired” (61). The sympathetic connection is so 
strong that indigestion can lead to “gusts of passion, fits of despondency, brooding melancholy, 
permanent irascibility, and still higher grades of intellectual disturbance” (69). Other mental 
symptoms include “[c]onfusion of thought, unsteadiness of the mind, irritability of the temper, 
defect of the memory, fickleness of disposition, and many other phenomena which are little 
suspected of corporeal origin” (43). Symptoms such as “irritability of the temper” and 
“fickleness of disposition,” by affecting dyspeptics’ moods, project disorders of the body’s 
nervous sympathy into the social fabric, thus disrupting interpersonal sympathy. 
 Echoing the pains Benjamin Rush and James Cowles Prichard took to seat the mind in 
the brain without endorsing materialism, Johnson treads cautiously in his explanation of how 
gastric disturbances might afflict one’s mental processes. In a section on “Nervous Irritability; 
Mental Despondency,” he writes that he knows nothing of “the intimate nature of mind”; he 
wishes to leave “that department” to “metaphysics” (60). “It is very evident,” he says, that “man 
is a compound being—moral and physical, or mental and corporeal” (60). In a lengthy footnote, 
he carefully distances himself from materialism: he writes that just as the eye “is the material 
organ of sight, but it is not the faculty of vision,” the brain is “merely that portion of matter 
which is in most proximate communication with the mind or immaterial principle” (60-61). The 
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brain is thus “only an instrument through which the mind receives impressions from without, and 
transmits its dictates from within” (61). “But,” he writes, “in all intellectual operations, the 
material organ is as necessary to the mind, as the mind is to the material organ” (61). Although 
he subscribes to substance dualism, it is a dualism that puts mind and body in close relation, 
meeting in the brain.  
 Of indigestion’s effects on the brain, Johnson writes that because the “mind can only be 
manifested, in this world, through the instrumentality of matter, so its faculties and dispositions 
are pretty regularly influenced by the state or conditions of our corporeal organs” (60).  The 
mind, he says, suffers along with the body: 
Some of our mental faculties, however, are much more under the influence of physical 
disorder than others: but I much doubt whether any, even the very highest attributes of 
the mind, can stand completely independent of, and unaffected by, derangement of 
function or structure in the corporeal fabric. A very slight inflammation of the 
membranes of the brain, will destroy, for a time, the judgment, the memory, the feelings, 
the affections, of the greatest philosopher or divine. How, then, can we wonder that 
various derangements of the body, and especially of those organs with which the brain is 
closely linked in sympathy, should disturb the subordinate attributes of mind, as, for 
example, the TEMPER of an individual? (60) 
 
Here two definitions of the word “ruminate” intersect—a philosopher ruminates on existence; a 
cow ruminates the cud.45 Nervous sympathy links the two processes together in such a way that 
one might disorder the other. Johnson goes on to write that “the aids of religion and philosophy, 
are much less available, and much less effectual” as treatments for deranged minds (60-61). That 
he specifies that inflamed brain membranes will—not might—“destroy” the mental function of 
even “the greatest philosopher or divine” illustrates the extent to which he, like his contemporary 
                                                
45 A December 1850 letter to Duyckinck, Melville writes about the pleasure he receives watching 
his cow ruminate: “it’s a pleasant sight to see a cow move her jaws—she does it so mildly & 
with such sanctity” (Correspondence 174). 
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Prichard, understands the mind and brain as the province of physicians, not philosophers and 
theologians. 
 If a philosopher’s mind were to be destroyed by indigestion, he or she might not know it: 
Johnson views the stomach’s influence on the brain as working below the level of consciousness. 
The temper, he writes, is not altered by the pain of indigestion but rather the sympathetic 
resonance between stomach and brain: “an individual who would bear … a fit of the gout, or the 
pain of a surgical operation, will be completely changed in his temper, and become waspish, 
irascible, and captious, by an irritation of the stomach (transmitted sympathetically to the brain), 
of which he is perfectly unconscious" (61). Because the stomach affects a dyspeptic person’s 
brain unconsciously, he or she may not be aware of the onset of the disorder’s mental effects. At 
the same time, Johnson worries that “connecting irritability of temper with a physical disorder” 
might “furnish the person thus afflicted, with an excuse for giving way to every impulse of an 
irritable mind,” especially when that person can say that his or her affliction is unconscious (62) 
His solution is vigilance: “the moral curb which he should now endeavor to keep on his temper, 
ought to be more forcibly strained than ever” (62). That vigilance and its attendant practices 
(self-knowledge and self-control) lie at the heart of Johnson’s approach to what he calls the 
“abstract of all maladies” (1). His insistence on “a more rigorous system of self-control” makes 
preventing and treating indigestion a matter of willpower rather than the “farrago of tonics and 
stimulants” advertised in newspapers (i). 
 Dietary reformers in the 30s, 40s, and 50s enshrined three important elements of 
Johnson’s focus on treating indigestion with “self-control” rather than pharmaceuticals: self-
knowledge, vigilance, and self-control. Self-knowledge promises to make one an expert on the 
subject of one’s own body. The self-knower is aware of his or her mental and bodily processes 
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and is thus cognizant of those deviations that signal the early stages of disease. Vigilance ensures 
that those deviations will be recognized for what they are. Self-control allows one to master the 
impulse to gratify the “palate at the expense of the stomach,” as Philip writes (133). And, as I 
will discuss in the next section, dietary reformers, as they mediated Johnson’s work, added their 
own ingredient to this recipe: the concept of using diet to sculpt the self. 
Manufacturing Mind and Soul 
As I explained in the previous chapter, phrenology gave nineteenth-century Americans a 
popular science of the mind even as it provided scientific cover for racism, classism, and sexism. 
And because phrenologists took Philip’s and Johnson’s ideas about the stomach’s influence on 
the brain seriously, their writings often address digestion’s effects on the operations of the 
mental organs. Orson Fowler, author of Fowler’s Practical Phrenology (1840), the most popular 
midcentury phrenological text, finds diet key to the brain’s health: 
By the truly wonderful process of digestion, food and drink are converted into thought 
and feeling—are manufactured into mind and soul. Is it then unreasonable to suppose that 
different kinds of food produce different kinds of mind? Reasonable or unreasonable, it is 
nevertheless the fact. … Ardent spirits and wine excite the animal organs, located in the 
base of the brain, more than they do the intellectual or moral faculties. This is 
unquestionably the fact with every thing heating in its nature; such as condiments, flesh, 
tea, coffee, and high-seasoned or highly stimulating food of any kind. (30) 
 
He goes on to predict that physiologists will discover that “animal food,” or meat, excites the 
animalistic mental organs at the back of the head at the expense of the intellectual organs at the 
front of the head (30). He writes that “vegetable food” will soon be found by physicians to 
reduce body temperature and thus clear the mind and calm the nerves (30). In a broad sense, 
then, Fowler agrees with what physicians such as Philip and Johnson thought about the stomach: 
that different foods digest differently, and that the conditions of the stomach affect other organs, 
especially the brain. 
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 But the differences between Fowler and the physicians are more interesting because they 
indicate the ways that reformers adapted medical theories of digestion into their broader 
ameliorative schemes. In Fowler’s case, he grafts digestion onto phrenology, which forms his 
core structure of beliefs about the human body. Johnson writes of the stomach as influencing the 
whole of the brain, particularly its enveloping membrane, which suggests that he does not view 
indigestion as affecting one part of the brain more than another. For Fowler, who takes cerebral 
localization as a matter of course, different foods affect different mental organs. Whereas 
Philip’s dietary guidelines distinguish between more and less healthy meats (turkey without the 
skin versus fatty beef, for example), Fowler understands all meat as “keeping the body in a 
highly excited, not to say feverish state,” which overwhelms the delicate intellectual organs that 
sit atop the head, the furthest away from the rest of the body (30). Those organs require a cool 
and calm (rather than feverish and irritable) body to function, which necessitates the need for 
cool, bland food such as vegetables. That he views vegetables as beneficial is at odds entirely 
with Philip’s and Johnson’s advise to avoid them altogether because they ferment in the stomach, 
but because Fowler understands “cooling” foods as reducing nervous excitation, he construes 
them as promoting “placidity of mind” (30). This is to say that although Fowler retains the core 
elements of medical theories of digestion, he modifies those theories so that they fit with 
phrenology’s emphasis on equilibrium and balance. Thus, when he writes that to “distinguish 
yourself intellectually, you must regulate the quantity and quality of your food and drink in 
accordance with the established laws of physiology, or your wings of fame will be melted in the 
heat of animal indulgence,” he refashions Johnson’s prescription of self-control as a cure for 
dyspepsia into the key to intellectual achievement (30). 
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 In what follows I trace how dietary reformers adapted medical theories of digestion to 
create extensive, sophisticated, and popular systems of self-improvement. These systems 
incorporate the previously mentioned core elements of Johnson’s treatment of indigestion—self-
knowledge, vigilance, and self-control—and make refashioning the self their end. They thus saw 
managing one’s diet as a way for one to “manufactur[e] mind and soul” according to one’s 
wishes, as Fowler writes (30). I conceptualize dietary regulation as a technology that allows 
individuals to guide their bodily processes. To do so, I draw on sociologist Nikolas Rose’s and 
Joelle M. Abi-Rached’s work on “neurotechnologies,” which they define as techniques that 
“seem to open ourselves up to new strategies of intervention through the brain” (2). Although 
they ground their thinking on neurotechnologies in neurological developments of the past forty 
years, I argue that dietary reformers likewise saw themselves as sculpting the self by making 
interventions through the brain (via the stomach).46 Dietary reformers, I claim, made it possible 
for nineteenth-century Americans to understand themselves as what Rose calls “somatic selves,” 
shaped by their diets but also able to shape those diets. Whereas phrenology, the mid-nineteenth 
century’s other popular science of the mind-body, stresses the permanence of one’s mental 
characteristics, diet renders them malleable. I focus on Sylvester Graham as the most prolific and 
influential of the dietary reformers. 
 After dropping out of Amherst College and training as a Presbyterian minister, Sylvester 
Graham read physiologist François J. V. Broussais’s Treatise on Physiology, published in 
America in 1826, and other physiological and medical texts (Smith 31). Thereafter, he traveled 
the Northeast delivering lectures on the virtues of temperance and of learning what he called “the 
science of human life.” He rose to prominence in 1832, when, as food historian Andrew F. Smith 
                                                
46 By “self” I mean an individual’s sense of identity and subjectivity as defined by the historical 
and cultural circumstances that form the horizons of his or her self-understanding.  
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writes, adherents of his dietary regimen of fruits, vegetables, and water “appeared to thrive” in 
the wake of a cholera epidemic in New York City (29). He achieved fame practically overnight, 
and he wasted no time publishing the dozens of letters he received from those who believed they 
had survived cholera because of his diet (29). His influence was such that in 1833 Asenath 
Nicholson, a boardinghouse owner in New York City, instituted his dietary regimen in what was 
afterwards known as a “Graham boardinghouse” (33-34). Other Graham boardinghouses soon 
arose in Boston and other Northern states (34). In an appendix to A Lecture on Epidemic 
Diseases Generally (1833), Graham includes a three-page-long copy of the “Rules and 
Regulations of the Graham Boarding House,” the contents of which comprise exacting rules for 
when and how to wake, sleep, eat, bathe, and exercise (78-80). Boarders, a group that included 
such luminaries as Horace Greeley and William Lloyd Garrison, were to rise between four and 
five each morning, depending on the season; eat breakfast at seven, lunch at one, and dinner at a 
mutually agreed-upon time (Smith 34; Graham 78). They were to drink no alcohol, coffee, or tea, 
and ideally eat no meat, but if meat were served it should be done so simply, without spices or 
condiments (79). Graham also recommended that boarders take cold sponge-baths daily and 
immerse themselves wholly in water at least weekly (80). 
These rules illustrate the transformation of Philip’s and Johnson’s treatments for 
indigestion into something more like a lifestyle—a set of behaviors, attitudes, and beliefs that 
structure a certain way of living. I argue that the Grahamian lifestyle is not so much a deviation 
from the physicians as it is an elaboration of their theories of the stomach-brain connection and, 
more broadly, of the concept of nervous sympathy itself. In A Lecture to Young Men on Chastity, 
first published in 1834, Graham emphasizes the interconnectedness of every organ of the human 
body, which he says form a “grand web of organic life” (36). He writes that a disturbance in any 
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part of this web resonates throughout the whole, which does not differ significantly from 
Johnson’s thought; but Graham’s shift is to dramatically widen the range of what could be 
considered a disturbance. His use of a web as a metaphor for the nerves is fitting, for he 
understands them as fragile in the extreme: “All extraordinary and undue excitements,” he 
writes, “whether caused by mental, moral or physical stimuli, increase the excitability and 
unhealthy activity of the nerves of normal life; and tend to bring on, and establish in them, a state 
of diseased irritability and sensibility; which is more or less diffused over the whole domain” 
(37). In Graham’s view, any nervous excitement whatsoever can be pathological: a caffeine rush 
would court death. And because in that view nervous excitement can be caused by any “mental, 
moral or physical stimuli,” not just poorly digested food, avoiding such excitement requires 
adhering to a controlled regimen such as that found in Graham boardinghouses.  
 A Lecture to Young Men on Chastity, like Graham’s other early writings, focuses on 
avoiding lust, masturbation, and excessive sex. He writes that because genital nerves “partake, in 
common with those of other organs, of this general debility and diseased excitability, and 
become exceedingly susceptible of irritation;—sympathizing powerfully with all the 
disturbances of the system, and especially of the brain and alimentary canal” (38). Graham thus 
adds the genitals to the brain-stomach connection, and in doing so he extends his emphasis on 
exercising abnegation and discipline in diet to sexuality. He recommends shunning “stimulating 
and heating substances, high-seasoned food, rich dishes, the free use of flesh, and even the 
excess of aliment, for they “increase the concupiscent excitability and sensibility of the genital 
organs,” which in turn slows digestion, obstructs the lungs, and floods the organs with large 
amounts of quickly-circulating blood (40-41). In this view, even nocturnal emissions are 
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hazardous; sufferers, Graham says, would be best served avoiding all stimulating foods, rising 
early, exercising often, sleeping on a hard bed, and taking cold baths (134).  
 Graham’s advocacy of dietary regulation as a tool to govern one’s urges brings light to 
the relationship between food and the self by making food thinkable as an agent for modifying 
one’s digestion and thus one’s brain and mind (6). Food consequently became, for Graham, other 
dietary reformers, and their followers, at once agential (“healthy” foods affect the mind/body) 
and subject to the eater’s agency (the eater, armed with self-knowledge, makes the choice to eat a 
certain way). The concept of food as opening the body to modification, in turn, enables 
reimagining Rose’s and Abi-Rached’s affirmative theories of bioethics in an alimentary rather 
than a neurological context. Those theories illuminate the ways that dietary management can be 
thought of as a technology of self-sculpting. Although dietary management emphasizes that the 
mind/body is susceptible to outside determinants in ways invisible to the scrutiny of 
consciousness, it also makes the individual an expert on his or her own physiology—“know 
thyself,” says Graham—and the ways to shape it by altering its very substance. Thinking of 
dietary management in the terms made available by Rose and Abi-Rached adds to the prevailing 
scholarship on dietary reformers the insight that following Graham’s dicta was not so much a 
capitulation to sexual repression as it was a way for his followers to take responsibility for being 
the persons they wished to be. 
 Rose and Abi-Rached identify the brain as the focus of “an emerging style of thought” 
that locates brain disorders as “encompass[ing] everything from anxiety to Alzheimer’s disease,” 
even “includ[ing] both addictions and obesity—all, it seems, have their origin in the brain” (14). 
This new style of thought asks us to think of ourselves as “somatic selves” equipped with a 
“neurobiological dimension to our self-understanding and our practices of self-management” 
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(223). Identifying the brain as the seat of disorders previously conceptualized primarily as moral 
or social issues (addiction and obesity) echoes the ways that the stomach came to be understood 
as the site of all disease and dyspepsia the “abstract of all maladies” (Johnson 1). And just as in 
the early nineteenth century the stomach became a site of treatment for a variety of ills, in the 
twenty-first century the brain is thought of as open to a range of treatments and interventions that 
Rose and Abi-Rached term “neurotechnologies”: tailored pharmaceuticals, gene therapy, 
transcranial magnetic stimulation, etc.  
 Rather than attempt to depict such neurotechnologies as the horsemen of the reductivist 
apocalypse, as many humanists and social scientists do, Rose and Abi-Rached “seek to trace out 
some directions for a more affirmative relation to the new sciences of brain and mind” (2). They 
argue that neurotechnology construes brains as “open for intervention and improvement, 
malleable and plastic” rather than as destined to be or to work a certain way (223). Although 
some would be quick to point out (correctly) that brains being “open for intervention and 
improvement” means that they are made available to government and corporate influence, brains 
also “become open to action by each individual themselves … The plastic brain becomes a site 
of choice, prudence, and responsibility for each individual” (52). In this formulation, “our selves 
are shaped by our brains but can also shape those brains” (22). Individuals thus understand 
themselves as subject to unconscious influences; at the same time, their awareness of those 
influences and their access to the means by which to affect them (interventions such as drugs and 
mindfulness) means that they can exercise “choice, prudence, and responsibility” with respect to 
their brains (52). Rose and Abi-Rached note that “each of us is now urged to develop a reflexive 
understanding of the powers of these nonconscious determinants of our choices, our affections, 
our commitments: in doing so, we will no longer be passive subjects of those determinants, but 
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learn the techniques to act on them in order to live a responsible life” (22-23). In other words, 
neurobiological selves are encouraged to develop self-knowledge, particularly of those 
unconscious processes that affect their mental lives, so that they can manage those processes. 
Thinking of oneself as corporeal is thus not a capitulation to biological determinism but an 
opportunity to exercise choice about how to navigate the claims of biology. 
 The same commitment to shaping oneself through self-knowledge and the management 
of unconscious bodily processes propels Grahamian dietics. Graham’s binding of the digestive 
and the reproductive systems have received most of the scholarly attention directed towards him, 
most recently and convincingly in Kyla Wazana Tompkins’ Racial Indigestion: Eating Bodies in 
the 19th Century (2012). But his later writings, such as Lectures on the Science of Human Life 
(1849), show Graham extending the benefits of his regimen to improved longevity, beauty, 
agility, stamina, resistance to disease, mental clarity, “cerebral development,” and moral 
sentiments (4). Lectures, written for the “unlearned reader,” includes a glossary of medical terms 
such as “hepatic” and “renal,” a feature that indicates the degree to which he takes the book’s 
epigraph, “Know thyself,” seriously (i). It also indicates that he seeks to make individuals 
experts on their selves. Arranged in the style of Euclid’s Elements of Geometry to “refer[] 
continually to previously ascertained principles, or established facts and conclusions,” it begins 
with Graham’s understanding of the basics of physiology and builds logically to his dietary 
regimen (i). Graham writes it so that “every individual of suitable age and ordinary intelligence, 
by a proper degree of application,” can understand his or her body and maintain it (i). The 
underlying ethos of the Lectures is that the human body, being part of the natural world, is 
subject to fixed laws and principles, including “relations between human organic life, and the 
animal, vegetable, and inorganic world around us; relationships which not only greatly affect the 
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body, but, in the present state of being, modify mind and morals and religion to an extent which 
cannot safely be disregarded” (6). Because “mind and morals and religion” are subject to the 
human body’s conditions, only knowing oneself well enough to manage those conditions can 
keep them under control. The care one takes of oneself becomes ethically and theologically 
salient. 
Graham stresses that because individuals are able to govern their alimentary selves, they 
are responsible for doing so: once given the tool of dietary management, they are morally 
responsible for their dietary choices and the aftermaths of those choices. “Excessive 
alimentation,” he writes, “is one of the greatest sources of evil to the human family in civic life” 
(258). This is a point about which he feels so strongly that he reiterates it in italics: 
every individual should, as a general rule, restrain himself to the smallest quantity, which 
he finds from careful investigation and enlightened experience and observation, will fully 
meet the alimentary wants of the vital economy of this system [the body],—knowing that 
whatsoever is more than this is evil! (258). 
 
In Graham’s model, eating too much is not only unhealthy—it is “evil” (258). Mary Peabody 
Mann, wife of reformer Horace Mann and one of the famous Peabody sisters, reiterates this point 
forcefully in her cookbook, Christianity in the Kitchen: A Physiological Cook-Book (1858). She 
writes that foods such as “wedding cake, suit plum-puddings, and rich turtle soup, are masses of 
indigestible material, which should never find their way to any Christian table”; she grieves to 
see such food eaten at weddings, for “a book of reckoning is kept for the offences of the 
stomach, as well as for those of the heart, and this is one of the deeds done in the body, for which 
the doer will be called to account” (2). She terms such indigestible food “unchristian” because 
“health is one of the indispensable conditions of the highest morality and beneficence” (2). 
Mistreating one’s stomach is to mistreat one’s temperament, making one a worse person, so one 
is responsible for eating healthily (2). “It is a good omen,” she writes, “that practical 
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physiologists, even now, begin to feel ashamed of ill health, and feel bound to apologize for it” 
(2-3). In a footnote, she remarks that Sylvester Graham “published an apology in the newspapers 
for having been sick” (3). And like Graham, she intends her work to increase its readers’ self-
knowledge, for only “knowledge of physiology” will “stem the tide” of dyspepsia (162). She 
hopes for a future in which “every mother will be a physiologist, and all nurses [nursing women] 
will be physicians” (163). When that day comes, she writes, all will recognize that “[r]egimen 
and diet” are the keys to restoring and maintaining bodily, mental, and moral health (155). 
 When literary scholars focus exclusively on the politics of dietary reform, they do so at 
the expense of its medical context and its recuperative aims. Specifically, they miss the ways that 
dietary management offered nineteenth-century Americans opportunities to govern bodily 
processes otherwise out of their control even as they ceded control of their appetites to reformers.  
Although other nineteenth-century popular sciences such as phrenology, craniometry, and 
physiognomy assume the permanence of mental ability or temperament, dietary reformers 
envisioned the stomach as a site of change. Individuals were able to understand their dietary 
choices as choices about themselves—choices that provided the opportunity to exercise 
responsibility in the care of their bodies. Despite its emphasis on the stomach’s influence over 
the brain, dietary reform is not a science of determination but of the possibilities afforded by 
embodiment.  
The Sins of Indigestion 
In his heavily marked copy of Emerson’s Essays: First Series (1841), Melville records 
his humorous reaction to the transcendentalist’s claim that “Hideous dreams are exaggerations of 
the sins of the day”: according to Melville, Emerson means, “of course, the sins of indigestion” 
(132). What Emerson sees as metaphysical reckoning, Melville sees as the result of an upset 
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stomach. The conceptual move Melville makes in his marginal note is to put Emerson’s 
philosophical speculations into conversation with the body; the same, I claim, holds true for 
Moby-Dick. Just as dietary reformers insist upon the stomach as unconsciously influencing the 
mind, Moby-Dick continually returns to questions about how the manner and content of what 
individuals think might be affected by the manner and content of their ingestion. Specifically, the 
novel draws on dietary reform and its assumptions about the mind-body relationship to counter 
contemporary philosophical hopes of transcending the body such as those held by Emerson. In 
the course of doing so, it poses questions about digestion’s implications for religious belief and 
moral agency.  
I view Melville as pushing against the American transcendentalist tendency to imagine 
philosophy, thought, and emotion as actuated by the disembodied mind. Emerson writes in 
Nature (1836) that “[s]tanding on the bare ground,” he feels that “all mean egotism vanishes. I 
become a transparent eye-ball; I am nothing; I see all; the currents of the Universal Being 
circulate through me; I am part or particle of God. The name of the nearest friend sounds then 
foreign and accidental” (6). Emerson’s famous eyeball, bereft of a body, has no identity (“I am 
nothing”); no physiological limitations (“I see all”); and no connections that it values over others 
(“[t]he name of the nearest friend sounds then foreign and accidental”). In other words, it 
signifies a relationship to the universe in which the body plays no part. But humans have bodies: 
Emerson cannot actually become a transparent eyeball, free of physical needs; a stubbed toe 
might have interrupted Thoreau’s metaphysical speculations in the woods. In his poem “Art,” he 
distinguishes “brave unbodied scheme[s]” speculated upon in “placid hours” from “unlike 
things” that “must meet and mate,” as in digestion, to create “pulsed life,” the stuff of art (Poems 
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322). Melville makes this point when he writes of the limitations of Goethe’s optimistic 
philosophy to his friend Nathaniel Hawthorne in June of 1851:  
In reading some of Goethe's sayings, so worshipped by his votaries, I came across 
this, "Live in the all." That is to say, your separate identity is but a wretched one, -- good; 
but get out of yourself, spread and expand yourself, and bring to yourself the tinglings of 
life that are felt in the flowers and the woods, that are felt in the planets Saturn and 
Venus, and the Fixed Stars. What nonsense! Here is a fellow with a raging toothache. 
"My dear boy," Goethe says to him, "you are sorely afflicted with that tooth; but you 
must live in the all, and then you will be happy!" (Correspondence 193-94) 
 
Melville makes a sharp point, and it is one that will reappear in Moby-Dick: contra Goethe and 
“his votaries,” including Emerson, the physical body—its pains, exhilarations, and changes—
punctures the hope of transcending the bounds of one’s self and partaking in universal kinship. 
Goethe advises us to “get out of yourself,” but few things situate us within our bodies like a 
toothache. In a note at the bottom of his letter, Melville adds that Goethe’s “all” feeling is not 
entirely without truth: one feels it, he writes, “lying in the grass on a warm summer’s day” (194). 
But, Melville adds, “what plays the mischief with the truth is that men will insist upon the 
universal application of a temporary feeling or opinion” (194). As a dyspeptic might agree, part 
of what makes feelings and opinions temporary is their susceptibility to changes in and to the 
body: how long can a body that needs to drink, eat, and excrete lie in the grass experiencing 
transcendence?47  
If, as Stephanie Browner writes, “Melville preferred to write about the body from the 
ground level and to immerse his readers in spectacularly somatic worlds,” part of what makes 
Moby-Dick so “spectacularly somatic” is its insistence on the influence of digestion, the body’s 
“ground level” or fundament, on thought, emotion, and behavior (71). It has long been 
                                                
47 In a February 1851 letter to Duyckinck, Melville notes that Hawthorne himself is worryingly 
incorporeal: “there is something lacking – a good deal lacking – to the plump sphericity of the 
man. What is that? – He does’nt patronize the butcher – he needs roast-beef, done rare” (181). 
For Melville, food—“roast-beef, done rare”—can fill the bodily lack he sees in Hawthorne. 
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recognized that Moby-Dick concerns itself with eating, digestion’s sister art: Robert T. Tally Jr. 
says as much when he asserts that the novel “uses culinary rhetoric to establish its analysis of 
power relations in the nineteenth century” (73). Caleb Crain links the novel’s many references to 
cannibalism to homoeroticism, noting that both instances involve “unusual male-male intimacy” 
(26). Mark Edelman Boren, surveying the novel’s many dining scenes, remarks that “[e]ating 
and being eaten play such a large role in Moby-Dick that even if Ishmael doesn’t understand it, 
he must acknowledge its presence” (9). And, given such memorable scenes as Ishmael and 
Queequeg’s chowder feast and Stubb’s supper of near-raw whale steak, studies of eating are 
more than warranted. 
But focusing exclusively on eating extracts it from a historical context in which ideas 
about what, when, and how to eat are inextricable from ideas about digestion. Indeed, for dietary 
reformers and their adherents, attaining a healthy digestion (and thus one’s best self) was the sole 
end of eating. Literary criticism that focuses on eating tends to construe it as a contained event, 
but the act of eating is not in and of itself the sum total of a person’s relation to food, especially 
in the antebellum context. Food is ingested and digested; it goes inside the body, and in 
antebellum America, it affects that body in powerful ways. Critics’ focus on the act of eating to 
the neglect of digestion accounts for their tendency to take the alimentary elements of Moby-
Dick not as subjects of analysis in and of themselves but as springboards by which the more 
rarefied critical heights inhabited by politics and sexuality may be reached. Kyla Wazana 
Tompkins’ work towards establishing “critical eating studies” is an example: it “seeks to render 
discursive two kinds of matter toward which so much human appetitive energy is directed: food 
and flesh” (2-3). Attending to the very real ways that food and eating overlap with social and 
political forces allows for a clear view of the biopolitics of eating—and indeed attaining such a 
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view is one of Tompkins’ goals—but making matter “discursive” neglects digestion’s signal role 
in contemporary medicine and culture (Tompkins 5).  
Melville, as Ralph James Savarese writes, “seems to be familiar” with contemporary 
theories of digestion; further, he elaborates those theories in his fiction (30). Nippers of 
“Bartleby the Scrivener” (1853), after all, is a “victim” of “indigestion,” a condition that, 
Melville writes in chorus with physicians and reformers, is “betokened in an occasional nervous 
testiness and grinning irritability” (NN Piazza Tales 16). In “Bartleby” Melville’s 
characterization of Nippers as dyspeptic results in him being a comically poor officemate: 
Nippers, eternally unsatisfied with his desk, “would sometimes impatiently rise from his seat, 
and stooping over his table, spread his arms wide apart, seize the whole desk, and move it, and 
jerk it, with a grim, grinding motion on the floor, as if the table were a perverse voluntary agent, 
intent on thwarting and vexing him” (17). And Melville was, at the very least, aware of the 
basics of Graham’s ideas. A copy of Graham’s A Lecture to Young Men on Chastity was in the 
library of the Charles and Henry, a whale-hunting ship aboard which Melville worked from 
November 1842 to April 1843 (Delbanco 44). We cannot be sure if Melville read the book, but a 
moment in Pierre: or, The Ambiguities (1852) indicates that he was familiar with (and skeptical 
toward) the Grahamian model of dietics. The young Pierre Glendinning lives in New York City 
with a group of Grahamists and philosophers known as the Apostles, who partake of seemingly 
every reform movement the city has to offer and live “huskily muttering the Kantian Categories 
through teeth and lips dry and dusty as any miller’s, with the crumbs of Graham crackers” (NN 
Pierre 300). They keep, in fact, “a bushel of Graham crackers” as some of their “only 
convivials” (300). Melville’s narrator inveighs against the attention they give to their diets with a 
specificity that indicates the author’s familiarity with not only Grahamism but also like 
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movements: “Nor shall all thy Pythagorean and Shellian dietings on apple-parings, dried prunes, 
and crumbs of oat-meal cracker, ever fit thy body for heaven” (299).48 Melville was not a passive 
recipient of others’ theories of digestion, then, but a participant in the structure of their cultural 
reception.49 
Moby-Dick addresses the body and the need to govern it in its first paragraph, in which 
Ishmael, who finds himself growing restless with life on land, decides to “sail about a little and 
see the watery part of the world” as a way of “driving off the spleen, and regulating the 
circulation” (3). Melville thus makes bodily regulation the cause of Ishmael’s adventures. The 
young man views sea travel as restorative to his health:  
Whenever I find myself growing grim about the mouth; whenever it is a damp, drizzly 
November in my soul; whenever I find myself involuntarily pausing before coffin 
warehouses, and bringing up the rear of every funeral I meet; and especially whenever 
my hypos get such an upper hand of me, that it requires a strong moral principle to 
prevent me from deliberately stepping into the street, and methodically knocking people’s 
hats off—then, I account it high time to get to sea as soon as I can. (3) 
 
When a grim, splenetic view of the world begins to overtake Ishmael, he goes to sea. This is 
especially so when his “hypos” threaten to rule his actions. In antebellum America, a hypo attack 
meant hypochrondriasis, a commonly self-diagnosed condition with symptoms equal in 
nebulousness to those of late-century nervous diseases such as neurasthenia and hysteria. 
                                                
48 Pythagoras and Percy Bysshe Shelley were vegetarians. In 1813, Shelley published an 
influential pamphlet, “A Vindication of Natural Diet,” which advocates strict abstention from 
meat and alcohol. 
 
 
49 In July 1854, Herman Melville gave his wife Elizabeth a copy of Matilda Marian Pullan’s The 
Modern Housewife’s Receipt Book (1854) (Kelley 7). An essay written by physician J. B. 
Langley prefaces the guide, and in it he ties the culinary arts to healthy mental function: “We do 
not believe that the happiness of home depends entirely upon the cuisine, or that WOMAN is 
never to have higher ambition than to be food-maker to the sterner sex. Not at all. But we do 
believe that woman’s duties are in the domestic sphere, and that some of them refer to the 
material comforts without which the brain—the organ of the mind—cannot perform its 
functions” (qtd. in Kelley 7). 
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Ishmael’s use of the shorthand term “hypos” presumes that he and his reader have a shared 
language for the disorder, which indicates its prevalence in antebellum culture. Justine Murison 
characterizes hypochondriasis as causing a person to believe himself or herself an animal or an 
inanimate object (Murison 33). But hypochondriasis was not a singular, stable epistemic 
category but rather a mélange of symptoms, the causes and cures of which were topics of 
vigorous debate in the mid-nineteenth century.50 For James Johnson, hypochrondriasis is a “curse 
of civilization” that arises when “the mind has been cultivated at the expense of the body” (63). 
He writes that “mental anxiety, too much exercise of the intellect, and too little exercise of the 
body” are the chief causes of the disease and recommends that sufferers “narrowly watch” 
fluctuations in their “natural temper or feelings” to alert themselves to its influence (65, 69).51 
Some hypochondriacs, he writes, “conscious of the danger they ran, by the slightest collision or 
contradiction from even the nearest relations,” shunned company until their attacks wore away 
(72). Ishmael does much the same thing: he takes responsibility for his body by monitoring his 
                                                
50 An anonymous review of two treatises on hypochondriasis in an 1844 issue of The Medico-
Chirugical Review charts an array of disagreements about the disease: James Johnson views it as 
originating in overstimulation of the brain, leading to a “morbid sensibility of the digestive 
organs”; German physician Christoph Hufeland claims that it originates in the nervous system 
generally and the digestive organs more particularly; William Cullen understands it as primarily 
a neurosis (421-23). In the midst of the controversy, though, physicians agreed that the two most 
common symptoms of the disorder are digestive troubles and despondency. 
 
 
51 Melville himself was thought by friend and neighbor Sarah Morewood to suffer from “too 
much exercise of the intellect.” She writes in a December 1851 letter to George Duyckinck that 
Melville writes all day and does not “leave his room till quite dark in the evening -- when he for 
the first time during the whole day partakes of solid food -- he must therefore write under a state 
of morbid excitement which will soon injure his health” (Melville Log 441). Melville, then, was 
thought to be something of a dyspeptic himself. 
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moods and relying on his “strong moral principle” to stay violence (3).52 When he feels the 
“damp, drizzly November” in his soul, he goes to sea as soon as he can, not only because he 
relishes “being paid” for his labor but also “because of the wholesome exercise and pure air of 
the forecastle deck” that can reverse the adverse effects of hypochondriasis (6). The passage thus 
illuminates the cultural aspects of hypochondriasis, which are predicated, for both Ishmael and 
Johnson, on regimes of self-observation and self-restraint.  
Going to sea, for Ishmael, is an attempt to cure a disorder both corporeal and moral in 
nature. Rush writes that while hypochondriasis is “seated in the mind,” it “is as much the effect 
of corporeal causes as a pleurisy, or a bilious fever” (10). Ishmael’s wish to “regulat[e] the 
circulation” as a way of curing his hypos suggests that he believes as much. But he also sees 
hypochondriasis as a moral disorder: when his hypos are strongest, “it requires a strong moral 
principle to prevent me from deliberately stepping into the street, and methodically knocking 
people’s hats off” (3). When his body is not fully under conscious control, it causes him to wish 
to act in ways that are morally dubious—here, knocking others’ hats off. This echoes Mann’s 
emphasis on maintaining health as a way of maintaining one’s good temperament: retaining full 
moral agency requires a healthy, properly regulated body. Ishmael goes to sea not only for his 
health but also for his soul; further, he takes care of his soul precisely by taking care of his 
health. Yet whether his time on the Pequod alleviates his indigestion is an open question, for his 
narration wavers between, on one hand, a dyspeptic character—irritable, mutable, reactive—and, 
on the other, the sort of ironclad digestive capabilities he attributes to hyenas:  
                                                
52 Rush also notes that “persons who are afflicted with it [hypochondriasis] are said to be 
spleeny, in some parts of the New England states” (12). James Emmett Ryan, in an incisive study 
of illness and healing in Moby-Dick, argues that Ishmael is a hypochondriac, noting that his 
hypos “figure as commonplace symptoms within nineteenth-century medical theory” (33). 
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“He [the hyena-like man] bolts down all events, all creeds, and beliefs, and persuasions, 
all hard things visible and invisible, never mind how knobby; as an ostrich of potent 
digestion gobbles down bullets and gun flints. And as for small difficulties and 
worryings, prospects of sudden disaster, peril of life and limb; all these, and death itself, 
seem to him only sly, good-natured hits, and jolly punches in the side bestowed by the 
unseen and unaccountable old joker” (226). 
 
Ishmael here makes the connection between cognition and digestion clear—both are ways of 
understanding one’s relation to the environment. To have the digestion of a hyena or an ostrich is 
to be able to maintain one’s equanimity in the face of “small difficulties and … peril of life and 
limb” alike (226). His avid narration, like the ostrich, attempts to “bolt[] down all events, all 
creeds, and beliefs, and persuasions, all hard things visible and invisible,” but the novel, 
capacious as it is, can only stomach so much—Ishmael’s acidic, ulcerative digressions mark the 
consequent dyspepsia.  
The Try Pots, where Ishmael and Queequeg lodge before their journey on the Pequod, is 
the site of much of the novel’s early engagement with food and digestion. The famous chowder 
scene figures food’s agency by invoking its power to affect whatever ingests it. The sentence 
describing the clam chowder served to Ishmael and Queequeg at the Try Pots makes the dish’s 
appeal clear: “It was made of small juicy clams, scarcely bigger than hazel nuts, mixed with 
pounded ship biscuits, and salted pork cut up into little flakes; the whole enriched with butter, 
and plentifully seasoned with pepper and salt” (66-67). The friends consume their supper “with 
great expedition,” and soon Ishmael orders a round of chowder made with cod rather than clams 
(67). It is while attending to this second bowl that Ishmael wonders whether chowder might 
affect the head. His question indicates an awareness that contemporary physicians and dietary 
reformers would balk at the rapid consumption of a great quantity of rich, hot food—Melville 
thus structures the chowder scene as a site of engagement with dietary reform. Sylvester Graham 
inveighed against soups in general; they are “altogether too complicated to be healthy” (Lectures 
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223). He writes that “a dish of salted or smoked fish, broiled and perfectly saturated with butter, 
and perhaps also dressed with mustard and pepper,” a dish much like chowder, “is enough to 
give a hyena a fit of dyspepsy” (223-24). Ishmael describing his meal in a way that makes it 
sound irresistible—“Oh, sweet friends! hearken to me,” he says before describing it—brings to 
attention the tension inherent in dietary reform between what is healthy and what tastes good. 
And though Philip warned against pleasing the “palate at the expense of the stomach,” Ishmael 
has a second bowl of chowder (Philip 133).  
Ishmael might look to the structure and surroundings of the Try Pots itself, the “[f]ishiest 
of all fishy places,” for evidence of food’s potency: 
Chowder for breakfast, and chowder for dinner, and chowder for supper, till you began to 
look for fish-bones coming through your clothes. The area before the house was paved 
with clam-shells. Mrs. Hussey wore a polished necklace of codfish vertebra; and Hosea 
Hussey had his account books bound in superior old shark-skin. There was a fishy flavor 
to the milk, too, which I could not at all account for, till one morning happening to take a 
stroll along the beach among some fishermen's boats, I saw Hosea's brindled cow feeding 
on fish remnants, and marching along the sand with each foot in a cod's decapitated head, 
looking very slipshod, I assure ye. (67) 
 
In this passage, the Try Pots’ kitchen, which continuously transforms fish into chowder, acts as 
the stomach of its environs, spreading fishiness to human, animal, and object alike. Eating fish 
for every meal makes one fishy, as Hosea’s cow demonstrates, literalizing epicure Jean 
Anthelme Brillat-Savarin’s mantra, “tell me what you eat, and I will tell you what you are.” The 
passage thus dramatizes dietary reformers’ dismantling of the ontological distinction between 
eaten and eater (a distinction absent from Queequeg’s cannibalistic dietary practices). That is 
why Ishmael imagines fish-bones poking through his clothing: because he eats chowder for 
every meal, his body becomes fishy. And because food’s psychological effects are coterminous 
with its effects on the eater’s body, Ishmael’s (or is it Fishmael’s?) question of whether the 
chowder has affected his head is bound to the question of whether it has changed his body. 
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Ishmael’s and Queequeg’s relationship, forged while searching for a whaling ship in 
Nantucket, is marked by Ishmael’s anthropological interest in Queequeg’s cultural differences 
from white New Englanders. Those differences extend to different habits and beliefs regarding 
food. Queequeg “never consorted at all, or but very little,” with other sailors; instead, to 
Ishmael’s eye exhibiting a “Socratic wisdom,” the harpooner “seemed entirely at his ease; 
preserving the utmost serenity; content with his own companionship; always equal to himself” 
(50). “Surely,” Ishmael asserts, “this was a touch of fine philosophy; though no doubt he had 
never heard there was such a thing as that” (50). Ishmael thinks of Queequeg, who seems to live 
philosophically without being trained for it, as a born philosopher. He finds this far preferable to 
the typical philosopher, of whom “I conclude that, like the dyspeptic old woman, he must have 
‘broken his digester’” (50). For Ishmael, philosophy as it is typically practiced is a product of 
poor digestion; it follows that Queequeg, whose mind is impervious to the debilitating effects of 
dyspepsia, is a different type of philosopher, one not “conscious of so [philosophically] living” 
(50). Early on, then, Melville takes care to align digestion (or rather, indigestion) not only with 
what Ishmael sees as Queequeg’s personal philosophy but also with philosophy in general: 
Queequeg’s healthful digestion makes him a harpoon-flinging Socrates, while the common breed 
of philosophers must have disordered stomachs. As Melville’s responses to Goethe and Emerson 
suggest, he meditates on the body’s ability to challenge philosophical perspectives that neglect 
its role in thought and knowledge. To call philosophy the result of a “broken digester” is to 
subordinate it and its traditional practitioners not to rational argumentation but to the body’s 
vagaries.  
Ishmael’s characterization of Queequeg as a natural-born philosopher hints at civilized / 
uncivilized differences in digestion, a subject that I will address in detail later in the chapter. 
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Here, Ishmael’s conception of differences in digestion inheres in the differences between his 
dyspeptic mood swings and morbid introspections and Queequeg’s calm self-assurance. Johnson 
wrote that indigestion is a “curse of civilization” that can arise from overexertion of the mind at 
the cost of the body, which explains why philosophers have “broken digesters”; if Ishmael goes 
to sea to treat his dyspepsia, part of what he seeks from his journey is a shift away from the sort 
of mental taxation that, per Johnson, burdens intellectuals with indigestion (63). Ishmael thinks 
that Queequeg, who lives philosophy rather than thinks it, is not subject to the “curse of 
civilization” because, in the young man’s view, he is not civilized.53 Queequeg, for Ishmael, is a 
member of a natural aristocracy whose very lack of civilization equips him with the cool-
headedness and equanimity that dietary reformers sought to attain. 
Ishmael construes not only philosophy but also religion as subject to the influence of 
digestion. After a day spent searching for work, Ishmael returns to his and Queequeg’s shared 
room to find the harpooner silently sitting with a carven idol, Yojo, on his head (83). To his 
roommate’s alarm, he holds the position for a full day. At the end of Queequeg’s religious 
observance, Ishmael decides to educate him on the history of religion, “beginning with the rise 
and progress of the primitive religions, and coming down to the various religions of the present 
time, during which time I labored to show Queequeg that all these Lents, Ramadans, and 
prolonged ham-squattings in cold, cheerless rooms were stark nonsense” (85). These practices 
are “bad for the health; useless for the soul; opposed, in short, to the obvious laws of Hygiene 
and common sense” (85). Fasting is central to Lent and Ramadan, and Queequeg takes no food 
                                                
53 Dietary reformers’ identification of “civilized” eating practices as causing digestive troubles 
precedes current-day attitudes about purportedly more “natural” ways of eating, e.g. “paleo” 
regimes that seek to replicate prehistorical humans’ diets, strictures against processed foods, and 
locavorism. 
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during his worship, so it is most likely fasting that’s “bad for the health” and “opposed … to the 
obvious laws of Hygiene.”  
Ishmael then delivers to Queequeg an extended monologue on fasting and religion: 
Besides, argued I, fasting makes the body cave in; hence the spirit caves in; and all 
thoughts born of a fast must necessarily be half-starved. This is the reason why most 
dyspeptic religionists cherish such melancholy notions about their hereafters. In one 
word, Queequeg, said I, rather digressively; hell is an idea first born on an undigested 
apple-dumpling; and since then perpetuated through the hereditary dyspepsias nurtured 
by Ramadans. (85) 
 
Here, Ishmael explicitly binds body to spirit: if “fasting makes the body cave in,” then it 
necessarily does the same to the spirit (85). If, as Orson Fowler asserts, food becomes mind and 
soul, then “all thoughts born of a fast must necessarily be half-starved.” Ishmael thus understands 
religious belief as something intrinsically tied to adherents’ digestion (or, in the case of fasting, 
lack thereof): hell is not the punishment of a just God but the product of the dyspeptic’s 
disordered mind.   
I read Ishmael’s monologue as reflecting his own indigestion. It is rude and 
presumptuous, if not ill-tempered; it is the philosophizing of someone with a broken digester, 
which means that we should not take what Ishmael says without a grain of salt. When he finishes 
his lecture, he asks Queequeg about his digestion: the harpooner responds that his only incidence 
of dyspepsia was after a feast of fifty of his kingdom’s enemies (85). His friend declines to hear 
any more. Melville’s willingness to make this joke suggests that we not take Ishmael’s professed 
views on digestion to be the same as his. But, as Samuel Otter writes, Melville “does not reject 
the idea of the body as meaningful” even though his work at times critiques contemporary 
American culture’s obsession with phrenology, physiognomy, and other modes of reading the 
body (154). Indeed, the early chapters of Moby-Dick engage digestion in ways informed by 
contemporary physicians and dietary reformers. What Melville adds, as I have argued, is an 
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exploration of digestion’s effects: the early chapters of Moby-Dick consider how both philosophy 
and religion are inflected by the stomachs (and thus the psychological states) of thinkers and 
believers. 
Stomachs and Sharks 
 Ishmael’s conversation with Queequeg indicates Melville’s interest in tracing digestion as 
it moves across racial and cultural lines. I argue that this tracing ultimately expresses the futility 
of racing bodies’ interiors. As Kyla Wazana Tompkins has amply demonstrated, food, eating, 
and digestion were central to how white nineteenth-century Americans viewed the black body. 
The “performative production” of race, she writes, depended on an alimentary dialectic (7). On 
one hand, black bodies were commonly construed not just as commodities, but as edible 
commodities—see, for example, the Jim Crow-shaped sweets Hepzibah sells in her shop in 
Hawthorne’s The House of the Seven Gables (1851).54 On the other hand, black Americans were 
understood to be prodigious consumers, as pervasive stereotypes about their purportedly 
insatiable appetite for watermelons and sweets of all sorts attest.55 Here, I argue that Moby-Dick 
undermines notions of racial differences by posing one’s capacities for self-control, not race, as 
driving what and how one eats.  
                                                
54 Hepzibah also gives a boy a gingerbread whale inspired by Moby-Dick.  
 
 
55 Tompkins concludes that in Graham’s dietics “correct eating, like correct sexual behavior, is 
understood as a performative act of national identification and formation. In eating as national 
subjects flesh is called into social being through a model that understands race as anchored” to 
digestion (85). But her claim that “correct eating” is an act of “national identification and 
formation” rests on her argument that Sylvester Graham characterizes “foods that constitute a 
threat to the body” as “‘foreign’ and ‘exotic’ to the United States (spices, coffee, sugar, tea, and 
wine),” which is not accurate (81). Graham inveighs equally against such domestic products as 
whiskey and butter. 
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I begin my analysis of race and digestion in Moby-Dick by pairing two often-paired 
dining scenes, both depicted in Chapter 34, “The Cabin-Table”: the officers’ dinner and the 
harpooners’ dinner. Every aspect of the officers’ dinner is choreographed and restrained. They 
depart from the deck to the cabin in order of rank: first Ahab descends, then Starbuck, then 
Stubb, and then Flask. Ishmael notes that the absolute deference given to the ship’s captain at 
mealtimes is linked to the “unchallenged power” of “he who in the rightly regal and intelligent 
spirit presides over his own private dinner-table of invited guests.” “Who has but once dined his 
friends,” Ishmael avers, “has tasted what it is to be Caesar” (150). The officers are served in total 
silence according to rank: Starbuck “received his meat as though receiving alms; and cut it 
tenderly; and a little started if, perchance, the knife grazed against the plate; and chewed it 
noiselessly, and swallowed it, not without circumspection” (150-51).  
While all of the officers observe the table’s traditional silence, one seems to find it 
stifling: “What a relief it was to choking Stubb, when a rat made a sudden racket in the hold 
below” (151). Why does Stubb choke when Starbuck, in harmony with both Pequod tradition 
and contemporary dietary discourse, swallows his food carefully, “not without circumspection” 
(151)? Put another way, what is it that Stubb has trouble swallowing? The readiest answer, of 
course, is that he chokes on the parching salted beef served by Dough-Boy, the ships’ steward. 
Stubb’s being so relieved at the sound of a stowaway rat leads me to propose a different answer: 
he chokes on the cabin’s restrained, restraining quiet, for it cannot accommodate his capacious 
appetite. He might be more comfortable dining with the harpooners, who eat in lively “contrast 
to the hardly tolerable constraint and nameless invisible domineerings of the captain’s table” 
(152). Their table is characterized by “almost frantic democracy” and “entire care-free license 
and ease”: 
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While their masters, the mates, seemed afraid of the sound of the hinges of their own 
jaws, the harpooneers chewed their food with such a relish that there was a report to it. 
They dined like lords; they filled their bellies like Indian ships all day loading with 
spices. Such portentous appetites had Queequeg and Tashtego, that to fill out the 
vacancies made by the previous repast, often the pale Dough-Boy was fain to bring on a 
great baron of salt-junk, seemingly quarried out of the solid ox. (152) 
 
The harpooners break every rule in the dining book. They eat so loudly that the noise echoes, 
and, contrary to prevailing Anglo-American thought on digestion, they stuff (not sculpt) 
themselves. The simile Melville uses to describe their hunger, “they filled their bellies like 
Indian ships all day loading with spices,” toys with the dangers associated with spiced foods in 
general, but especially with the fiery Indian foods that were popular with sailors in Melville’s 
time.56  
 Contemporary physicians and dietary reformers might have thought that eating with such 
speed and immoderation would lead to nervous debility, but, as Ishmael discovers early in his 
friendship with Queequeg, dyspepsia is not a universal complaint. In fact, the only one whose 
health seems affected by the harpooners’ dinner is Dough-Boy, worried that he himself might be 
eaten: 
[Dough-Boy] was naturally a very nervous, shuddering sort of little fellow, this bread-
faced steward; the progeny of a bankrupt baker and a hospital nurse. And what with the 
standing spectacle of the black terrific Ahab, and the periodical tumultuous visitations of 
these three savages, Dough-Boy's whole life was one continual lip-quiver. Commonly, 
after seeing the harpooneers furnished with all things they demanded, he would escape 
from their clutches into his little pantry adjoining, and fearfully peep out at them through 
the blinds of its door, till all was over. (151) 
 
If the harpooners are ships loaded with spices, then Dough-Boy is just what his name suggests: 
soft, bland bread dough. Ishmael’s description of him as both “bread-faced” and perpetually 
                                                
56 In Lectures on the Science of Human Life, Sylvester Graham praises “Hindostan and India 
generally” for their vegetarian diets; he condemns, however, their taste for “curry powder—a 
composition made of cayenne pepper, black pepper, ginger, mustard, and several other 
ingredients of a very heating and irritating character, calculated to produce the worst disorders of 
the alimentary canal” (178). 
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nervous—his “whole life was one continual lip-quiver”—marks his role as the living intersection 
of food and health as surely as his heritage as “the progeny of a bankrupt baker and a hospital 
nurse.” When the harpooners eat in ways considered hazardous by prevailing medical thought, 
only the glutinous Dough-Boy suffers.  
The stark differences between the quiet and restraint of the officers’ meal and the “frantic 
democracy” of the harpooners’ seem to reinforce Ishmael’s ideas about racial differences in 
digestion: whites’ digestive systems are suited for eating in moderation, while other races’ 
systems drive them to ravenous consumption. But that reading overlooks the ways that the diners 
act in ways contrary to this idea. Although Stubb is third in command, he seems as if he would 
be happier eating with the harpooners than with the officers. And Daggoo, the “great negro” 
harpooner, runs counter to stereotypes about black eating by taking considered, “dainty” bites of 
his food, seeming to Ishmael to subsist mostly on air alone (152). These details indicate that 
there are no particularly white or nonwhite ways of eating—self-control and moderation, for 
dietary reformers the hallmarks of civilization, are available to all. To analyze the conceptual 
tensions in the dining scenes, I now turn to Chapter 64, “Stubb’s Supper,” which depicts Fleece’s 
sermon to the sharks, whose frenzied, noisy feast echoes the harpooners’ dinner. Drawing on my 
analysis of the crew’s dinners, I argue that despite the similarity of the harpooners’ dinner to the 
sharks’, it does not follow to read that similarity as expressing the animality and ravenousness of 
nonwhite, “uncivilized” bodies. Doing so unnecessarily homogenizes the harpooners and ignores 
the sharkishness of white men like Stubb, who, as Fleece notes, is “more of shark dan Massa 
Shark hisself” (297). Sharkishness—eating ravenously, with no governance of one’s appetite—
thus transcends race and culture. Joined in their sharkishness by rejecting “healthy” dining habits 
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en masse internationale, Stubb and the harpooners figure the failure of looking to digestion for 
racial meaning.  
After Stubb kills a whale, the crew fastens it to the ship’s side so that its oil can be 
harvested. Stubb, “flushed with conquest,” demands that a steak be cut from the whale’s “small,” 
or “the tapering extremity of the body,” for, being “a high liver,” he is “somewhat intemperately 
fond of the whale as a flavorish thing to his palate” (292). The word “intemperately” invokes the 
all-important dietary concept of temperance—“simplicity and temperance in diet,” Graham 
writes, is paramount—a concept that high-living Stubb rejects (Lectures 141). As he settles “at 
the capstan-head, as if that capstan were a sideboard” to eat, he is joined in his meal by 
“thousands on thousands of sharks,” “[m]ingling their mumblings with his own mastications” in 
a fractious feast that mirrors not only Stubb’s eating but also the harpooners’ own “frenzied 
democracy” at table (293). The rest of the chapter returns to the linked images of Stubb’s dining 
and the sharks’ repeatedly. He is not aware of their similarities at first: he “heeded not the 
mumblings of the banquet that was going on so nigh him, no more than the sharks heeded the 
smacking of his own epicurean lips” (293). When he calls the black cook Fleece over to castigate 
him for the steak being too cooked and tender, though, he draws the connection. A good whale 
steak “must be tough,” he says: “those sharks now over the side, don’t you see they prefer it 
tough and rare?” (294). He seems to align himself with the sharks because of their shared taste 
for tough, rare whale meat. But then he tells Fleece to “tell ‘em they are welcome to help 
themselves civilly, and in moderation, but they must keep quiet” (294). “Go,” he says, “and 
preach to ‘em!” (294). That he couches the advice to eat “civilly, and in moderation,” something 
he struggles to do, as preaching suggests that he views dietary reformers as evangelical; and, as 
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we have seen, he does not care for their message.57 Telling Fleece to preach to the sharks is a 
way of sarcastically telling him to proselytize them into the digestive fold, an absurd and 
impossible task that in its absurdity and impossibility indicates Stubb’s frustration with digestion 
reform. 
Fleece takes the injunction to “preach” literally and, addressing the bloody waters below, 
sermonizes the sharks: 
Your woraciousness, fellow-critters, I don't blame ye so much for; dat is natur, and can't 
be helped; but to gobern dat wicked natur, dat is de pint. You is sharks, sartin; but if you 
gobern de shark in you, why den you be angel; for all angel is not'ing more dan de shark 
well goberned. Now, look here, bred'ren, just try wonst to be cibil, a helping yourselbs 
from dat whale. (295) 
 
The sharks cannot help their sharkishness, for “dat is natur, and can’t be helped” (295). The 
point, Fleece emphasizes, is to govern one’s own nature and so govern one’s voraciousness. That 
is, by now, a familiar theme: the call to govern one’s appetite, to eat moderately, is the central 
doctrine of midcentury dietary reform. Just as Graham and his adherents found virtue, freedom, 
and agency by managing their diets, in Fleece’s sermon being in control of one’s appetite leads 
to the moral and spiritual purity of the angels. But Fleece has a suspect congregation. 
Throughout the sermon, though, Stubb “help[s] himself freely” to his steak, a signal that he does 
not take the homily seriously, and the sharks continue to gnaw the whale and each other (296). 
Fleece soon grows tired of sermonizing a congregation deaf to his lessons: “No use goin' on; de 
dam willains will keep a scougin' and slappin' each oder, Massa Stubb; dey don't hear one word” 
(296). Stubb does not appear to hear, either: as he turns to excoriate Fleece for cooking his steak 
                                                
57 Later, Queequeg falls into the water; after he is hauled back aboard, Dough-Boy hands him a 
cup of ginger and water instead of spirits (321). Stubb is incredulous: “Ginger? ginger? and will 
you have the goodness to tell me, Mr. Dough-Boy, where lies the virtue of ginger? Ginger! is 
ginger the sort of fuel you use, Dough-Boy, to kindle a fire in this shivering cannibal? … There 
is some sneaking Temperance Society movement about this business” (322).  
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too much, he does so while “rapidly bolting” whale meat into his mouth (296). At the end of the 
chapter, Fleece concludes that he is “more of shark dan Massa Shark hisself” (297).58 
 Though the harpooners’ and officers’ dining scenes appear at first to posit racial 
differences in eating and digestion, the bottomless hunger and enthusiastic consumption 
characteristic of sharks cross racial lines. As Fleece’s sermon suggests, what is at stake in one’s 
sharkishness is not so much race as self-governance. But careful attention to one’s intake is not 
without its difficulties: just as asking sharks to practice temperance and eat “civilly, and in 
moderation” is absurd, it is absurd to ask Stubb, Queequeg, and Tashtego to adhere to Grahamian 
dietary rules. Captain Peleg says before the voyage that “Pious harpooners never make good 
voyagers—it takes the shark out of ‘em; no harpooner is worth a straw who ain’t pretty sharkish” 
(89). His fear is that they will become too concerned for their souls to risk their lives hunting 
whales, a fear that is to some extent borne out in Starbuck, the well-governed shark who 
contemplates derailing Ahab’s hunt for Moby Dick. Ultimately, though, the business of the 
Pequod and the whale fishery more generally depends upon the ferocity of men like Stubb and 
Queequeg; to expect them to sit and dine as if they were at Sylvester Graham’s table is as absurd 
as preaching to swarming sharks.  
Vengeance on a Dumb Brute 
Much like Stubb and the sharks, Moby Dick is characterized by his consumption. When 
Ishmael signs up to work on the Pequod, he soon learns that the White Whale “devoured, 
chewed up, crunched” Ahab’s leg on his last voyage (79). Especially irksome to Ahab is what 
appears to be “the White Whale’s infernal aforethought of ferocity”; for those who hunt him, 
                                                
58 This is a sentiment the narrator of Typee echoes (1846): “The fiendlike skill we display in the 
invention of all manner of death-dealing engines, the vindictiveness with which we carry on our 
wars, and the misery and desolation that follow in their train, are enough of themselves to 
distinguish the white civilized man as the most ferocious animal on the face of the earth” (125). 
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“every dismembering or death that he caused, was not wholly regarded as having been inflicted 
by an unintelligent agent” (183-84). Ahab hates Moby Dick not because he ate his leg but 
because he perceives the animal as doing so purposefully. For him, the whale is either a moral 
agent himself or an instrument of another agent, be it fate or divinity. This means that the loss of 
his leg appears to him not an accident but a crime; this distinction provides moral justification for 
his quest for revenge. Starbuck, Ahab’s Quaker first mate, recoils from thinking of the whale as 
an agent: “Vengeance on a dumb brute!” he cries, “that simply smote thee from blindest instinct! 
Madness! To be enraged with a dumb thing, Captain Ahab, seems blasphemous” (163-64). 
Starbuck understands Moby Dick as an animal that acts from “blindest instinct” rather than from 
deliberation, so it cannot be a moral agent or, consequently, a target of revenge. 
Attending to digestion in Moby-Dick leads, perhaps surprisingly, to a question not 
frequently asked: what drives the whale? As I will suggest, the novel poses indigestion as one 
potential cause of Moby Dick’s “inscrutable malice” (164). Ishmael portrays whales’ indigestion 
as a double-edged sword. One edge is its economic value: Ishmael tells us that ambergris, the 
most commercially valuable substance produced by a whale’s body, “is supposed by some to be 
the cause, and by others the effect,” of cetacean dyspepsia (408). “Who would think,” he crows, 
“that such fine ladies and gentlemen should regale themselves with an essence found in the 
inglorious bowels of a sick whale!” (408). Laxatives were a common mode of relieving 
dyspepsia in the mid-nineteenth century; Ishmael therefore proposes, as a way of curing whales’ 
dyspepsia, ramming “three or four” boatloads of laxatives down their throats, “and then running 
out of harm’s way, as laborers do in blasting rocks” (409).59 Though he obviously delights in his 
                                                
59 Melville draws this striking image from Henry Theodore Cheever, who remarks that ambergris 
is formed from “that state of the system which calls for a cathartic” (115). “A peck of Morrison’s 
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bathroom humor, Ishmael cautions against turning up our noses at ambergris because of its 
intestinal origins: “Bethink thee of that saying of St. Paul in Corinthians, about corruption and 
incorruption; how that we are sown in dishonor, but raised in glory.” (409).60 Ishmael aligns the 
Pauline relationship between corruption and incorruption with that between sweet ambergris and 
indigestion. The point he wishes to make is that purity can arise from foulness.  
But the novel also depicts a darker, more dangerous effect of whales’ dyspepsia: 
indigestion produces not only ambergris but also rage and violence. When the Pequod meets the 
Samuel Enderby, an English whaling ship, readers meet Captain Boomer, who lost his arm to 
Moby Dick the previous whaling season—though the whale did not swallow it, he injured it 
enough to require amputation (440). Unlike Ahab, Boomer seems to bear the whale no ill will 
(“he’s best let alone”) and maintains a cheerful perspective on life (441). Present during Boomer 
and Ahab’s conversation is the Samuel Enderby’s straight-laced surgeon, Dr. Bunger, whom 
Boomer ribs for his “dietetically severe” course of treatment after being wounded in the struggle 
with Moby Dick (439). Bunger, not only a physician but also “late of the reverend clergy,” draws 
on a mixture of science and religion to explain the White Whale’s violence:  
"Well, then," interrupted Bunger, "give him your left arm for bait to get the right. Do you 
know, gentlemen"—very gravely and mathematically bowing to each Captain in 
succession—"Do you know, gentlemen, that the digestive organs of the whale are so 
inscrutably constructed by Divine Providence, that it is quite impossible for him to 
completely digest even a man's arm? And he knows it too. So that what you take for the 
White Whale's malice is only his awkwardness. For he never means to swallow a single 
limb; he only thinks to terrify by feints.” (441) 
 
                                                
or Brandreth’s pills,” he writes, “would probably remove obstructions in the creature’s 
abdominal viscera” (115).  
 
 
60 See 1 Corinthians 15: 42-45. 
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The physician, whose interest in regulating his captain’s diet echoes that of physicians such as 
Philip and Johnson, holds that whales’ divinely constructed digestive systems are such that they 
cannot digest human limbs. This physiological premise leads him to contradict Ahab’s 
conception of the whale as a moral agent acting with malice; in his view, far from being 
malicious, the whale suffers from indigestion (441). And whereas humans can treat their 
dyspepsia, whales must take the preventative route: they rely on their knowledge (says Bunger) 
that they cannot digest human limbs to avoid dyspepsia. Moby Dick, to whom the culture of 
dietary reform is not accessible, cannot exercise the sort of agency-creating self-regulation that 
Ishmael practices.61 
The novel teeters on rendering Bunger’s explanation ridiculous by immediately following 
it with the doctor’s tale of “the old juggling fellow … that making believe swallow jack-knives, 
once upon a time let one drop into him in good earnest, and there it stayed for a twelvemonth or 
more; when I gave him an emetic, and he heaved it up in small tacks” (441). This story implies 
that Bunger is a less than honest or a less than competent physician, which means that his ideas 
about Moby Dick’s digestion might be just humbug. But answering the question of whether the 
White Whale has indigestion is less important than the question itself. Echoing Melville’s comic 
reduction of Emerson’s “sins of the day” to “the sins of indigestion,” the gam on the Enderby 
poses an encounter between the novel’s grandest concepts—fate, God, madness, vengeance—
and a whale’s upset stomach. 
                                                
61 Ishmael notes that whales are able to maintain their internal temperatures: “Oh, man! admire 
and model thyself after the whale! Do thou, too, remain warm among ice. Do thou, too, live in 
this world without being of it. Be cool at the equator; keep thy blood fluid at the Pole. Like the 
great dome of St. Peter's, and like the great whale, retain, O man! in all seasons a temperature of 
thine own” (307). Yet the question raised by Bunger is whether the whale can regain its 
physiological equilibrium once it has been disturbed.  
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This is not to say that indigestion is the only road the novel takes into the whale’s 
interior, as Ishmael’s attempts to read his body phrenologically and physiognomically attest. 
Though these attempts ultimately fail to provide the answers Ishmael seeks, rather than declare 
the task impossible he challenges others to try their hand: “I but put that brow before you. Read 
it if you can” (347). Samuel Otter notes that Ishmael’s efforts at knowing the whale delve ever 
deeper into its body, from the skin-deep sciences of dermatology and physiognomy to the depth 
of the spine (155). Looking to the depths of the stomach as one among many avenues that 
provide partial, imperfect views of the whale’s mind, with the aid of Bunger’s diagnosis, brings 
the opening chapters’ evident interest in the ties between digestion, philosophy, and religion full 
circle. If the whale’s violence is due to dyspepsia, then Ahab’s “blasphemous” desire for revenge 
seems even more so: not only does he wish to hunt an unreasoning animal, but one that acts as he 
does because of sickness. And a dyspeptic Moby Dick would be much like Ishmael himself: 
afflicted with illness, the whale would be driven to enact the cetacean equivalent of “deliberately 
stepping into the street, and methodically knocking people’s hats off” by wreaking terrific 
violence on the ships that hunt him (3). Unlike Ishmael, however, he would have no “strong 
moral principle” or medical culture to ward off the urge to do violence (3). Finally, if the whale 
is dyspeptic, then Moby-Dick would be a story not just about the fatal consequences of Ahab’s 
cosmic insanity—itself a bodily madness, given that it is the blending of “his torn body and 
gashed soul” that “made him mad”—but also those of the whale’s illness (185). True to form, 
though, the novel refuses to allow this conclusion to stand on unshakeable ground: Bunger’s 
explanation is, at best, a guess. 
 Moby-Dick’s weaving of the animal’s violence into the larger fabric of digestion asks us 
to reconsider the place of food and the body in Moby-Dick. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Sr., dean of 
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nineteenth-century American letters and noted physician, writes in “The Physiology of 
Versification” (1875) that we are ruled by bodily processes barely noticeable at the conscious 
level: 
We are governed in our apparently voluntary actions by impulses derived from many 
obscure sources which act upon us almost without our cognizance. The digestive system 
legislates largely for our habits, bodily and mental, and its condition has no insignificant 
effect upon our intellectual and spiritual states. We are commanded to a considerable 
extent by our idiosyncrasies and infirmities. The secret of our diversities as social beings 
lies far more in our peptic capacities, in our indifference to exposure or liability to suffer 
from it, in our sensibility to cold and head or to the air of ill-ventilated rooms, in the 
varying amount of sleep we require… than our friends who call us good companions or 
otherwise are always ready to believe. (6) 
 
Holmes makes two points here: one is that “obscure” bodily processes play outsize roles in who 
we are and what we do. The rest of the article goes on to identify respiration and the pulse, both 
“preeminently distinguished by their rhythmical character,” as central to writing and enjoying 
poetry (6). His other, less emphasized point is that those who know us, not to mention we 
ourselves, might be less than ready to admit our bodies’ influence over us. Dietary reform 
discourses offered answers to questions about how to manage involuntary bodily impulses and 
even prevent madness, yet what remained unanswered was the question of how to address the 
sorts of physiological “idiosyncrasies and infirmities” unaffected by diet—especially, as Chapter 
4 argues Holmes’s fiction makes clear, those idiosyncrasies that came to be known as heredity. 
A Very Long Night’s Digestion 
Early reviewers of Moby-Dick found the novel a riotously spiced, hard-to-digest dish. A 
November 1851 review in the New York Albion says that it “is having oil, mustard, vinegar, and 
pepper served up as a dish, in place of being scientifically administered sauce-wise” (qtd. in 
Selby 29). The reviewer imagines the greasy, piquant combination of fatty and fiery ingredients 
as served by themselves like a sort of stomach-roiling soup. It would be better, the reviewer 
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implies, to turn to science to find ways to dull its sharp flavors and serve it as a sauce instead. 
Another November 1851 review in Bell’s New Weekly Messenger notes that some might enjoy 
the novel’s spice: 
There are people who delight in mulligatawny. They love curry at its warmest point. 
Ginger can not be too hot in the mouth for them. Such people, we should think, constitute 
the admirers of Herman Melville. He spices up his narrative with uncommon courage, 
and works up a story amazingly. If you love heroics and horrors he is your man. Sit down 
with him on a winter’s eve, and you’ll find yourself calling for candles before the night 
sets in. … You will have supper for a very long night’s digestion.” (qtd. in Selby 29)  
 
A mulligatawny is a spicy English soup derived from an Indian sauce—the reviewer perceives, 
then, the appeal of Moby-Dick’s ecumenical makeup and sharp, pungent flavors. How it sits 
depends on the reader’s own digestion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
. 
. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: TRICKS OF THE BLOOD: HEREDITY, CALVINISM, AND THE LIMITS 
OF RESPONSIBILITY IN OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES 
 
Well, we doctors see so much of families, how the tricks of the blood keep breaking out, just as 
much in character as they do in looks, that we can't help feeling as if a great many people hadn't 
a fair chance to be what is called “good,” and that there isn't a text in the Bible better worth 
keeping always in mind than that one, “Judge not, that ye be not judged.” 
 
 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Sr. 
Elsie Venner: A Romance of Destiny (Works V: 324) 
 
Midcentury dietary reformers envisioned the body/mind as malleable and subject to 
individual governance, a vision that promised, as I argue Moby-Dick makes clear, to place the 
management of one’s biological processes at the center of one’s moral life. Yet moral questions 
remained about those processes that are outside the control of the individual, especially, as this 
chapter argues, the biological processes that comprise heredity. Five years before he published 
his thoughts on digestion’s influence on bodily habits, physician, poet, and novelist Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, Sr. gave an address on unconscious thought, or “Mechanism in Thought and 
Morals,” to Harvard University’s Phi Beta Kappa Society on June 28, 1870. In the speech 
Holmes expounds upon what he calls “the true mechanical relations of the thinking principle,” 
including “a few hints as to the false mechanical relations which have intruded themselves into 
the sphere of moral self-determination” (Works VIII: 261). He draws on an ecumenical mix of 
thinkers, including John Stuart Mill, Gottfried Leibniz, and physiologists Thomas Laycock and 
Henry Maudsley, to conclude that “[t]he more we examine the mechanism of thought, the more 
we shall see that the automatic, unconscious action of the mind enters largely into all its 
processes” (284-85). By this he means that our conscious thoughts, the “stepping-stones” that are 
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our “definite,” coherent, seemingly discrete mental concepts, are in fact connected by some 
“creating spirit” invisible to consciousness (285). This spirit, the mechanism of thought, he 
writes, is an “internal movement, of which we are wholly unconscious, and which we only know 
by its effect” (285). As he asserts in “The Physiology of Versification,” thoughts that appear to 
be willed and voluntary are made possible by—and are, in some cases, determined by—
unperceivable mental machinery. At the same time, Holmes says, we still feel as if we are self-
determining; though we might accept determinism intellectually, few “accept it as an article of 
faith” (303). Even Thomas Henry Huxley, “who throws quite as much responsibility on 
protoplasm as it will bear,” agrees that volition plays a role in thought and behavior (303).  
Although Holmes accepts biological determinants of thought as a fact of nature, he 
regards “outside influences, whether it work with the logic of Edwards, or the averages of 
Buckle; whether it come in the shape of the Greek’s destiny, or the Mahometan’s fatalism” as 
artificial constructs that warp morality (303).62 Thinking of persons as morally subject to external 
mechanisms, he explains, leads to the “[m]oral chaos” of “transmissible responsibility”; though it 
seems obvious that “every moral act, depending as it does on choice, is in its nature exclusively 
personal,” certain moral and theological schemes—in a footnote, he names Catholicism and 
Calvinism—still envision responsibility as transferable from one person to another (303-04). He 
means that both Christian sects, otherwise separated by unbridgeable dogmatic gulfs, subscribe 
to the doctrine of original sin, according to which Adam’s guilt transfers to his descendants. 
Such a doctrine, he writes, materializes morality far more than even someone like Huxley 
because it makes responsibility like an object that one person can hand to another: this is 
nonsensical, he says, because any “mal-volition” is “inseparably involved with an interior 
                                                
62 Holmes refers here to Henry Thomas Buckle, whose History of Civilization in England (two 
vols, 1857 and 1861) puts forward a deterministic theory of history.  
  
144 
condition” or mental state particular to the individual and thus cannot be rendered external and 
transferable (304). To thus transfer responsibility is as absurd, Holmes asserts, as “tak[ing] the 
dimensions of virtue by triangulation” or speaking of “the specific gravity of truth, or the square 
root of honesty” (304). But if responsibility were a matter of mathematics, then “[t]he misfortune 
of perverse instincts, which adhere to us as congenital inheritances, should go to our side of the 
account” (304-05). A person whose nature inclines him or her towards wickedness is not to be 
condemned but shown mercy. Even God, Holmes says, should respect an individual’s right not 
to “suffer for any thing except our own wrong-doing”; else, “there is an end to all moral relations 
between them” (305). In other words, Holmes puts forward the bold argument that a just God 
would not hold Adam and Eve’s descendents responsible for their ancestors’ sins. 
 In this chapter I explore the relationship among the terms of “Mechanism in Thought and 
Morals”—morality, theology, and heredity—in Holmes’s first two novels, Elsie Venner: A 
Romance of Destiny (1861) and The Guardian Angel (1867). I argue that these works’ use of 
heredity (understood in biological terms) to critique original sin illuminates the conditions under 
which heredity became thinkable as a way to address ethical and theological issues. I claim that 
Holmes’s novels, written on the cusp of the Darwinian revolution, attempt to address how 
biological heredity might mitigate moral responsibility; further, I argue that this attempt makes 
possible a set of ways of thinking about descent, destiny, and morality later used by eugenicists, 
although Holmes had no commitment to the cultural or political aims of the eugenicists 
themselves. In his attempt to absolve individuals driven by their heredity to vice, he implicitly 
suggests that others should assume responsibility for them, opening the door to imagining 
inheritors of less desirable traits as best managed by a supposed hereditary elite. But Holmes 
differs from eugenicists, I argue, in two respects: first, he addresses unwanted or dangerous 
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inherited tendencies as treatable rather than immutable parts of a person’s being; second, he 
depicts such tendencies as the province of the community and individual rather than the state. 
Holmes thus understands heredity as powerful enough an influence that it limits human 
responsibility but not so powerful that it cannot be treated. By displacing the heredity of original 
sin with the heredity of biological science, Holmes articulates a view of inheritance that allows 
for the amelioration of transmitted traits—giving form to a pliable heredity historically and 
conceptually situated between the twin hereditary determinisms of Christianity and eugenics. 
The chapter’s first section recovers the conceptual space heredity occupied between the 
1830s, when it emerged as a coherent biological concept among French physiologists and 
physicians, to when Holmes began writing in the 1850s. Holmes regards the concept of heredity 
as the biological transmission of traits from parents to offspring as obvious, but that 
understanding is, I argue, contingent upon a shift away from previous models of hereditary 
transmission that view similarities between parents and offspring as a result of the environmental 
circumstances surrounding conception, gestation, and birth. I demonstrate that as the biological 
model of heredity gained acceptance in the middle decades of the nineteenth century, it came to 
be understood as the transmission of not only phenotypic features such as hair color and stature 
but also mental and moral characteristics such as temperament and character. In the second 
section I turn from biological heredity to theological heredity to analyze how Calvinist 
theologians such as Jonathan Edwards and Charles Hodge understand heredity’s function in the 
doctrine of original sin. I argue that Holmes’s critique centers on his understanding of the friction 
between theological and biological conceptions of heredity.   
In the third section I analyze Holmes’s use of allegory to advance his argument against 
Calvinism. I argue that his first novel and first extended attack on Calvinism, Elsie Venner 
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(1861, first serialized in The Atlantic Monthly beginning December 1859), tellingly subtitled A 
Romance of Destiny, uses an allegorical literary mode to address biology’s implications for 
original sin through the figure of Elsie Venner, its teenaged protagonist. In the novel, readers 
follow teacher Bernard Langdon as he unravels Venner’s unaccountable, unprovoked hostility. 
Langdon discovers that she behaves as she does because her constitution was altered when a 
snake bit her pregnant mother. The snake venom, absorbed in utero, causes her to be, seemingly, 
part snake and therefore subject to the snakelike propensity to fascinate and ensnare others. The 
novel’s first preface announces that in “calling this narrative a ‘romance,’ the Author wishes to 
make sure of being indulged in the common privileges of the poetic license”; although “a grave 
scientific doctrine may be detected lying beneath some of the delineations of character,” he does 
not “pledg(e) his absolute belief in it” (v). “It was adopted,” he writes, “as a convenient medium 
of truth rather than as an accepted scientific conclusion” (v). In other words, Venner’s unusual 
physiological circumstances and the “delineations of character” consequent to them are to be 
understood as allegorical of rather than a representation of scientific doctrine. But, I argue, 
expressing “scientific doctrine” through symbolism and the allegorical figure of Elsie Venner 
raises some problems for Holmes’s attempt to address heredity’s consequences for original sin: 
the circumstances that give rise to Venner’s inherited tendencies are so singular and 
circumstantial that, as Holmes’s first biographer John T. Morse writes, “one could sneak away 
from giving a decisive answer to the questions raised” in the novel (265-66). As I will discuss, 
Holmes’s prefaces for subsequent editions of the novel published in 1883 and 1891 attempt 
retroactively to revise the romance into something more straightforward in its representations, 
more objective, more scientific—a “test” of original sin, as the second preface puts it. I read 
these revisionary prefaces as reflecting both heredity’s signal role in the late nineteenth-century 
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American imagination and the literary shift from the Romantic, allegorical mode to the realist 
mode and its accompanying characteristics, especially its claims to objectivity. 
In the chapter’s fourth section, I turn to Elsie Venner’s sibling novel, The Guardian Angel 
(1867). The novel is largely ignored in the scholarship—one could call it a forgotten novel—but, 
I argue, it seeks to refine the theological argument of its predecessor by abandoning the 
allegorical mode and shifting to a realist mode.63 The Guardian Angel, like Elsie Venner, uses a 
young woman’s inherited tendencies as a case study in limited responsibility that argues that 
Calvinists ought not blame all of humanity for Adam’s sins, but in the second novel those 
tendencies are transmitted through biological heredity rather than snake venom. Pressing its 
point through normal and widely known bodily processes, I argue, lends it realist verisimilitude, 
establishing both a biology-based understanding of heredity and Holmes’s authority to express 
heredity’s repercussions for the doctrine of original sin. In the novel Holmes seeks to articulate a 
“doctrine of limited responsibility,” by which those who inherit bad tendencies are shown a 
proportionate amount of lenience (Works VI: viii). If a person does inherit a depraved nature, 
then he or she ought to be pitied, for one does not choose one’s nature. Further, as the novel 
depicts, inherited tendencies might actively impede one’s ability to distinguish right from wrong 
acts altogether. Holmes presses his case through the story of Myrtle Hazard, a teenaged girl who 
inherits her ancestors’ qualities and inclinations. Those inheritances cause her to act in ways she 
normally would not, and she often finds herself in morally hazardous situations because of them. 
The novel’s narrator emphasizes throughout that we ought not blame her for what she cannot 
help doing, though her strict Calvinist guardians do. 
                                                
63 The novel is so ignored in the scholarship that Cynthia J. Davis, whose book Bodily and 
Narrative Forms offers a persuasive reading of Elsie Venner, mistakenly refers to A Mortal 
Antipathy (1885), not The Guardian Angel, as the “subsequent novel” to Elsie Venner (30). 
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 Hazard works to overcome the limits to her moral capability to gain a fuller range of 
agency, and she does so not through providential means but through the acquisition of good 
habits and the guidance of her friends and mentors. Holmes, then, suggests that inherited 
tendencies are something to educate and treat rather than condemn. And this is where the stakes 
of Holmes’s project cohere: his scientific approach to responsibility does not end in abnegating it 
altogether (a charge still leveled by opponents of the insanity defense) but rather in finding ways 
to accrue more agency.  
By turning to heredity to explore what it means to be responsible for one’s actions, 
Holmes seeks to explain God’s duties to humanity in terms of “the total moral capacity of the 
finite agent” as discovered by science rather than “the scale of the Infinite” as deduced by 
theology (“Mechanism,” Works VIII: 87). As I will show, part of this explanation involves 
figuring inherited tendencies as physical (and thus exculpatory) rather than spiritual 
characteristics, a distinction observed even by the most orthodox Calvinists. This means that 
though Holmes does attack Calvinist theology, he does so in ways ultimately intelligible to its 
doctrines. And by tracing how Holmes shifts from allegory to realism in his attempt to reconcile 
theology to biology, this chapter reveals the reciprocities between literature and science. When 
Holmes turns to the realist mode in The Guardian Angel, he adopts the authority of biology; he 
also, by putting the ethical and theological repercussions of that biology into narrative form, 
transforms it into new conceptual structures and disseminates them to the public. In turn, 
Holmes’s ways of thinking about heredity—its power to mitigate responsibility and the need to 
monitor and guide inheritors of “bad” traits or impulses, especially—became available to 
eugenicists, who elaborated them into their own forms. What Holmes understood as 
progressivism thus became over time as strong a determinism as that he set himself up against.    
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Like Begets Like 
 Charles Boewe is correct when he writes that “it is very difficult to establish any exact 
sources for Holmes’s scientific knowledge of heredity”: in his 1867 preface to The Guardian 
Angel, Holmes insists that the “successive development of inherited bodily aspects and 
habitudes” are “well known to all who have lived long enough to see families grow up under 
their own eyes” (Boewe, Heredity 113; Holmes, Works VI: vi). At no point in his first two novels 
does he refer to another scientist or physician to support what seems obvious to him. But I am 
less interested in determining Holmes’s “exact sources” than I am in recovering the broader 
epistemic conditions under which Holmes could understand his view of heredity as the 
“successive development of inherited bodily aspects and habitudes” as obvious. Although the 
concept of heredity as the biological transmission of traits from parents to offspring seems as 
self-evident today as it did to Holmes, it did not take shape as a coherent way of explaining 
similarities between parents and offspring until well into the nineteenth century. Historian of 
science Carlos López-Beltrán writes that “for those living under different physiological and 
theological frames,” including those anterior to Holmes, similarities between parents and 
children “could be accounted for in different ways or dismissed as accidental or irrelevant” 
(“Medical Origins” 105). Before the 1830s, when French physiologists popularized the modern 
model of heredity, the transmission of traits was understood to be contingent upon the 
environmental circumstances surrounding “conception, pregnancy, embryonic development, 
parturition, and lactation” (Müller-Wille and Rheinberger 3). Whatever similarities inhered 
between parents and offspring were understood as a function of “the similarity in the 
constellation of causes,” whether environmental or social, “involved in each act of generation” 
(3). Müller-Wille and Rheinberger draw upon Laurence Sterne’s Tristram Shandy (1760) as an 
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illustration: in the act of conceiving Shandy, his mother asks his father whether he had wound 
their clock for the night (1). The distracting question hampers the man’s ejaculation, which 
“scattered and dispersed the animal spirits” that transmit the stuff of a “man's sense or his 
nonsense, his successes and miscarriages in this world” from father to child. Shandy is 
consequently doomed to an absurd life (2). He can only wish that “either my father or my 
mother, or indeed both of them, as they were in duty both equally bound to it, had minded what 
they were about when they begot me; had they duly consider'd how much depended upon what 
they were then doing” (1). For Sterne and his eighteenth-century contemporaries, the 
transmission of characteristics is contingent upon the circumstances of conception, “understood 
as an individual, separate act” (Müller-Wille and Rheinberger 4). The stuff of inheritance inheres 
not just in the animal spirits themselves but also in the singular means of their emission.   
 In this section I trace the emergence of the idea that hereditary traits originate in parents’ 
biological makeup rather than the circumstances of conception and development. As I will 
discuss, one of the consequences of the shift from social and environmental to biological models 
of heredity is the new idea that not only “the superficial qualities of color, height, weight, and 
form of the body” but also “the internal constitution of tissues and organs” and thus 
“peculiarities of temperament and constitution” are inherited (López-Beltrán, “Medical Origins” 
120). I analyze the moral implications of ascribing an individual’s temperament and constitution 
to heredity, including Holmes’s argument that inherited tendencies impose limits on the bounds 
of moral responsibility. In other words, I recover the period, situated between the early 
nineteenth-century emphasis on environment and the Darwinian, late nineteenth-century 
emphasis on species, when heredity addressed “the fluctuating patterns and processes that 
structure life at the subspecific level” (Müler-Wille and Rheinberger 16). I claim that this period 
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is of special import to Holmes’s first two novels: the structure of ideas about heredity current in 
midcentury, especially the idea that one’s temperament is inherited, allows Holmes to conceive 
of heredity as morally and theologically salient. 
Two poems make the distinction between environmental and biological models of 
heredity clear. In 1803, Charles Darwin’s grandfather, the naturalist and poet Erasmus Darwin, 
published The Temple of Nature; Or, the Origin of Society: A Poem, with Philosophical Notes, 
an epic didactic poem exploring such topics as psychology, botany, reproduction, and 
materialism. Of heredity he writes: 
The clime unkind, or noxious food, instills 
To embryon nerves hereditary ills; 
The feeble births acquir’d diseases chase, 
‘Till Death extinguish the degenerate race. (71)  
 
In Darwin’s poem such environmental factors as climate and “noxious food” afflict the embryo’s 
nerves with “hereditary ills” that are “hereditary” not because they are inherent to the embryo’s 
biological structure but because the uterine environment was affected in such a way that the child 
will be born “feeble” (71). Historian of science Philip K. Wilson notes that Darwin, like his 
mentors William Hunter and William Cullen, understands certain environmental factors as 
transmitting to an embryo or fetus “the predisposition of disease,” resulting in “feeble births” 
susceptible to “acquir’d diseases” (137). Today, we would think of the child as having 
congenital, rather than hereditary, ailments.  
Compare the above lines to a stanza of “Dorothy Q,” a poem written by Holmes about a 
portrait of his great-grandmother, Dorothy Quincy, published in the January 1871 issue of The 
Atlantic Monthly: 
What if a hundred years ago 
Those close-shut lips had answered NO, 
When forth the tremulous question came 
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That cost the maiden her Norman name, 
And under the folds that look so still 
The bodice swelled with the bosom's thrill? 
Should I be I, or would it be 
One tenth another, to nine tenths me? (Works XIII: 48-49). 
 
Holmes wonders in his poem who he would be had Quincy refused her soon-to-be husband’s 
offer of marriage. He construes the question as tied to his very identity: “Should I be I” (would 
he be exactly who he is), were one-tenth (one-eighth, in reality) of his ancestry different? Or 
would he be only “nine tenths me” as he currently is, the other tenth being “another”? Heredity, 
for Holmes, is not a matter of the environmental circumstances of conception and pregnancy but 
of traits that are inherent to his progenitors. Because Holmes’s conception of heredity is not 
founded upon such circumstances, he understands his traits as inherited not only from his parents 
but also from their parents, theirs, and so on. He—and the midcentury model of heredity that 
makes his poem possible—thus understands heredity as involving a temporal scope larger than 
that of earlier models focused on the nine-month span between conception and birth yet smaller 
than later Darwinian models focused on evolutionary timescales. 
 Darwin’s and Holmes’s poems also reflect a shift, driven by an intervening biological 
model of heredity, from conceiving of inheritance primarily in terms of abnormalities and 
illnesses to conceiving of it in terms of characteristics and dispositions. Not only one’s ailments 
but one’s entire makeup, then, came to be understood as heritable. The implications of this shift 
are twofold: first, heredity came to be understood as the transference of normal rather than 
abnormal traits. Language tracked that change: Müller-Wille and Rheinberger write that whereas 
“the adjective hereditary can be dated back to antiquity in the context of nosography (maladies 
héréditaires), a transition to a nominal use (hérédité) took place only from the 1830s onward, 
first among French physiologists and physicians, then in other European scientific circles” (12). 
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Historian Carlos López-Beltrán agrees: although, he writes, traits such as hair color were 
sometimes construed as hereditary prior to the 1830s, “the reference to the hereditary nature of a 
trait occurred, however, with much more frequency and consistency when anomalies, moral or 
physical, were the subject” (“Medical Origins” 106). The second set of implications arises from 
the first: if putatively “normal” traits, not just abnormalities or diseases, are inherited, then one’s 
entire being, including one’s temperament and personality, is inherited. Holmes can thus imagine 
himself simultaneously as a mixture of his progenitors and as “I” and “me,” for he understands 
himself as the sum of his antecedents. 
 The shift from an environmental to a biological model of heredity is not due to the 
Whiggish march of scientific progress from “wrong” to “right” approaches to inheritance but to a 
set of developments in the early decades of the nineteenth century that positioned heredity to 
become an explanatory concept in biology. López-Beltrán argues convincingly that 
understanding this shift requires distinguishing between hereditary transmission and heredity 
(“Cradle” 40). The concept of hereditary transmission has existed since antiquity, but the concept 
of heredity as a way to explain hereditary transmission itself did not take coherent form until the 
nineteenth century. López-Beltrán takes the work of Jean-Baptiste Lamarck, whose 1809 
Philosophie Zoologique proposes an early theory of evolution, as an example of the earlier 
model of heredity (40). Today, he writes, although we tend to locate Lamarck “in the center of 
debates about acquired characteristics, neither Lamarck (nor anyone else in this time for that 
matter) paid attention to heredity itself, as the notion of heredity was not yet developed” (40).  
Lamarck’s theory of evolution is contingent upon his theory of acquired characteristics, 
according to which an organism can transmit to its descendants a tendency to develop phenotypic 
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characteristics it acquired before it reproduces. He famously explains his theory by way of the 
giraffe’s long neck: 
It is interesting to observe the result of habit in the particular shape and size of the giraffe 
(Camelo-pardalis): this animal, the largest of the mammals, is known to live in the 
interior of Africa in places where the soil is nearly always arid and barren, so that it is 
obliged to browse on the leaves of trees and to make constant efforts to reach them. From 
this habit, long maintained in all its race, it has resulted that the animal’s fore-legs have 
become longer than its hind legs, and that its neck is lengthened to such a degree that the 
giraffe, without standing up on its hind legs, attains a height of six metres (nearly 20 
feet). (122) 
 
For Lamarck, a giraffe’s “constant efforts” to reach high leaves forms a “habit” that elongates its 
neck during its lifetime. “The frequent use of any organ,” he explains, “when confirmed by habit, 
increases the functions of that organ, leads to its development and endows it with a size and 
power that it does not possess in animals which exercise it less” (119). According to this theory, 
giraffes developed their long necks over many generations of individual animals habitually 
stretching their necks, resulting in each generation having, on average, a longer neck than the 
last. On face, it seems as if Lamarck articulates a biological theory of heredity, for he does not 
view the circumstances of conception and pregnancy as affecting the transmission of traits. But 
all that is reproductively transmitted from parent to child, he later explains, is a “tendency of the 
organs or a state of the viscera adapted” for a given environment (339). In other words, “it is 
essential that circumstances should favour the development of this tendency in the new 
individual; for otherwise the individual would acquire another temperament, inclinations, and 
characteristics” (339). Because offspring only inherit a tendency to develop like their parents, 
they only develop in the same manner when their environments are the same. A giraffe would 
have to be born into an environment with high leaves to develop a long neck and to end its life 
with a neck like longer than its parents’. Otherwise, it would never experience the environmental 
pressures necessary for it to develop the habit of stretching its neck. The Lamarckian theory of 
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acquired characteristics thus depends upon (post-natal) environmental triggers rather than 
inherited biological structures that persist from parent to child.  
 López-Beltrán identifies the entry for “Héréditaire” in the sixty-volume Dictionnaire des 
Sciénces Médicales (1812-1820) as a key step towards the emergence of a biological theory of 
heredity (“Cradle” 47). The entry includes physician Antoine Petit’s Essai sur les Maladies 
Héréditaires (1817), in which he argues that the reproductive transmission of characteristics “has 
to be based on particular states of the bodily constitution communicated to children by parents” 
(48). As the title of Petit’s essay makes clear, his understanding of heredity draws on the 
prevailing focus on disease as the primary subject of hereditary transmission even as it seeks to 
account for familiar similarities in constitution. Understanding a child’s “bodily constitution” (its 
biological makeup or, in an analogous term of the time, “organization”) as derived from its 
parents’ bodies rather than environmental circumstances made it thinkable as a biological 
concept that explains both the transmission of pathology from parents to offspring and the 
transmission of normal bodily characteristics. And once heredity took form as a coherent 
biological concept, an avalanche of speculations about its mechanisms and boundaries followed. 
Gabriel Andral, one of Holmes’s professors at Paris’s École de Médicine and the man who 
succeeded François Broussais’s chair at the same institution, lectured to Holmes and his 
classmates “on the possibility of hereditary characteristics and weaknesses” in 1833 and 1834 
(Tilton 105). Dominique Auguste Lereboullet, a French physician, writes in his 1834 De 
l’hérédité dans les Maladies that biological heredity is an “unshakable law”: 
“if we direct our gaze to the members of the same family we will find between the 
children and the parents the most obvious conformity: features of the face, of the stature, 
the sound of the voice, the color of the skin, the constitution, temperament, habits, 
character … everything is similar. It is under the influence of this unshakable law, in 
virtue of which man gives life to beings similar to him, that one can see sometimes that 
vices of conformation are transmitted from generation to generation. In such way we 
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inherit the constitution and temperament from our parents; we inherit their physical and 
moral characters; we inherit their conformational vices. (qtd. in López-Beltrán, “Cradle” 
51-52) 
 
By 1834, biological heredity had become the dominant model for understanding physical 
similarities between parents and offspring. For Lereboullet, parents and offspring share not only 
“obvious” similarities such as facial features and skin color but also “constitution and 
temperament” and “physical and moral characters”: in his account we see the explanatory reach 
of heredity beginning to range beyond physical traits into mental and moral characteristics. 
 As that expanded explanatory reach spread outside of medical circles, heredity, like the 
sciences of habit, psychiatry, and digestion before it, came to be understood as a potential cure 
for societal ills. Orson Fowler, famed New York phrenologist and reformer, could thus write in 
his Hereditary Descent: Its Laws and Facts Applied to Human Improvement (1848) that 
“EVERY constitutional quality of offspring, mental and physical, has its procuring cause in 
similar qualities in parentage”: 
If causation governs this resemblance [between parents and offspring] in part, it governs 
all … Either NO causation governs this matter, or else the most minute constitutional 
peculiarities of children are caused by similar elements in their parents. Then let parents 
learn and remember that their prospective children will be the very images of themselves, 
reflected in all their shades of feeling and phases of character; inheriting similar tastes, 
swayed by similar passions, governed by kindred sentiments; debased by the same vices, 
ennobled by like virtues, adorned by kindred charms and graces, and endowed with 
similar moral powers and intellectual capabilities with themselves. (19) 
 
The title page of Hereditary Descent distills the above passage into two pithy maxims: “Like 
begets like” and “Each after its kind.” From this premise, virtually identical to the findings of 
Lereboullet and other French physiologists, Fowler concludes that different combinations of 
parents might “render their offspring short or tall, diseased or healthy … honest or unjust, 
ingenious, musical, witty, acquisitive, communicative, poetical, logical, oratorical, profound, or 
whatever else may be desired” (20). Indeed, he writes, prospective parents are “COMPELLED” 
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to choose mates with complementary traits, “or else not to become parents” (21). “Your 
children,” in sum, “are OBLIGED to be what you are, and cannot help themselves”: prospective 
parents are therefore tasked with ensuring that they do not marry mates whose undesirable 
qualities might reappear in the next generation (21). A section titled “Specific Applications of 
These Laws: Or, Who Should Marry Whom” provides guidelines on what traits and 
phrenological qualities best mix (261). If dietary reform can be understood as a technology of 
self-creation, as I argue in Chapter 3, then Fowler’s proto-eugenic reproductive guidelines 
articulate a technology of other-creation. Much as Graham means for his guidelines to enable 
others derive freedom from self-control, Fowler imagines himself as enabling prospective 
parents to choose what sort of children they will have by assessing and selectively limiting their 
mates. He differs from latecentury eugenicists in his focus on the parent rather than the state as 
the entity that governs reproduction, but certainly he shares (and participates in enabling) their 
fantasy of harnessing heredity to optimize humanity.  
 Fowler’s ideas illuminate several aspects of biological heredity that distinguish it from 
earlier models. First, he emphasizes that parents transmit not only their physical but also their 
emotional, intellectual, and moral qualities to their children, linked by the concept of the 
constitution. This explanatory breadth made it so that a person’s characteristics could be 
understood as outside his or her personal, conscious control: children are obliged, Fowler writes, 
to become what their parents are (21). Second, understanding personal characteristics as a 
function of heredity enabled individuals such as Holmes to equate his or her biological 
inheritance with his or her identity or being. Holmes’s wondering if a different great-grandfather 
would make him “One tenth another, to nine tenths me,” in other words, would not have been 
possible had he been born a century earlier: his verse is contingent upon the biological theory of 
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heredity. Third, many of the qualities that Fowler asserts can be hereditarily transmitted have a 
strong moral weight. Because Fowler believes such qualities as honesty to be just as much a 
product of heredity as stature or skin color, and because he views children as “debased by the 
same vices, ennobled by like virtues” as their parents, he makes choosing one’s mate a moral 
choice (19). Fourth, viewing moral qualities as hereditary suggests that the bounds of moral 
responsibility should be extended beyond the scale of the individual into the scale of the family. 
A family’s underlying predispositions, preserved in its shared biology, could thus be considered 
in ascribing moral responsibility.  
In much of his writing, Holmes argues as much: in his essay “Crime and Automatism” 
(1874) he asks, if both physical and mental qualities are inherited, “why should not deep-rooted 
moral defects and obliquities show themselves, as well as other qualities, in the descendants of 
moral monsters?” (Works VIII: 343). The question is ethically and theologically salient, he 
writes, because “we are getting to be predestinarians as much as Edwards or Calvin was, only 
instead of universal corruption of nature derived from Adam, we recognize inherited congenital 
tendencies,—some good, some bad,—for which the subject of them is in no means responsible” 
(380). For Holmes, both Calvinist theology and heredity embrace some version of determinism: 
for the former, Adam’s original sin forever corrupted human nature, inclining us all towards 
depravity; for the latter, “inherited congenital tendencies” incline us towards predetermined 
behaviors. The two differ, as I will discuss in the next section, in that blaming Adam’s 
descendants for their inherited sinful natures is a foundational point of Calvinist doctrine 
whereas inherited moral deficiencies ought to be understood as limiting moral responsibility, at 
least in Holmes’s view. And it is from this distinction between Calvinist and biological theories 
of inheritance that Holmes’s theological project emerges. 
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Hereditary Corruption 
In Elsie Venner Holmes stages a confrontation between science and religion in the form 
of an encounter between Dr. Kittredge, a grizzled country doctor, and the Rev. Dr. Honeywood, 
a local minister whose heart, Holmes writes, is more humane than the doctrines he explicates on 
Sunday mornings. The two men are invited to the same dinner party, and each takes an armchair 
and sit “squared off against each other” to talk (313). Once the two touch upon the topic of free 
will, Kittredge asks Honeywood if he would like to know his views on the subject; the pastor 
agrees. Kittredge, a mouthpiece for Holmes, asserts that theologians “work out the machinery of 
responsibility in an abstract kind of way; they have a sort of algebra of human nature, in which 
friction and strength (or weakness) of material are left out” (321). Responsibility, Holmes 
suggests, is not so abstract as mathematics; human nature, being enmeshed in the fluctuations of 
the body, is such that we ought rather to think of responsibility the way we do mechanical 
engineering. A wheelbarrow made of wood and one made of iron might perform the same task, 
but under the same conditions one will crack while the other bends; exposed to rain, one will 
swell while the other rusts. By figuring responsibility as a product of machinery and human 
nature as subject to the same physical forces as any other material, Holmes calls attention to the 
ways that the will can be damaged by the dents, cracks, and corrosions that affect all machinery, 
including the human body, in time. The algebraic model of responsibility, in contrast, figures 
each individual as equal in responsibility, so that any given moral calculation is uniformly 
applicable. 
Ministers, Kittredge continues, think of the will as totally unconstrained, “as if it stood on 
a high look-out, with plenty of light, and elbow-room reaching to the horizon” (323). Physicians 
see “how it [the will] is tied up by inferior organization, by disease, by all sorts of crowding 
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interferences” imposed by the human body (323). Monomania and other partial insanities, he 
says, teach us that one need not be totally deranged to be insane and thus that we should 
“recognize all sorts of queer tendencies in minds supposed to be sane, so that we have nothing 
but compassion for a large class of persons condemned as sinners by theologians, but considered 
by us as invalids” (323). As we learn more of the ways that a variety of automatic, unconscious 
bodily processes affect our behavior, Holmes suggests, what used to be a spiritual wickedness 
looks more like a bodily disorder. Kittredge argues for an epistemic shift from sin to bodily 
illness regarding those affected by “queer tendencies” of mind; as Chapter 2 argues, moral 
insanity and phrenology laid the groundwork for such a shift some thirty years earlier.  
For Kittredge, inherited tendencies, too, should inspire pity rather than condemnation: 
physicians, who “have constant reasons for noticing the transmission of qualities from parents to 
offspring,” do not condemn a child for behaviors it could not help inheriting. They “find it hard 
to hold a child accountable in any moral point of view for inherited bad temper or tendency to 
drunkenness,—as hard as we should to blame him for inheriting gout or asthma” (322). His 
assertion dramatizes one of the central assumptions of post-1830 theories of heredity, namely 
that mental and moral characteristics are as heritable as illnesses.  
The exchange between Honeywood and Kittredge dramatizes a larger argument Holmes 
makes in his first two novels. Biological theories of heredity, he argues, because they 
conceptualize behavior as to some degree determined by ancestry, excuse inherited behaviors as 
out of the individual’s control; therefore, the doctrine of original sin, according to which all of 
humanity bears the guilt of Adam’s sin, is inconsistent with he existence of a just and merciful 
God. Adam’s children should be no more responsible for his sin than someone who inherits a 
tendency to steal should be held fully responsible for stealing. Analyzing this argument and the 
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means by which Holmes’s novels articulate it requires a grasp of how Calvinist theologians 
understand Adam’s relation to his descendants. Therefore, in this section I explore the ways that 
heredity, understood as the transmission of Adam’s guilt to his descendants, operates in the 
theology of Jonathan Edwards, New England’s premier Calvinist intellectual, and Charles 
Hodge, Holmes’s contemporary and a prominent theologian of the conservative Princeton 
school. I show that just as physiologists understood heredity as preserving biological structures 
across generations, Edwards and Hodge understood it as preserving the guilt of Adam’s sin. 
Holmes’s critique originates, I ague, in the friction between these two conceptions of heredity. 
Charles Boewe writes that “the scientific element” of Holmes’s writing should receive 
more attention than the theological element, for, he argues, science provides the foundation for 
his arguments about religion (“Reflex” 303). But those arguments are founded equally on 
Holmes’s sophisticated understanding of Calvinist theology. That understanding, in turn, is 
partly a result of a childhood steeped in religion. He received extensive religious education as a 
boy, and like many other “Boston Brahmins” (a term he coined in Elsie Venner), he was 
schooled in a strain of New England Calvinism devoted to preserving the austere doctrines of 
centuries past. His father, Abiel, was a pastor at Cambridge’s First Congregational Church and 
was trained at Yale University, during his time there a fortress of orthodox Calvinism (Tilton 
10). Abiel maintained that orthodoxy throughout his life: in the 1820s and 30s, he became 
involved in a schism between liberal and conservative Congregationalists that resulted in his 
association with Lyman Beecher, the conservative pastor of the Hanover Street Church in Boston 
(Hoyt 34). He also ceased to exchange places with liberal, Unitarian and Unitarian-leaning 
pastors on Sundays, favoring instead Beecher and other conservatives (34). Sundays in the 
Holmes household were strictly reserved for Sabbath activities, which required, as Holmes’s 
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biographer Eleanor Tilton writes, “a decorum, a silence, an inactivity very trying to a nervous 
and talkative boy” (10). The family’s library tended towards theological texts; its only secular 
offering was a volume of Dryden’s poems (6). More representative books included Bunyan’s 
Pilgrim’s Progress and the New England Primer (7, 9). Like most other children raised in 
Calvinist households, Holmes learned from the Primer the shorter Westminster catechism, a 
series of questions and answers that outlines Calvinist theological tenants.64 
 Holmes also learned from the Primer the doctrine of original sin, summarized in the 
verses “In Adam’s Fall / We sinned all” (Primer 8). In other words, the Fall—the original sin—
was committed by Adam, but we, his posterity, bear the weight of sin along with him. The 
shorter Westminster catechism elaborates the Fall and its consequences: “The covenant being 
made with Adam, not only for himself, but for his posterity, all mankind descending from him by 
ordinary generation, sinned in him and fell with him in his first transgression” (33). To be fallen, 
the catechism continues, is to be in “a state of sin and misery,” two distinct concepts (33). 
Humanity’s sinful state is threefold: it “consists in the guilt of Adam’s first sin, the want of 
original righteousness, and the corruption of his whole nature, which is commonly called original 
sin, together with all actual transgressions which proceed from it” (34). In other words, humans 
are sinful in that they are 1. Guilty, being descended from Adam, of Adam’s sin; 2. Stripped of 
the righteousness enjoyed by Adam and Eve in their innocence; 3. Of a nature forever corrupted 
by their loss of innocence. Calvinist theologians emphasized that while “the want of original 
righteousness” is a negative quality (a lack of righteousness), “the corruption of [Adam’s] whole 
nature” is a positive quality (corruption is added to Adam’s nature) (34). The state of misery is 
the “lost communion with God” that deprives humans of what Edwards calls the “spiritual sense” 
                                                
64 For example: “Q. What is the chief end of man? / A. Man’s chief end is to glorify God, and to 
enjoy him forever.” 
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by which the elect perceive God’s goodness (34). And all of these punishments are preserved and 
passed on from Adam by “ordinary generation,” or reproduction, which is why another term for 
the doctrine of original sin is “total hereditary depravity.” Because sinfulness is inherited, even 
newborns are responsible for Adam’s sin: “The wicked are estranged from the womb: they go 
astray as soon as they be born, speaking lies.” (KJV, Psalms 58:3). Heredity, understood as the 
means by which the stuff of human nature is communicated from parents to children, is thus the 
vehicle of original sin. 
 Charles Hodge, onetime president of Princeton University, elaborates hereditary guilt and 
corruption in his magisterial Systematic Theology (1870), the nineteenth century’s most 
comprehensive statement of Calvinist theology. His disagreements with predecessor Jonathan 
Edwards’ conception of inherited guilt are few but significant. Hodge writes, correctly, that 
Edwards explains our inheritance of Adam’s guilt as due to God’s perception of Adam and his 
descendants as being ontologically one (218). For Edwards, whose theology is as metaphysically 
complex as it is pious, all substance is God, and reality exists because of His continued 
willingness for it to do so. Because all substance is Himself and past, present, and future are 
equally knowable, Adam and his posterity are in God’s eyes one in the way we think of a seed 
and the tree it becomes as one. It would thus not make sense to think of Adam and his 
descendants as separate agents. Hodge recoils from this theory, writing that “if God is the only 
substance He is the only agent in the universe … therefore there can be no free agency, no sin, 
no responsibility, no individual existence. The universe is only the self-manifestation of God. 
This doctrine, therefore, in its consequences, is essentially pantheistic” (219-20).  
In contrast to Edwards, Hodge favors intuitive, commonsense distinctions between 
substances and persons. His view more closely echoes the Westminster catechism: Adam’s 
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descendants bear his guilt, want of righteousness, and corruption through a compromised nature 
inherited through “ordinary generation” (229-30). The original sin changed human nature such 
that our corrupted dispositions incline us towards evil. Hodge does not accept the argument that 
one cannot be held responsible for inherited depravity: he opposes “the doctrine which admits a 
hereditary depravity of nature, and makes it consist in an inclination to sin, but denies that it is 
itself sinful” (230). Some theologians, he writes, make “a distinction between vitium [hereditary 
sinfulness] and peccatum [actual sin],” but Hodge finds that distinction flimsy: hereditary 
sinfulness is actual sin (230). A depraved nature inclines a person towards sin, but that one’s 
nature is so inclined makes one’s sins no less sinful, contra Holmes. “Depravity, or inherent 
hereditary corruption,” he writes, “has always been designated peccatum, and therefore to say 
that it is not peccatum, but merely vitium, produces confusion and leads to error … it is contrary 
to Scripture for the Bible undeniably designates indwelling or hereditary corruption, or vitium, 
as ἁµαρτία [hamartia, sin]” (230-1). Despite Edwards’ and Hodge’s differences, they agree on 
one crucial concept: we, as Adam’s children, bear the guilt of his sins as surely as he did. 
Holmes was apathetic to his father’s attempts to educate him in Calvinist theological 
orthodoxy even from childhood. John T. Morse includes in his Life and Letters of Oliver Wendell 
Holmes (1897), a collection of Holmes’s scattered autobiographical reflections, a fragment titled 
“Religious and Literary Education.” In this fragment, Holmes writes of Abiel’s expectation that 
he and his siblings would recite to their mother the shorter Westminster catechism. She “sat 
down to hear us recite of ‘justification,’ ‘adoption,’ and ‘sanctification,’ and the rest of the 
programme,” he writes; “We learned nominally that we were a set of little fallen wretches, 
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exposed to the wrath of God by the fact of that existence which we could not help” (38).65 “I do 
not think,” he continues, “we believed a word of it, or even understood much of its phraseology” 
(38). His mind “early revolted from the teachings of the Catechism and the books which 
followed out its dogmas” (38). He directs special ire at hereditary depravity, which he calls a 
particularly “New England doctrine” (44). It asserts, Holmes writes, “that a child must repent of, 
and be punished for, not only his own sins but those of his first parent. This was the foundation 
of the condemnation of unborn and unbaptized children, as taught in the Day of Doom, the 
celebrated and most popular poem of Michael Wigglesworth” (44).66 This doctrine, “held up to 
scorn in the fable of the ‘Wolf and the Lamb,’ was accepted by the church as in perfect harmony 
with the human reason and the divine character” (44).67 He was left caught between two worlds: 
one was the orthodox Calvinism of his home, and the other was the liberal “Unitarian 
atmosphere” of Boston’s colleges (39).  
In 1857, Holmes put these tensions into print when he began writing as the “Autocrat at 
the Breakfast-Table” for the Atlantic, a publication he named and helped bring into being (Tilton 
235). The first installation of the Autocrat’s chatter on “mathematics, mutual admiration 
societies, puns, the naturalness of conceit, and self-made men” was published in the same issue 
as Emerson’s polytheistic “Brahma” (235). The Autocrat pieces, which feature an endlessly 
                                                
65 In Calvinist theology, justification, adoption, and sanctification are steps towards the reception 
of divine grace. 
 
 
66 Wigglesworth’s poem, published in 1662, describes the Day of Judgment.  
 
 
67 One of Aesop’s fables. In it, a wolf decides to eat a lamb, so he accuses the lamb of insulting 
him the previous year to have an excuse to do so. The lamb replies that he is only six months old, 
so he could not have done as the wolf says. The wolf responds that if the lamb did not do it, then 
it must have been his father, so he eats him anyway. The moral is that someone seeking to abuse 
power will always find a reason to do so, including blaming a child for its father’s infractions. 
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talking, Holmesean figure holding court at his landlady’s breakfast-table, is Holmes at his most 
charming and affable. Still, the Autocrat insists on needling the Divinity Student, another 
boarder, on theological matters—why do so few pastors listen to each others’ sermons, he 
impishly asks—which netted the Atlantic condemnation from the religious press (Works I: 29). 
In the meantime, Holmes delivered a 1858 Boston Lyceum lecture on “The Chief End of Man” 
that suggested that the chief end of man might be found in earthly works rather than in the 
glorification of God, as dictated by the Westminster catechism (Hoyt 186). The 
Congregationalist, a Calvinist periodical, demanded that Holmes be removed from the Lyceum 
lecture circuit (187). Seeming to delight in shocking the religious press, Holmes cut the 
Congregationalist piece out of the paper and put it in a scrapbook. (Tilton 249-50). Despite (or, 
perhaps, because of) this criticism, the Autocrat pieces were a tremendous success, and financier 
Moses Philips paid him to produce another series of breakfast-table books, “The Professor at the 
Breakfast-Table” (245).  
With the publication of the first piece of “Professor at the Breakfast-Table” in January 
1859, Holmes began a bolder attack on Calvinist theology. The Professor is a far more pointed 
and critical figure than the urbane Autocrat: at one point, he calls Jonathan Edwards “a man with 
a brain as nicely adjusted for certain mechanical processes as Babbage’s calculating machine” 
(Works II: 114). In this formulation, Edwards is a computer that assimilates theological concepts 
in ways that are logically coherent but that are, at heart, removed from and indifferent to human 
experience. The Professor also mocks ministers who think the earth is four thousand years old 
and predicts that a hundred years’ time will see an end to the nineteenth century’s religious 
“barbarisms” (114). In one entry, “The Professor Finds a Fly in His Teacup,” he counters 
Calvinists’ complaints by declaring that he “didn’t know that Truth was such an invalid” that it 
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cannot be subjected to scrutiny, which drew protests from the Boston Recorder and the New 
York Courier (Holmes 108, Hoyt 215) By this time, the identity of the breakfast-table writer was 
Boston’s worst-kept secret, and Holmes had ample opportunity to add to his scrapbook (Tilton 
249). 
Neglecting the structure of theological beliefs to which Holmes addresses himself, as 
most scholars writing about Holmes do, risks ignoring the nuances he brings to his critique.68 
Few take him seriously at all, preferring instead to characterize him as the Saturday Club’s class 
clown, a whimsical dilettante whose literary and medical contributions happen almost by 
accident.69 But bringing Calvinist conceptions of heredity to attention illuminates the ways that 
Holmes’s first two novels, both of which feature heredity as a foundational plot device, argue 
against what Holmes views as theological barbarism. Further, as I argue in the rest of the 
chapter, attending to Holmes’s grasp of Calvinist theology enables us to see how Holmes 
articulates his position in terms intelligible to Calvinist doctrine. Elsie Venner and The Guardian 
Angel, then, attempt to establish continuities between theological and biological models of 
heredity.   
A Palpable Outside Agency 
 In 1859 and 1860, Holmes published a serial novel in the Atlantic titled The Professor’s 
Story (later published in 1861 by Ticknor and Fields as Elsie Venner: A Romance of Destiny) that 
                                                
68 Joan Burbick acknowledges Holmes’s theological argument but analyzes instead how 
Venner’s “poisoning by the rattlesnake becomes an emblem of the dangers embedded in the 
bodies of the hegemonic classes” (242). Randall Knoper reads Holmes’s first two novels as 
“stories of reproduction and representation” that “crystallize problems that emerge from the 
juncture of art and the nervous system” (724). 
 
 
69 Peter Gibian, however, argues that Holmes’s many interests signal an interest in what we 
would today call interdisciplinarity rather than an inability to pursue any one subject deeply. 
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would become his best-known novel. In a letter to Harriet Beecher Stowe dated September 13, 
1860, Holmes elaborates his assertion, given in the novel’s first preface, that “a grave scientific 
doctrine may be detected” beneath its charming New England setting and melodramatic plot: 
You see exactly what I wish to do: to write a story with enough of interest in its 
characters and incidents to attract a certain amount of popular attention. Under cover of 
this to stir that mighty question of automatic agency in its relation to self-determination. 
To do this by means of a palpable outside agency, predetermining certain traits of 
character and certain apparently voluntary acts, such as the common judgment of 
mankind and the tribunals of law and theology have been in the habit of recognizing as 
sin and crime. Not exactly insanity, either general or partial, in its common sense, but 
rather an unconscious intuitive tendency, dating from a powerful ante-natal influence, 
which modifies the whole organization. (Morse 264) 
 
Holmes seeks, in other words, to wrap his speculations about “automatic agency” as it relates to 
common judgment, the law, and theology in an interesting story. He frames the characters and 
plot of the story as a “cover” for his ideas and as a way to disseminate them to a popular 
audience—the narrative, then, is much like Pilgrim’s Progress, the didactic Christian allegory. 
He wishes to use the influence of “a palpable outside agency” as a way to illustrate how 
behaviors that appear voluntary can be motivated by “certain traits of character” alien to a 
person’s nature, thus calling into question whether a person could be considered responsible for 
them. And indeed Holmes’s novel does just that: Bernard Langdon, who interrupts his medical 
studies to make money teaching, finds in his classroom Elsie Venner, a “strange, wild-looking 
girl” who moves with serpentine grace, basks in the sun, and dances “wild Moorish fandangos” 
with rattling castanets (51, 147). In time, Langdon discovers that Venner’s pregnant mother was 
bitten by a snake, which affects the young woman’s bodily organization in such a way that she 
exhibits snakelike tendencies: she has small, cold, glittering eyes, is rumored to have poisoned a 
governess, and behaves, at times, maliciously (193). Holmes’s question, repeatedly put to the 
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reader over the course of the novel, is this: should Venner bear responsibility for actions 
motivated by her ophidian impulses? 
 Elsie Venner attempts to convince its reader that the most humane answer to that question 
is “no.” In the most nuanced of the novel’s many digressions on the subject, Langdon writes his 
medical school professor a letter asking about Venner’s case: “Do you think there may be 
predispositions, inherited or ingrafted, but at any rate constitutional, which shall take out certain 
apparently voluntary determinations from the control of the will, and leave them as free from 
moral responsibility as the instincts of the lower animals? (220)” His professor replies that his 
question “opens a very wide range of speculation”: 
Automatic action in the moral world; the reflex movement which seems to be self-
determination, and has been hanged and howled at as such (metaphorically) for nobody 
knows how many centuries: until somebody shall study this as Marshall Hall has studied 
reflex nervous action in the bodily system, I would not give much for men's judgments of 
each others' characters. Shut up the robber and the defaulter, we must. But what if your 
oldest boy had been stolen from his cradle and bred in a North-Street cellar? What if you 
are drinking a little too much wine and smoking a little too much tobacco, and your son 
takes after you, and so your poor grandson's brain being a little injured in physical 
texture, he loses the fine moral sense on which you pride yourself, and doesn't see the 
difference between signing another man's name to a draft and his own? (227) 
 
The professor compares the issue of “Automatic action in the moral world” to Marshall Hall’s 
studies of the reflex arc, thus explicitly linking morality to physiology.70 Like the theorists of 
what he calls “that great doctrine of moral insanity,” which he says “has done more to make men 
charitable and soften legal and theological barbarism than any one doctrine that I can think of 
since the message of peace and good-will to men,” the professor views physicians and 
physiologists as the proper arbiters of the nineteenth century’s pressing new moral conundrums 
                                                
70 Holmes was more than familiar with Hall’s work, for he and his colleague Jacob Bigelow 
prepared the first American edition of Hall’s Principles of the Theory and Practice of Medicine 
in 1839 (Boewe 122). In the 1830s Hall articulated the theory of the reflex arc, according to 
which nerves can communicate without the mediation of the brain. Hall’s work laid the 
foundation for physiological studies of unconscious thought and movement. 
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(227). Crucially, the professor does not advocate letting criminals run free even if they should 
not be held morally responsible for their actions: society must protect itself. “Treat bad men 
exactly as if they were insane,” he tells Langdon later in the letter; “They are in-sane, out of 
health, morally” (228). Just as a society might restrain an insane man without holding him 
morally accountable for his actions, the professor asserts, it might restrain criminals not as 
retribution but as a practical action necessary for the public good.  
 In the course of this moment and others like it, e.g. the conversation between Dr. 
Kittredge and the Rev. Dr. Honeywood discussed earlier, Holmes attacks theologians’ 
distinctions between natural inability and spiritual inability, terms at the heart of Calvinists’ 
defense of the justice of original sin. Natural inability refers to the limitations of human nature: 
for example, it is a natural limitation that we cannot fly. As Charles Hodge writes, “A child 
cannot be required to understand the calculus, or an uneducated man to read the classics” (274). 
Although in time an uneducated man might learn how to read, so long as he is uneducated he is 
totally unable to do so. Such things are incompatible with nature, so they cannot be expected. 
And because natural inability “arises out of the limitations which God has imposed on our 
nature,” it “thus limits obligation” (274). That protection does not extend, however, to the moral 
debility imposed by original sin: natural inability, Hodge writes, “does not apply in the sphere of 
morals and religion, when the inability arises not out of the limitation, but out of the moral 
corruption of our nature” (274). That is the domain of spiritual inability. Recall that sinfulness is 
in part a corruption of human nature, which is distinct from God-given limits upon it. This 
corruption is what inclines Adam’s descendants towards evil.  
This inclination, Hodge says, is compatible with “continued obligation”: just because our 
corruption inclines us towards evil does not excuse us for it (274). He explains as follows: 
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 And as it has been shown from Scripture that the inability of the sinner to repent and 
believe, to love God and to lead a holy life, does not arise from the limitation of his 
nature as a creature (as is the case with idiots or brutes); nor from the want of the 
requisite faculties or capacity, but simply from the corruption of our nature, it follows 
that it does not exonerate him from the obligation to be and to do all that God requires. 
(274) 
 
Whereas Hodge agrees that one cannot blame “idiots or brutes” for sinning, given their natural 
limitations, he insists that a corrupted nature is no excuse for crossing God. Jonathan Edwards, in 
Freedom of the Will (1754), provides a clearer statement on the doctrine: man’s “moral inability, 
consisting in the strength of his evil inclination, is the very thing wherein his wickedness 
consists” (309).71 If moral inability, which is a corruption caused by sin, excuses sin, “then 
wickedness always carries that in it which excuses it” (309). Therefore, “moral inability alone 
(which consists in disinclination [to righteousness]) never renders anything improperly the 
subject matter of precept or command, and never can excuse any person in disobedience, or want 
of conformity to a command” (309). In contrast, natural inability, “arising from the want of 
capacity” in mind or body, “wholly excuses” those who suffer from it (309). Hereditary 
depravity is not a limit to our nature but rather a corruption of it caused by the Fall: it is just, 
then, for God not to excuse humans on the basis of their inclination towards sin. 
Holmes’s conception of heredity broadens the sphere of natural inability. Both Edwards 
and Hodge agree that natural inability is exculpatory, and both specifically excuse mental 
limitations (“as is the case with idiots or brutes,” Hodge writes) (274). Holmes, though, would 
echo theorists of partial insanity and say between perfect mental health and “idiots or brutes” lies 
a wide range of mental limitations. An image Holmes deploys in The Autocrat of the Breakfast-
Table to explain the will’s limits clarifies the point. The Autocrat describes the will as being like 
                                                
71 Edwards’ “moral inability” is analogous to Hodge’s “spiritual ability”: both are contrasts to 
exculpatory natural inability.  
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a drop of water imprisoned in a crystal (86). In this image, the crystal—rigid yet arranged 
according to a given structure—stands in for the body, constituted according to a set of 
hereditary structures. The drop of water, or the will, has a certain amount of movement within its 
enclosure, but ultimately that enclosure binds and shapes it.  This is not to deny free will and 
moral responsibility altogether, he writes; in describing the limits of the will he wishes rather to 
“define moral obligations, and not weaken them” (86). His point is that probing how the body 
might limit one’s moral agency can lead us to a better, more exact way of thinking about 
responsibility. One’s “organization,” or physical makeup, he continues, “may reduce the power 
of the will to nothing, as in some idiots,” which is something that even orthodox Calvinists such 
as Edwards and Hodge agree erases one’s obligations, for the body’s organization imposes the 
sorts of limitations that constitute natural inability (86).  
What Holmes seeks to add to the concept of natural inability is the idea that from the 
infant’s or the irrevocably insane person’s total lack of moral agency, “the scale mounts upwards 
by slight gradations” to a fully responsible person (Autocrat, Works I: 89). Holmes’s interest is in 
individuals such as Elsie Venner who fall somewhere on that scale. Such individuals call for a 
more profuse, fine-grained way to reckon their obligations to God than the Calvinists’ binary of 
naturally unable or naturally able. What Holmes suggests, then, is a modification of how 
Calvinists understand natural inability rather than a rejection of the concept of sin altogether. A 
scene in the novel in which Honeywood writes a new sermon, “On the Obligations of an Infinite 
Creator to a Finite Creature,” after considering Venner’s case dramatizes how Holmes imagines 
theologians might incorporate the idea of limited responsibility into their theology: 
He did not believe in the responsibility of idiots. He did not believe a new-born infant 
was morally answerable for other people's acts. He thought a man with a crooked spine 
would never be called to account for not walking erect. He thought if the crook was in his 
brain, instead of his back, he could not fairly be blamed for any consequence of this 
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natural defect, whatever lawyers or divines might call it. He argued, that, if a person 
inherited a perfect mind, body, and disposition, and had perfect teaching from infancy, 
that person could do nothing more than keep the moral law perfectly. But supposing that 
the Creator allows a person to be born with an hereditary or ingrafted organic tendency, 
and then puts this person into the hands of teachers incompetent or positively bad, is not 
what is called sin or transgression of the law necessarily involved in the premises? Is not 
a Creator bound to guard his children against the ruin which inherited ignorance might 
entail on them? Would it be fair for a parent to put into a child's hands the title-deeds to 
all its future possessions, and a bunch of matches? And are not men children, nay, babes, 
in the eye of Omniscience? (247-48) 
 
In Honeywood’s sermon, Holmes suggests how biology might lead to doctrinal shifts: the 
theological conclusions he draws arise from the “logic which had carried him to certain 
conclusions with reference to human nature” (247). The minister begins by articulating the now-
familiar Holmesean argument that a crook in the brain, just like a crook in the back, is a “natural 
defect” that lessens culpability. But the term “natural defect,” especially in a Calvinist minister’s 
sermon, invokes the ways that natural inability mitigates spiritual responsibility. Here, though, 
the pastor puts biology into contact with doctrine: the crook in the brain could be part of a 
“hereditary or ingrafted organic tendency” towards sin rather than a total lack of mental function. 
Is it still a natural inability? Honeywood argues that God is obligated to protect humanity, who 
are not only children but babies compared to divinity, “against the ruin” wrought by inheritance. 
He thus extends natural inability to heredity. This sermon, Holmes writes, “was really much 
more respectful to his Maker” than the usual “Oriental hyperboles of self-abasement” (247).  
 In his letter to Stowe, Holmes writes that Venner herself is an important aspect of his 
attempt to “stir that mighty question of automatic agency in its relation to self-determination” 
(Morse 263). In creating a character influenced by the absorption of snake venom in the womb, 
he writes, he wishes to personalize his theological arguments: 
To make the subject of this influence interest the reader, to carry the animalizing of her 
nature just as far as can be done without rendering her repulsive, to redeem the character 
in some measure by humanizing traits, which struggle through the lower organic 
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tendencies, to carry her on to her inevitable fate by the natural machinery of 
circumstance, grouping many human interests around her, which find their natural 
solution in the train of events involving her doom,—such is the idea of this story. (Morse 
264-65) 
 
The “subject of this influence,” Elsie Venner, is just sympathetic enough to convince readers that 
she does not deserve to bear judgment for her immoral behavior. She stands in for all of those 
subject to influences out of their control. Holmes thus hopes that by “humanizing” Venner, he 
might convince his readers that the doctrine of original sin is unjust. 
 But, as Jane F. Thralkill argues, the Elsie Venner readers come to know is not human: 
therefore, humanizing her “would be to deny or even destroy what makes her Elsie” (Holmes ix; 
Thrailkill 79). And that is precisely what happens in the novel. Langdon includes in a bundle of 
flowers sent to her leaves from the white ash, rumored to be deadly to snakes (439). When she 
comes into contact with them, she flings the basket away and faints; thereafter, she loses her 
snaky traits—the “cold glitter” of her “diamond eyes,” the “stormy scowl” that shades her face—
and comes to resemble her mother (441). She also becomes so weak that she cannot leave her 
bed. The leaves of the white ash purge the “lower nature” of the snake from her body, but Dr. 
Kittridge fears that the corruption has “involved the centres of life in its own decay” and is 
killing her (445). Finally, what would seem to restore her supposedly “true,” human self, if one 
could be said to exist, kills her.  
 If, according to Holmes’s letter to Stowe, humanizing Venner is part of his larger plan to 
demonstrate the errors of Calvinism, why does it kill her? One possibility is that he borrows from 
the death of little Eva and brings his character to maximum sympathetic resonance by ending her 
life, thus bolstering the work he wishes his novel to perform. But ridding her of her snaky 
characteristics seems to weaken his theological argument, for doing so suggests that her inherited 
immoral tendencies are not inherited from her ancestors—she looks like her mother only after 
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the ophidian part of her deteriorates—but are, echoing pre-1830 theories of heredity, a matter of 
circumstance. If Venner’s mother had never been bitten, there would be no modification of her 
daughter’s nature. Because Venner’s case of “moral poisoning” is contingent upon that one 
event, it is not predetermined in the ways Holmes needs it to be for it to stand as a metaphor for 
original sin: it is not inevitable, nor is it applicable to all humanity. In Calvinist terms, although 
one might grant that Elsie Venner’s nature is compromised to the point of natural inability, that 
says nothing about the damned whose mothers were not bitten by snakes. And is true that, 
insofar as original sin partly consists of a corruption of human nature caused by a serpent, 
Venner’s case fits. But the novel describes Elsie’s inherited traits as the immediate effect of her 
mother’s encounter with the snake rather than, say, her grandmother’s; if the serpent bit “Eve 
before the birth of Cain,” we might expect Cain to exhibit snakelike qualities, but not necessarily 
his children. 
I voice these discrepancies not to resolve them but to suggest that Holmes’s use of the 
allegorical mode in Elsie Venner detracts from his goal of calling original sin into question. As I 
have discussed, Kittredge and Honeywood think in terms of biological heredity, and they both 
explore, however briefly, what that means for original sin. But the novel places most of its 
persuasive weight on the allegorical figure of Venner, which leaves its argumentative thrust 
contingent upon the unusual, singular circumstances of her gestation. Holmes is successful in his 
goal to “write a story with enough of interest in its characters and incidents to attract a certain 
amount of popular attention,” but one speculates that his efforts to make the reptilian Venner and 
her story interesting distracted both him and his readers from the force of his theological 
reasoning (Morse 264).  
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Holmes seems to have realized this issue, for in prefaces to subsequent editions of Elsie 
Venner in 1883 and 1891 he recasts it as something other than a “romance” in which he uses 
“poetic license” in his depiction of “a grave scientific doctrine,” as his first preface characterizes 
the novel. In the second preface, he writes that the novel was written to “test the doctrine of 
‘original sin’ and human responsibility for the disordered volition coming under that technical 
denomination” (ix). And in the third preface, he writes that it “was not written for popularity, but 
with a very serious purpose,” that purpose being “to make a case for poor Elsie, whom the most 
hardened theologian would find it hard to blame for her inherited ophidian tastes and tendencies” 
(xii). These later prefaces, published twenty-four and thirty-two years after The Atlantic first 
began publishing what was then The Professor’s Story, mark the cultural shifts wrought by 
Darwin and the rise of literary realism in the intervening period. Darwin’s theory of evolution 
fostered the perceived explanatory power of heredity in ascendant human sciences such as 
anthropology, sociology, and criminology. At the same time, literary realists such as Émile Zola, 
who famously compared his literary method to that of “the physiologist and the experimental 
doctor,” sought to represent reality objectively and immediately, cultivating an overt 
identification with science (25).72 Thus Holmes’s generic shift in the second preface from 
romance to “test” and the shift in the third preface to “case”: he tames the messiness and poetic 
license of his romance first by casting it as a test or experiment, a Zolaesque dissection of the 
real, and then as a case or argument. 
                                                
72 See especially George Levine’s Dying to Know: Scientific Epistemology and Narrative (2002) 
and Realism, Ethics, and Secularism: Essays in Victorian Literature and Science (2008). Ann 
Stiles argues in Popular Fiction and Brain Science in the Late Nineteenth Century (2012) that 
not only realism but also Gothic narratives and romances made use of contemporary 
developments in brain science.  
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These generic shifts, I argue, reveal the work of literature as a medium for representing, 
framing, and disseminating heredity’s repercussions for original sin. Elsie Venner the romance, 
as the novel’s first preface and Holmes’s letter to Stowe makes clear, covers its speculations 
about heredity under the fabric of plot and character—a relationship akin to that between a 
fishing hook and the bait impaled on it. But in Elsie Venner the “test,” the hook and the bait are 
the same thing, for the narrative itself is the test. This is to say that in reimagining his novel as a 
sort of experiment, Holmes figures literary representation as a controlled environment in which 
the repercussions of hypothetical situations (a part-snake teenager, for example) might be 
discovered and observed with something close to the veracity of real life. At the same time, the 
shift marks heredity’s new, post-Darwin status as a science prominent enough to be the subject 
of a popular novel. Yet for the reasons I have already outlined, the very elements that make Elsie 
Venner a romance—the unusual, even fantastical circumstances surrounding Venner’s 
personality, her role as an allegorical figure, and so on—make it at best a messy experiment. 
Holmes needed more than a preface to turn his romance into an experiment: he needed a new 
novel altogether. 
Inherited Impulses 
Elsie Venner was successful enough that William Ticknor, a publisher of The Atlantic, 
asked Holmes to write another novel, a proposition to which the physician agreed. Throughout 
1867, Ticknor led every issue of the magazine with an installment of the new work, The 
Guardian Angel (published in book form November 1867) (Tilton 284). The first preface to the 
novel explains Holmes’s view of its relation to Elsie Venner, which he writes was predicated 
upon “an experiment which some thought cruel, even on paper” (v). The new tale “forms a 
natural sequence” to Elsie Venner, he writes, making The Guardian Angel something of an 
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answer to or development of its sibling novel (v). He says that although the earlier novel posed 
an outlandish situation to explore original sin, The Guardian Angel “comes more nearly within 
the range of common experience” (vi). Instead of relying on the deleterious moral effects of a 
prenatal snakebite to demonstrate responsibility’s limits, Holmes here draws on human heredity, 
or “inherited bodily aspects and habitudes,” the existence and effects of which are obvious (he 
says) to all who observe them (vi).  
Though the premise of The Guardian Angel is more mundane than its sibling novel, both 
might still be called, he writes, “Studies of the Reflex Function in its higher sphere” or “protests 
against the scholastic tendency to shift the total responsibility of all human action from the 
Infinite to the finite” (vii). But doing so, he jokes, “might alarm the jealousy of the cabinet-
keepers of our doctrinal museums” (vii). As his poke at “doctrinal museums” suggests, Holmes 
anticipated a backlash similar to that inspired by his earlier writing (vii). He attempts to nip the 
familiar complaint that he abolishes moral responsibility in the bud: anyone who confuses his 
“the doctrine of limited responsibility” for a denial of self-determination and responsibility 
altogether is one of the country’s many “intellectual half-breeds” (vii). If we “cannot follow the 
automatic machinery of nature into the mental and moral world,” we might as well embrace our 
backwardness and “return at once to our old demonology” (vii). The Guardian Angel, then, 
promises to depict the machinery of nature (heredity, especially) as limiting but not eliminating 
responsibility. 
Holmes writes of the snake venom’s influence on Venner that “[w]hether anything like 
this ever happened, or was possible, mattered little” because he wanted to explore “the 
limitations of human responsibility in a simple and effective way” (vi). But, as I have discussed, 
the question of whether a case like Venner’s is possible is important to the success of Holmes’s 
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theological argument if he wants that argument to be predicated upon a realistic “experiment” in 
human responsibility. I argue that The Guardian Angel, “more nearly within the range of 
common experience” and founded on what is to Holmes the everyday mechanism of biological 
heredity, attempts to be what Elsie Venner was not written to be: an experiment, in sync with and 
made possible by contemporary science, in human responsibility. By founding its depiction of 
inherited tendencies on biological heredity instead of the circumstances of one snakebite, I argue, 
the novel articulates the “doctrine of limited responsibility” in such a way that it applies to all 
humanity. The shift to literary realism and its affinities with science, then, enables Holmes to 
frame the results of his narrative experiment as applicable not only to the narrative’s characters 
but to the reader. Further, I argue, biological heredity comes more near to engaging Calvinist 
theology on its own terms, for it was believed to be constitutive of human nature (including its 
natural limitations). And it does not require the heroine, Myrtle Hazard, to pay for self-
determination with her life: after she masters her inherited tendencies, she enjoys the beginning 
of a happy marriage. 
Like Holmes’s other novels, The Guardian Angel takes place in a bucolic New England 
village, (here, Oxbow), populated by charming if sometimes flat characters. Readers are 
introduced to Hazard, the novel’s case study in biological heredity, through her ancestors. This is 
because it is, as the narrator says, not “certain that our individual personality is the single 
inhabitant of these our corporeal frames”: some of us “have cotenants in this house we live in,” 
and it is best to familiarize oneself with as much of the household as possible (22). The dead, 
Holmes writes, might find within their descendants “a kind of secondary and imperfect, yet self-
conscious life,” which leads to our detecting at one time “the look, at another the tone of voice, 
at another some characteristic movement of this or that ancestor” (22). To know Hazard, then, is 
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to know Ann Holyoake, a sixteenth-century Protestant burned at the stake by Catholics; Major 
Gideon Withers, a pompous, bombastic American of the eighteenth century; his son David, a 
sensitive aesthete of Poe’s mold; his wife Judith Pride, a flirtatious beauty; her daughter-in-law, 
Virginia Wild, who is part American Indian; and Wild’s son-in-law, Captain Charles Hazard, 
Myrtle’s dead father, who loves the sea (24-26). Candace, Wild’s daughter and Charles Hazard’s 
wife, gives birth to Myrtle in India, and while she is still an infant both parents die of disease 
(26). A relative in India brings her back to America to be raised in New England. Hazard, then, is 
subject to the influence of an extraordinarily varied family tree. At few points of the story does 
Holmes make it clear which ancestors predominate at which times; he keeps their influence 
subtle enough that the reader must keep them all in mind to distinguish one’s characteristics from 
another’s. 
These ancestors’ “instincts and qualities” lie within Hazard “in embryo” in much the 
same way as when a tree bears grafts from many others: 
It is as when several grafts, bearing fruit that ripens at different times, are growing upon 
the same stock. Her earlier impulses may have been derived directly from her father and 
mother, but all the ancestors who have been mentioned, and more or less obscurely many 
others, came uppermost in their time, before the absolute and total result of their several 
forces had found its equilibrium in the character by which she was to be known as an 
individual. These inherited impulses were therefore many, conflicting, some of them 
dangerous. (26-27)73 
 
                                                
73 Boewe notes that Holmes explores the grafted tree figure even more forcefully in The Poet at 
the Breakfast-Table: “You have seen a tree with different grafts upon it, an apple or a pear tree 
we will say … It is the same thing with ourselves, but it takes us a long while to find it out. The 
various inherited instincts ripen in succession. You may be nine tenths paternal at one period of 
your life, and nine tenths maternal at another. All at once the traits of some immediate ancestor 
may come to maturity unexpectedly on one of the branches of your character, just as your 
features at different periods of your life betray different resemblances to your nearer or more 
remote relatives” (Holmes, Works III: 165-66, qtd. in Boewe, Heredity 190). 
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Key to Holmes’s figure of the grafted tree is the idea that the different grafts bear fruit that 
“ripens at different times” despite “growing upon the same stock” (26). This image dramatizes 
the biological concept of latent heredity, in which inherited traits express themselves at different 
points of their descendants’ lives.74 Even Hazard’s more distant ancestors might thus, in 
Holmes’s words, “come uppermost in their time” before their descendant attains “equilibrium” 
(27). That her “inherited impulses” are “many, conflicting, some of them dangerous” makes her 
inner life a site of conflict and incoherence (27). Her personal development depends upon 
cohering her inherited tendencies into a stable character while under the constant threat of a 
latent characteristic showing itself. The process of learning how to do so drives the plot. Holmes 
here poses biological heredity as a sort of “problem” in that it affects Hazard in ways that limit 
her responsibility, but it is a problem with a solution: by attaining “equilibrium,” Hazard might 
assimilate her competing hereditary traits into a whole personality. This means that just as 
Holmes creates new ways of thinking about heredity’s ethical and religious ramifications, he also 
makes it possible to think of the body as trainable and malleable in ways that mitigate heredity’s 
effects. In The Guardian Angel, then, Holmes posits heredity as a sort of temporary determinism, 
one strong enough to raise potent questions about responsibility but plastic enough that it can be 
tamed.  
Secondary characters abound in the novel, including the wannabe poet Gifted Hopkins 
and Hazard’s naïve friend Susan Posey, but the most important character other than Hazard (and 
perhaps the novel’s real protagonist) is Byles Gridley, an “old Master of Arts” and a bachelor 
who retires to Oxbow after a career as a professor (2). Holmes invests many of his own traits into 
Gridley: both are men of letters, great talkers, and critics of theological dogma (3). For example, 
                                                
74 Latent heredity helps enable latecentury discourses about atavism, or the regression to 
behaviors and mental states characteristic of evolutionary anterior species.  
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Gridley goes to the local Calvinist church precisely because he disagrees with its doctrines: he 
“liked to go there so as to growl to himself through the sermon, and go home scolding all the 
way about it” (3). Despite his cantankerous personality, he develops a grandfatherly affection for 
Hazard after learning of her difficulties. As the novel progresses, he guides her through the 
challenges raised by her inherited tendencies, and by the conclusion he is revealed to be the 
eponymous guardian angel.  
 The plot of The Guardian Angel concerns a series of mishaps Hazard encounters due to 
her inherited tendencies. The novel begins with Gridley finding in his newspaper an 
advertisement placed by Hazard’s guardian and aunt, Silence Withers, “a shadowy, pinched, 
sallow, dispirited, bloodless woman” (13).75 The advertisement says that Hazard, “tall and 
womanly for her age,” has gone missing (6). Withers and her maiden second cousin, Cynthia 
Badlam, live with their Irish servant, Kitty Fagan, and Hazard in their ancestral home, the 
Poplars. Withers worries that Hazard has run away with a man, but her worry is not for ward’s 
sake but her own: she would rather “know that she was dead, and had died in the Lord” than for 
her to be “living in sin, or dead in wrong-doing” because, she thinks, the sin would reflect on 
herself (14). What will happen, she wonders, “when ‘He maketh inquisition for blood’?” (14).76 
Her “engine,” the narrator later remarks, is “responsibility,—her own responsibility, and the 
dreadful consequences which would follow to her, Silence, if Myrtle should in any way go 
wrong” (76). To protect her responsibility, her spiritual training of Hazard consists of “going to 
meeting three times every Sabbath day, and knowing the catechism by heart, and reading of good 
                                                
75 That Hazard and Withers do not resemble each other could be attributed to Wither’s being 
only half-sister to Hazard’s mother. 
 
 
76 Psalm 9:12 (KJV): “When he maketh inquisition for blood, he remembereth them: he 
forgetteth not the cry of the humble.” 
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books, and the best of daily advice” (14). Withers’ unceasing concern for her own responsibility 
even at the cost of her ward’s life dramatizes what Holmes views as the folly and cruelty of the 
doctrine of original sin—Withers’ belief that Hazard’s responsibility might fall on her shoulders 
makes her callous about the young woman’s well-being in a way that mirrors theologians’ 
damning of children to perdition. In her desperation to be Godly, Holmes suggests, Withers 
forgets to be good.  
 Readers discover in time that Hazard has run away from the Poplars because of a sudden 
urge to go to sea. She spends her days gazing at a river visible from her home, and one day “it 
appeared all at once as a Deliverer” (73). Like all rivers, it leads to the ocean, “the great highway 
of the world,” and eventually to “the gates of those cities from which she could take her 
departure unchallenged” (73). Her urge to travel is sparked by her discovery a few months before 
of “some sea-shells and coral-fans, and dried star-fishes and sea-horses, and a natural mummy of 
a rough-skinned dogfish” (75). These items strike a “dangerous chord” within her, and she feels 
“impelled” to examine them; doing so the smell of the sea clinging to them reaches “the very 
inmost haunts of memory” and stirs her urge to go to sea (75). Soon after, Withers comments 
that she is beginning to look like her father, a ship’s captain (76). Here, Holmes suggests that the 
hereditary legacy of Hazard’s seagoing father becomes a powerful influence on her behavior 
after her discovery of the seashells triggers its emergence. She flees her home by cutting her hair 
short, which masculinizes her and makes her look even more like her father, and stealing a boat 
(82-83). 
 As Hazard drifts, her boat wanders into a marsh known by locals as the “Witches’ 
Hollow,” where she experiences a vision that dramatizes how her heredity affects her. She sees a 
burning cross and the ghostly figures of her ancestors, each one solid in proportion to how 
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closely he or she is related to her: her parents’ figures are more clear than her grandparents’, for 
example (90). She sees them silently mouthing the word “Breath,” as if “they wanted to breathe 
the air of the world again in my shape, which I seemed to see as it were empty of myself and of 
these other selves, like a sponge that has water pressed out of it” (90). Soon, “it seemed to me 
that I returned to myself, and then those others became part of me by being taken up, one by one, 
and so lost in my own life” (90). She inherits the tendencies of several ancestors in particular. 
Her parents become part of her, imparting to her their “longing to live over the life they had led, 
on the sea and in strange countries” (90). Major Withers, the boisterous, hard-drinking 
eighteenth-century American, possesses characteristics that Hazard does not want any part of, 
but “there was some right he had in me through my being of his blood, and so his health and his 
strength went all through me, and I was always to have what was left of his life in that shadow-
like shape, forming a portion of mine” (90). She feels the influence of Judith Pride, famous for 
her beauty and flirtatiousness; Ruth Bradford, burned as a witch in the seventeenth century; an 
unnamed American Indian woman, whose ghost is “wild-looking” and wearing a “head-dress of 
feathers”; and Anne Holyake, “burned long ago by the Papists,” whom Hazard feels is her 
“guardian and protector” (90-91). Each of these figures, Hazard says, “really live over some part 
of their past lives in my life” (91). 
 This scene models Holmes shift to the realist mode, for he refuses to let Hazard’s 
mysterious experience remain mysterious. A note by Gridley follows Hazard’s vision, which he 
says “must be accounted for in some way, or pass into the category of the supernatural” (92). 
This accounting models Holmes’s approach to heredity in The Guardian Angel—his impulse is 
to ensure that everything is explained scientifically. To leave the seemingly supernatural 
unexamined by science would be to leave it entirely in the hands of mystics and theologians, i.e. 
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those who Holmes views as obfuscating rather than illuminating reality. Gridley guesses that her 
vision “was one of those intuitions, with objective projection, which sometimes comes to 
imaginative young persons, especially girls, in certain exalted nervous conditions” (92). He 
proceeds to translate the supernatural into the natural, articulating his view of heredity:  
The lives of our progenitors are, as we know, reproduced in different proportions in 
ourselves. Whether they as individuals have any consciousness of it, is another matter. It 
is possible that they do get a second of as it were fractional life in us. It might seem that 
many of those whose blood flows in our veins struggle for the mastery, and by and by 
one or more get the predominance, so that we grow to be like father, or mother, or 
remoter ancestor, or two or more are blended in us, not to the exclusion, however, it must 
be understood, of a special personality of our own, about which these others are grouped. 
Independently of any possible scientific value, this 'Vision' serves to illustrate the above-
mentioned fact of common experience, which is not sufficiently weighed by most 
moralists. (92) 
 
Gridley, Holmes’s avatar in the novel, has two points here. One is that Hazard’s vision is not 
mystical but rather a psychological projection of the fact of inherited influences, a fact, he says, 
established by both science and experience. The entire vision, then, can be understood in a way 
that does not ask us “to suppose any exceptional occurrence outside of natural laws” (93). 
Acknowledging the presence of “a special personality of our own” around which one’s inherited 
tendencies “are grouped” provides a normative picture of heredity that provides a possible 
endpoint for Hazard’s story. The second point Gridley makes, articulated by Holmes elsewhere, 
is that inherited influences are not enough acknowledged by moralists as factors that limit the 
will. Here Holmes argues that the very thing Calvinists say preserves Adam’s responsibility for 
his sin, i.e. the nature he and his descendants share, instead mitigates that responsibility.  
Hazard’s escape by boat, which concludes when she hit rapids and is found unconscious 
in a downstream town, sets a pattern repeated throughout the novel. Her inexplicably dangerous 
actions seem to the community at large the work of a sinful nature, but readers hear from 
Gridley, the village physician, the narrator, or some other person learned in science that she acts 
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the way she does because of her heredity. And moralists and theologians, these characters 
emphasize, ought to recognize that physical condition as something that mitigate her 
responsibility. To think in terms of Calvinist theology, the novel presents her inherited 
tendencies as being part of her physical, not her spiritual, makeup, so what at first appears to be a 
moral corruption of her nature is actually a natural, physiological limitation. The issue, as the 
narrator of The Guardian Angel complains, is that ministers think “that the treatment of all 
morbid states of mind short of raving madness belongs to them and not to the doctors” (142). 
After all, Cotton Mather attributed New England’s preponderance of “Splenetic Maladies” and 
“Melancholy Indispositions” to the “unsearchable Judgments of God” (153).77 Hazard, not 
totally mentally incompetent yet not totally in control, is somewhere in between. Her 
responsibility, then, ought to be likewise partial. 
The novel charts the effects of Hazard’s inherited tendencies throughout, but I examine 
only a few episodes, the first being when her tendency towards hysteria, inherited from the 
women in her family leads her to the edge of sexual indiscretion. After returning home from her 
nautical adventure she requires convalescence, and Withers calls upon the services of Lemuel 
Hurlbut, a ninety-two-year-old physician (124). Due to his age he has seen five generations of 
Hazard’s family in his lifetime (“same thing over and over again”), and he immediately discerns 
in her features a predisposition to nervousness and hysteria (126). He comments that he has seen 
similar nervous disorders in her ancestors, for the living “are only dead folks warmed over” 
(127). As he predicts, Hazard soon begins showing signs of hysteria, or a “morbid condition, 
accompanied with a series of mental and moral perversions, which in ignorant ages and 
communities is attributed to the influence of evil spirits” (129). At this point, “the reader, if such 
                                                
77 Holmes draws Cotton’s words from the latter’s Magnalia Christi Americana, Book III, 
Chapter XVII, “The LIFE of Mr. WILLIAM THOMPSON.” 
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there be, who believes in the absolute independence and self-determination of the will, and the 
consequent total responsibility of every human being for every irregular nervous action and ill-
governed muscular contraction, may as well lay down this narrative” (129). Otherwise, “he may 
lose all faith in poor Myrtle Hazard, and all patience with the writer who tells her story” (129). 
What follows, then, will depict the limitations of the will. 
Hazard’s hysteria manifests as an attraction to Dr. Hurlbut’s middle-aged son, Fordyce. 
She becomes subject to strong headaches, and only his touch removes her pain; when he soothes 
“her strange, excited condition,” she fixes “her wandering thoughts upon him” (131, 133). Soon, 
her will loses its “power,” and “‘I cannot help it’—the hysteric motto—” becomes her refrain 
(133). Her hysteria causes her to “undergo[] a singular change of her moral nature”: whereas 
before she ‘had been a truthful child,” at this point “she seemed to have lost the healthy instincts 
for veracity and honesty. She feigned all sorts of odd symptoms, and showed a wonderful degree 
of cunning in giving an appearance of truth to them” so that she might see Fordyce more often 
(133). She comes to depend on the doctor’s constant care, and in time the two begin to have 
romantic feelings for one another. Nurse Byloe, Fordyce’s assistant, goes to Gridley for his help, 
telling him that “this gal ain’t Myrtle Hazard no longer” and that Hurlbut is “gettin’ a little 
bewitched” by her (137). Gridley solves the problem by inviting Hurlbut to his home, reading the 
Oath of Hippocrates to him, and asking him bluntly whether he is “in danger of violating the 
sanctities of your honorable calling, and leading astray a young person committed to your sacred 
keeping” (140). The physician agrees that he has been careless, and from that point his elderly 
father sees the teenager instead: after three days of nervous attacks, she returns to a healthy state 
(141).  
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This episode illustrates Holmes’s approach to treating those whose inherited tendencies 
drive them to immorality. The afflicted individual cannot help him or herself because a person 
who is affected enough to need help probably does not have the willpower necessary to achieve 
self-determination. Whereas dietary reformers sought to put the tools of self-determination in the 
hands of the individual, Holmes depicts heredity as out of the individual’s control. In The 
Guardian Angel, it falls to the community to provide treatment, which consists of protecting the 
afflicted from harm until his or her hereditary influences cohere with his or her own personality 
into an individual character. A community should thus approach a person with inherited immoral 
tendencies with mercy, not punishment or derision.  
After Hazard develops “the instincts of the coquette, or at least of the city belle” due to 
the influence of her worldly ancestor Judith Pride, she becomes “conscious of her gifts of 
fascination, and seemed to please herself with the homage of her rustic admirers” (253). She, 
Withers, and Gridley agree that she should leave the village for more schooling, and Gridley 
offers some money to send her to “Madam Delacoste’s institution for young ladies” where she 
will find no “rustic admirers” (253). But there she imbibes the ways of the rich and fashionable, 
and her inclination to flaunt her beauty grows. Pride’s influence only wanes when that of 
Hazard’s American Indian ancestor grows. The school holds a party featuring living tableaux, 
and Hazard is chosen to play the part of Pocahontas in a few scenes (271). As she dresses for the 
part, her Native ancestor surfaces in her consciousness: 
She felt herself carried back into the dim ages when the wilderness was yet untrodden 
save by the feet of its native lords. Think of her wild fancy as we may, she felt as if that 
dusky woman of her midnight vision on the river were breathing for one hour through her 
lips. If this belief had lasted, it is plain enough where it would have carried her. But it 
came into her imagination and vivifying consciousness with the putting on of her 
unwonted costume, and might well leave her when she put it off. It is not for us, who tell 
only what happened, to solve these mysteries of the seeming admission of unhoused souls 
into the fleshly tenements belonging to air-breathing personalities. (272). 
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Hazard’s first scene as Pocahontas, in which she holds a knife to cut the cords binding John 
Smith’s hands, is so well-received that someone in the audience throws a wreath to her, which 
enrages another student who had expected the accolade (273). In “a spasm of jealous passion,” 
she tears the wreath from Hazard’s hands and stomps on it just as the curtain rises for the next 
scene (273). Screaming “a cry which some said had the blood-chilling tone of an Indian’s battle-
shriek,” Hazard pins her assailant to the ground and raises the knife to strike her, but she 
suddenly flings the knife away (274). If the incident had gone further, the narrator comments, the 
evening “would have been treated in full in all the works on medical jurisprudence published 
throughout the limits of Christendom” (272). Unlike the other incidents, though, Gridley is not 
around to help her; she has learned through experience how to limit her ancestors’ deleterious 
influence on her own. The movement of The Guardian Angel, then, is towards a greater, not a 
lesser, degree of self-determination. If Calvinism “assumes the necessity of the extermination of 
instincts which were given to be regulated,” then Holmes seeks to delineate how they might be 
molded and governed (Autocrat 42). 
Hazard gains full self-determination only through her work as a nurse in the Civil War. It 
is surprising, given that the novel spans roughly 1859-1865, that the Civil War does not take up a 
larger share of the text. Only fifty of its roughly four hundred and twenty pages remain when, in 
a chapter titled “Just as You Expected,” the narrator announces that “The spring of 1861 had 
now arrived,—that eventful spring which was to lift the curtain and show the first scene of the 
first act in the mighty drama which fixed the eyes of mankind during four bloody years” (367). 
After the fall of Fort Sumter, the men of Oxbow organize and march to war (373). By this point 
Hazard has been guided through many problems caused by her inherited tendencies and has 
learned how to regulate her impulses.  
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 The outbreak of the war completes the harmonization of Hazard’s competing ancestral 
influences. She acquires “womanly endurance” in the face of conflict, for “a great cause makes 
great souls” (405). Her only wish, thereafter, is to “help the soldiers and their families” (406). In 
two paragraphs, her beau Clement Lindsay, a pleasant and colorless man from a nearby town, 
rises from the rank of Captain to Major and then to Colonel, and Hazard marries him and follows 
him to the front (406-7). From that point until the war’s conclusion, she becomes a nurse and 
“passe[s] her time between the life of the tent and the life of the hospital” (407). Her 
ministrations “performed for the sick and the wounded and the dying” remove the last traces of 
“the dross of her nature”: “[t]he conflict of mingled lives in her blood had ceased” (407). 
 By dramatizing how even the most combative “conflict of mingled lives” might be stilled 
with communal support and the acquisition of new habits, Holmes calls into question whether 
those damned by heredity need remain so. Two years after the publication of The Guardian 
Angel, J. Bruce Thompson, surgeon at Scotland’s General Prison and an early eugenicist, wrote 
in his article “The Hereditary Nature of Crime” that crime is “generally committed by criminals 
hereditarily disposed to it”; therefore, he writes, it is incurable (164). He views heredity as a 
concrete part of an individual’s character. He concludes that crime is “a moral disease of a 
chronic and congenital nature, intractable in the extreme, because transmitted from generation to 
generation” (167). That Thompson, whose work is favorably quoted by physiologist Théodule 
Ribot in Heredity (1875), views hereditary behavior as unchangeable demonstrates his similarity 
to orthodox Calvinist theologians who view humans as damned from birth. Just as Thompson 
theorizes the existence of a hereditary “criminal class” who are “born in crime,” Hodge and those 
like him envision the unelect as justly punished for having sinned in Adam’s loins (167). In his 
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novels, however, Holmes demonstrates how heredity may be called upon to serve both justice 
and mercy. 
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CODA: MORAL INTERVENTIONS 
 
Resonating throughout this dissertation has been the rhythmic push and pull between 
determinism and freedom—between, for example, the sense expressed in Sheppard Lee that 
embodiment curtails personal autonomy and Sylvester Graham’s sense that embodiment enables 
new forms of deliberative self-improvement. Fiction, I have argued, made it possible for 
nineteenth-century Americans to participate in this rhythm, to be affected by it, to work out what 
it means for the moral and spiritual dimensions of their lives, and ultimately to add their own 
cadences.  
 Today, neuroscience (or, more specifically, neuroscientific ways of thinking) pose to 
Americans some of the same questions about vice and virtue that phrenologists and physiologists 
posed in the nineteenth century. A raft of popular science books have introduced to twenty-first-
century American culture the idea that the brain holds answers to persistent quandaries about 
responsibility, culpability, and the life well lived; examples include Dean Buonomano’s Brain 
Bugs: How the Brain’s Flaws Shape Our Lives (2011), David Eagleman’s Incognito: The Secret 
Lives of the Brain (2011), and Joshua Greene’s Moral Tribes: Emotion, Reason, and the Gap 
Between Us and Them (2013). Proponents of neurolaw, an interdisciplinary field that seeks to 
apply neuroscience to the law, ask whether fMRI scans of the brain might contribute to what 
David Eagleman, in an article in The Atlantic that as of this writing has been shared more than 
seventeen thousand times on Facebook, calls “a more biologically informed jurisprudence” by 
offering judges and juries glimpses into individuals’ neural activity, understood as the biological 
index to their cognitive capacities, and, ultimately, their culpability or inculpability (“The Brain 
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on Trial”). (I can only imagine that Holmes would be pleased to see such an argument expressed 
in The Atlantic). I am unequipped to adjudicate the validity of such claims, but I wish to bring to 
attention how they enable Americans to inquire, as nineteenth-century Americans did, into the 
ethical and spiritual repercussions of emerging ways of understanding human biology.  
How might twenty-first-century Americans navigate the questions posed by the 
application of brain scanning and other techniques to matters of vice and virtue? Hannah Foster 
and Herman Melville might provide some answers. These and other nineteenth-century 
American writers, as I have argued, took physiology and the controversies it provoked as 
opportunities to create imaginative spaces in which readers might discover new worlds of ethical 
and religious experience. In doing so, they positioned fiction as a way to shape readers’ values (a 
function critics already recognize as foundational to seduction narratives and evangelical fiction) 
and to enable readers to work through physiology’s metaphysical implications. For its readers, 
nineteenth-century fiction was thus, like the practices of habit-building and dietary regulation it 
dramatizes, a way to intervene in one’s own moral being. Might fiction-reading be a way to do 
so today? Some, especially in the neurosciences, are beginning to think so.78 Yet I would suggest 
that turning to fiction to sort out the new ethical possibilities offered by neuroscientific ways of 
thinking is a move pioneered in the nineteenth century. 
 
 
 
                                                
78 See especially Kang Lee et al, “Can Classic Moral Stories Promote Honesty in Children?” 
Psychological Science 25.8 (2014): 1630-1636, Gregory S. Burns et al, “Short- and Long-Term 
Effects of a Novel on Connectivity in the Brain,” Brain Connectivity 3.6 (2013): 590-600, and R. 
A. Mar, “The Neural Bases of Social Cognition and Story Comprehension,” Annual Review of 
Psychology 62 (2011): 103-134. 
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